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Current efforts in the United States to reduce toxic chemical releases from facilities rely on 
information disclosure programs such as the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). The disclosure 
intends to help local communities take information-based actions and generate pressure on the 
facilities to reduce emissions. However, depending on residents’ political resources for collective 
action and their education regarding the health risks related to pollution, communities’ pressure 
can vary, and is usually weak in poor, minority, and less educated communities. Facilities may 
react to community pressure after the information disclosure by moving away from or improving 
their environmental performance in the communities with stronger pressure, which usually have a 
high socio-economic status. This can lead to disproportionately high exposure of residents to toxic 
chemicals in those disadvantaged communities, which can aggravate the problem of environmental 
injustice.  
        This dissertation seeks to empirically examine the responses of toxic-releasing facilities to 
community pressure in making their decisions to (re-)locate or to improve their environmental 
performance after the TRI information disclosure. The main body of this dissertation is composed 
of four distinct studies. The first three studies focus on facilities that existed before the TRI and 
continued operating after its first disclosure. The first study examines the effect of community 
socio-economic characteristics on the relocation decisions of facilities. The main results of this 
study show that facilities located in communities with high population density, high income, and 
high educational attainment have a higher likelihood of relocating; they are also observed to 
relocate into communities with low population density, low income, and low educational 
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attainment on average. The next two studies examine the environmental performance of facilities. 
The second study examines the performance of facilities that relocated. The third study examines 
the performance of facilities that decided to stay at their existing location. The main results of these 
two studies show that both facilities that moved to other communities and facilities that stayed in 
original communities choose emission levels based on the characteristics of their locations; they 
are found to generate more emissions in communities with a low socio-economic status. The fourth 
study switches to the new facilities born after the TRI and examines whether their location choice 
and post-siting performance are also affected by the socio-economic characteristics of 
communities. This study shows that new facilities prefer entering communities with low 
population density and low educational attainment; facilities making this choice are also associated 
with high emission levels after siting. This study also shows that income and race of communities 
are not good at explaining the location choice and the post-siting emission levels of facilities after 
the economic factors are controlled for.  
        The findings from this dissertation help to explain the source of environmental injustice 
from the behavior of polluting facilities through their location choice and environmental 
performance after an information disclosure. The findings suggest a distributional impact analysis 
on the environmental disclosure programs to protect the socio-economically disadvantaged 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction  
 
 
Facilities generating toxic chemical releases to local neighborhoods have caused public concerns 
about the risks they pose to human health and environmental quality. Current efforts in the United 
States to reduce toxic releases rely on information disclosure and other incentive-based programs 
that induce facilities to voluntarily reduce releases. The basic tenet of environmental disclosure is 
that publicly available information on the environmental performance of facilities can correct 
informational asymmetries that may exist between facilities and stakeholders such as local 
households, environmental groups, and investors; these parties can use the disclosed information 
to monitor toxic releases of facilities, and based on which, discipline the poor performers through 
channels such as targeted collective action, threat of liabilities for health and environmental 
damages, and reducing investments. One prominent member of the environmental disclosure 
programs in the US is the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). Initiated by the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) of 1986, the TRI discloses information on the toxic 
releases and waste management of facilities in each year since mid-1989. The TRI data has been 
shown to benefit various strategies of communities to act against the polluting facilities and fight 
for improvement of local environmental quality. During the first twenty years, the TRI records a 
dramatic 40% decrease in the national toxic emission level.  
However, the pressure from communities after the information disclosure can vary 
depending on community characteristics. Specifically, factors such as residents’ willingness for 
environmental goods, the number of vulnerable people affected, political resources for collective 
action, and the education regarding the health risks related to pollution can affect the willingness 
and ability of communities to generate pressure on the polluting facilities. This can result in a 
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relatively low level of pressure in the poor, minority, less populated, and less educated 
communities. Facilities may react to the community pressure by moving away from or by 
improving their environmental performance in communities with stronger pressure. This will lead 
to disproportionately high exposure of residents to toxic chemicals in those disadvantaged 
communities, and thus aggravate the problem of environmental injustice. 
        This dissertation seeks to empirically examine the response of toxic-releasing facilities to 
community pressure in making their decision to (re-)locate or to improve environmental 
performance after the TRI information disclosure. The main body of this dissertation consists of 
four related chapters. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I examine the effect of community socio-
economic characteristics on the relocation decisions of facilities and the environmental 
performance of the relocated facilities. In Chapter 4, I examine the effect of community socio-
economic characteristics on the emission reduction of the facilities that decided not to relocate 
with a long time after the TRI disclosure. In Chapter 5, I shift the attention from relocation of old 
facilities to the location choice of new facilities that were born after the TRI. All four chapters use 
detailed facility-level data on the location and toxic chemical releases of over 30,000 facilities, as 
well as census-tract level data on the characteristics of communities. 
         In Chapter 2, I analyze the effects of community socio-economic characteristics on the 
relocation by toxic-releasing facilities. To overcome the reverse causality problem inherent in 
identifying these effects, I use the public disclosure of environmental performance information on 
the facilities through the TRI as a natural experiment. Specifically, residents might “vote with their 
feet” for environmental quality and have migrated in response to the locations of different facilities 
before the facilities’ relocation; in this way, characteristics of the communities with facility movers 
could be inherently different to that of the communities with facility stayers. I estimate the effects 
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of the community characteristics in 1990, the first year after the start of TRI, on the relocation of 
facilities over the following twenty years. Given that people have little access to information about 
facilities’ emissions before the TRI, the community demographics in 1990, as proxies for the 
community pressure at the start of the TRI, are expected to be exogenous to the relocation decisions 
of facilities. I also compare the characteristics of the destination communities of facility movers to 
those of the origin locations. This helps obtain further insights about whether community 
characteristics motivate facilities to relocate.  
        The main contribution of Chapter 2 is to show that the relocation of facilities responds to 
the socio-economic characteristics of their host communities. I find that high population density, 
high income, and high educational attainment of a community have a negative and statistically 
significant effect on the likelihood of relocation by toxic-releasing facilities. These facilities are 
also found to relocate into communities with lower population density, lower income, and lower 
educational attainment on average. The spatial pattern of this relocation shows that facilities do 
respond to community socio-economic characteristics, and this has contributed to a worsening of 
environmental injustice.  
         Studies on relocation of facilities documented evidence on facilities’ response to 
community characteristics on the extensive margin about where to move. But little attention has 
been paid to the intensive margin, about whether facilities will adjust their environmental 
performance in response to their relocation decisions which may change the characteristics of their 
host communities. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I examine the change in toxic emission levels of 
facilities from 1990, the year after the first TRI disclosure, to 2011, in response to the 
characteristics of the communities where they chose to locate. I first examine the adjustment in 
emission levels of the facility movers in response to the difference in the socio-economic 
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characteristics between their moving origin and destination communities. Specifically, I adopt the 
synthetic control method and estimate the causal effect of relocation on the emission level of each 
facility mover; then, I regress the estimated treatment effects on the facilities to the differences in 
the socio-economic characteristics between their moving origins and destinations. This test 
answers whether facilities moving into socio-economically disadvantaged communities would 
degrade their environmental performance. I then examine the change in emission levels from 1990 
to 2011 of the facility stayers as a response to the 1990 characteristics of the communities where 
they stayed. This test answers whether the facility stayers would have different levels of emission 
reduction as a response to the socio-economic characteristics of the communities where they stayed. 
Together, the two tests on the movers and the stayers comprehensively describe the post-relocating 
environmental performance of the toxic-releasing facilities.  
         The main results from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 show that, after the TRI disclosure in mid-
1989, both facilities that moved to other communities and facilities that stayed in original 
communities were choosing toxic emission levels based on the socio-economic characteristics of 
their locations. Facilities relocating into communities with lower educational attainment and lower 
population density were more likely to have higher emissions after moving than those if they had 
not moved. Facilities that stayed in the less educated and less populated communities had less 
emission reduction over years.   
        In Chapter 5, I switch my focus to the new facilities born after the TRI and examine whether 
their location choice and post-siting performance are affected by the community socio-economic 
characteristics. Most existing studies on the location choice of facilities lack a systematic 
theoretical foundation on the choices of control variables and the geographic unit of analyses. This 
may account, at least in part, for their mixed evidence on the environmental injustice hypothesis 
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about whether race and / or income drive the location of toxic-releasing facilities. In Chapter 5 I 
develop a micro-scale location choice framework. It focuses on explaining facilities’ siting 
decisions at a particular stage where they select a site from several neighboring census tracts within 
a few miles. At this stage, facilities are assumed to primarily consider pressure from local 
communities and other factors related to the economic, infrastructure, and geographic conditions 
that only have effects at the local market scale on the profit. This restricted choice set reduces risks 
of omitted variable bias by flattening variations in the unobserved factors that have effects at the 
broad market scale. 
        The main contribution of Chapter 5 is to show that the location choice of facilities born 
after the TRI also responds to the socio-economic characteristics of communities. The results show 
evidence on environmental injustice at the micro scale: toxic facilities prefer entering census tracts 
with low population density and low educational attainment, and facilities with higher propensity 
of doing so have higher emission levels after are located. The results also show that income and 
race of communities do not have a significant effect on the location choice or the post-siting 
emissions of facilities conditional on the effect of economic factors. 
        The findings from this dissertation help to explain the source of environmental injustice 
from the behavior of toxic-releasing facilities in location choice and post-siting performance after 
the TRI information disclosure. The findings suggest a distributional impact analysis on the 
environmental disclosure programs to protect the socio-economically disadvantaged communities, 





CHAPTER 2: Community Pressure and the Spatial Redistribution of Pollution: The Relocation 




The presence of toxic-releasing facilities in populated communities has caused public concern 
about the risks they pose to human health, environmental quality, and property values. Despite 
these risks, toxic releases by facilities are not directly regulated (Currie et al., 2015) and the 
government has relied on information disclosure and other voluntary programs to induce firms 
to reduce these releases voluntarily (Bi and Khanna, 2012; Harrison and Antweiler, 2003; 
Khanna et al., 1998). Publicly available information about the toxic releases from facilities has 
grown following the mandatory reporting of these releases by facilities and the disclosure of the 
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) since 1990. This information has the potential to motivate public 
pressure on toxic-releasing facilities through a variety of channels, such as, targeted collective 
action, threat of liability for health and environmental damages, boycotting the purchase of their 
products and investment in their stock and lobbying politicians for stricter environmental 
legislation and zoning laws.  
A number of studies have examined the potential for information disclosure to lead 
communities, environmental interest groups, consumers, workers and investors to “take matters 
into their own hands” and impose pressure on facilities to reduce their releases (Harrison and 
Antweiler, 2003; Shapiro, 2005). This paper examines the extent to which community pressure, 
in particular, leads facilities to reconsider their location choice and to relocate to other 
communities with lower opposition to toxic releases. Various studies have shown that 
communities with low income, low education, and a high proportion of minorities tended to face 
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more exposure to toxic wastes1. These cross-sectional studies indicate that local pressures have 
influenced the behavior of polluting firms. But these studies do not explain the mechanisms by 
which these environmental disparities may have arisen. These studies also suffer from the 
reverse causality problem arising from households “voting with their feet” for environmental 
quality, as households may migrate in response to the entry of toxic facilities and alter the 
community demographics. As a result, these studies may only be describing the equilibrium 
outcome of the market and cannot tell whether the population characteristics were a consequence 
or the cause of the location choice of toxic facilities. Specifically, migration of households in 
response to the location of toxic facilities can alter community demographics. Banzhaf and 
Walsh (2008) showed that the entry of toxic-releasing facilities in a community was associated 
with a decrease in the local population density over time and with the community becoming 
poorer and less white. 
Recent studies have overcome the reserve causality problem by examining the planned 
locations of hazardous waste generating plants (Hamilton, 1993, 1995b) and the locations of new 
plant births (Wolverton, 2009; De Silva, Hubbard, & Schiller, 2016), which could not affect the 
pre-existing demographics at the locations. These studies differ in the influence of specific 
community characteristics, such as income, race and educational attainment on location choices 
of facilities. There has also been considerable research analyzing the “pollution haven” 
hypothesis in the context of multi-national companies that may locate into developing countries 
to take advantage of their weaker environmental standards. This research also found mixed 
evidence of the effect of regulatory stringency, proxied by pollution abatement expenditures, on 
                                                 
1 See, for example, (Gould, 1986; Greenberg and Anderson, 1984; United Church of Christ, 1987)Commission Racial Justice 




foreign direct investment across countries (Eskeland and Harrison, 2003).2 While these studies 
have examined the “pull” factors influencing a facility’s location decision, there has been no 
work examining the extent to which these factors can lead existing facilities to relocate and 
generate disproportionate exposure of socio-economically disadvantaged communities to toxic 
wastes, leading to the problem of environmental injustice.  
By focusing on relocation decisions by firms instead of de novo entry decisions, this 
research provides richer insights on both the “push” and “pull” factors influencing a facility’s 
location. It enables us to examine not only the factors relevant for attracting toxic facilities but 
also the factors relevant for their departure. Comparing relocation patterns with those for de novo 
entry, provides a more comprehensive understanding of how community pressures can affect the 
distribution of toxic polluters across communities.3 Additionally, analysis of relocation decisions 
allows us to compare existing location choice with the new location choice of a facility and 
thereby control for unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity can be a potential 
problem when studying de novo entry because an unobserved location characteristic that is 
attractive to a particular facility may be correlated with a community characteristic.4 In the case 
of relocation decisions, the fundamental nature of the facility remains unchanged after the move; 
thus, a comparison of community characteristics between the old and new locations reveals how 
the importance of those characteristics has changed, holding other aspects of the facility constant. 
Relocation choices can have significant effects on environmental justice if they are frequent and 
if the toxic emissions of relocating facilities are higher post-relocation.  
                                                 
2 Birg and Voßwinkel (2018) analyze theoretically the relocation of facilities across jurisdictions with differential environmental 
regulation as a function of the quality of the product they produce. 
3 There is some evidence from the broader literature that the relocation of existing facilities responds differently to general 
community characteristics than the location of newborn facilities, in part because relocation takes place in a different stage of a 
facility’s life-cycle (Van Dijk and Pellenbarg, 2000; Holl, 2004). 
4 For example, chemical facilities may value locations in the Gulf coast and in the Mississippi valley. These areas are low-lying 
and may have low income residents because of flooding risk which is not directly related to the location choice of the facilities. 
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We examine the extent to which differential community pressure proxied by community 
socio-economic characteristics pushed toxic-releasing facilities to relocate away from the 
communities where public opposition was strongest after 1990. The TRI disclosure after mid-
1989 provides a natural experiment to examine the effects of the pre-existing (as of 1990) 
community characteristics on the subsequent relocation by the facilities. Though residents were 
often aware prior to that date of the presence of manufacturing facilities in their proximity, they 
lacked knowledge of harmful emissions emanating from those facilities. The advent of the TRI 
resulted in dissemination of such knowledge, increasing the salience of the presence of such 
facilities to residents who were in close proximity. The use of the TRI disclosure as a starting point 
for our analysis mitigates a possible endogeneity problem caused by unobserved confounders, such 
as the opposition of residents against toxic facilities prior to a facility’s initial location decision. 5 
Our analysis also controls for various location-specific economic and regulatory factors and facility-
specific characteristics that can affect relocation decisions. 
We construct a panel dataset for 23,427 facilities existing before 1990 and which reported 
to TRI for at least some years during the 1990 to 2011 period. We first estimate the effects of 
the community characteristics in 1990 on the relocation decision of local toxic facilities over the 
following ten or twenty years. This yields the treatment effect of community pressure induced 
by the provision of the TRI on facility relocation; this treatment effect differs across communities 
with different socioeconomic characteristics. We then investigate the extent to which community 
characteristics (measured in 1990) affect the annual relocation probability as facility 
characteristics and other economic and environmental-related variables evolve. By 
distinguishing between facilities that were reporting to the TRI in 1990 and those that started to 
                                                 
5 To the extent that there is public opposition to toxic-releasing facilities when the entry decision is made, this could affect the 
relocation probabilities of the facilities following entry. 
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report in later years, we examine the effect of community pressure in prospectively inducing 
facilities to relocate if they expected to grow and report to TRI in the future. We also compare 
the characteristics of the destination communities to those of the origin locations to confirm that 
facilities tend to move “down” the community pressure gradient, and to examine the extent to 
which post-TRI relocations worsen environmental injustice. Finally, we examine the change in 
the facilities’ emission level, employment, and emission per employee following relocation to 
obtain further insights about the possible motivation for facilities to relocate. 
We find that the toxic facilities located in a census tract with higher population density 
and a larger share of college educated residents were more likely to relocate; a one percent 
increase in the population density increases the probability of relocation by 0.1%, while an 
increase in the share of college-educated in a census tract by one percentage point increases that 
probability by 1.4%. We also find that anticipated community pressures increased the relocation 
probabilities of facilities that were not reporting in 1990 but increased their emissions in later 
years. Moreover, we find that relocated toxic facilities tend to move into communities with lower 
population, lower income, and lower educational attainment. We also find that relocating 
facilities did not increase their pollution intensity relative to those that did not relocate; however, 
they tended to pollute more because their production levels were growing faster. This is 
particularly true for facilities moving to locations with weaker community pressure. These 
findings provide insights into how the reshuffling of existing toxic facilities across communities 
contributes to worsening environmental injustice following the public disclosure of the TRI. 
To the extent that the community pressures on firms were enabled by the public 
disclosure of the TRI, our research contributes to understanding the potential unintended 
implications of information disclosure programs. We do note however that in the absence of data 
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about relocation choices by facilities prior to the release of the TRI, we do not seek to draw 
conclusions about the effect of information dissemination per se. We do not have the basis for 
projecting relocation decisions in the absence of the disclosure of the TRI. Despite this data and 
methodological limitation, we can provide indirect evidence of the role that information 
disclosure induced community pressure can play in worsening environmental justice. 
 
2.2 Conceptual Framework  
2.2.1 A Stylized Model  
We consider a profit-maximizing facility i (i = 1, 2, ..., I) in location 𝑙0 that is generating toxic 
releases. In the absence of public information about its pollution, residents in the neighborhood 
are expected to be unware or to underestimate a facility’s toxic pollution. At time 𝑡𝑝 , an 
information disclosure program is established and starts to publicly disclose information about the 
magnitude of toxic chemical usage and disposal by facility i and other facilities and generates 
adverse publicity about them (Hamilton, 1995a; US EPA, 2016). The response of local 
communities to this information is likely to vary depending on the composition of the community. 
High income, highly-educated, politically active, and densely populated communities are expected 
to have greater capacity for imposing pressure on the toxic facilities by threatening political and 
regulatory actions and legal liabilities for the damages to health and property values caused by the 
toxic pollutants and to hamper future expansion of their operations (Hamilton, 1993; Hamilton, 
1995b; Wolverton, 2009).  
Facility i can respond to the pressure of its local community 𝑙0 by reducing its toxic releases 
(see evidence in Khanna et al., 1998) or by shutting down the operations at 𝑙0 and relocating to 
some other location 𝑙1 at some time 𝑡 > 𝑡𝑝. Facility i will weigh the costs and benefits of staying 
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in 𝑙0 with those of relocating. The benefits of relocating to various alternative locations depend on 
several factors, including the community pressure that it encounters for emission reduction, the 
benefits from industrial agglomeration, access to output and input markets, and the stringency of 
local environmental regulations. The costs of relocation include the fixed costs due to the 
immobility of fixed assets, the transaction costs of rehiring or relocating employees and 
transporting mobile assets, and the option value of waiting; these costs likely are facility-specific.  
We denote a facility i’s profit 𝜋𝑖𝑙𝑡 at location l at time t by the reduced-form function 
    𝜋𝑖𝑙𝑡 = 𝜋(𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑡, 𝒁𝒍𝒕, 𝑿𝒊𝒍𝒕, 𝒆𝒊𝒍𝒕)            (2.1) 
where 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑡 is the cost to pollution generation imposed on the facility by local community pressure, 
𝒁𝒍𝒕 is a vector of location-specific economic and regulatory factors that affect the revenues and 
costs of operations, 𝑿𝒊𝒍𝒕 is a vector of the facility’s characteristics such as size and pollution level 
that may affect the specific gains and costs of relocation, and 𝒆𝒊𝒍𝒕 includes the unobserved facility- 
and location-specific factors. Facility i is expected to select the profit-maximizing level of 𝑿𝒊𝒍𝒕
∗  
when establishing in location 𝑙0 given 𝑴𝒊𝒍𝟎𝒕 and 𝒁𝒍𝟎𝒕. Location and firm characteristics evolve 
over time. The relevance of specific location characteristics for a facility’s payoff can also change. 
One such source of change is the TRI disclosure. Because of all these changes, facility i can find 
that location 𝑙0 no longer matches its operating requirements even after adjusting 𝑿𝒊𝒍𝟎𝒕 and thus 
may decide to relocate to some more favorable alternative location 𝑙1 at a relocation cost of 𝐶𝑙0𝑙1,𝑡. 
Because 𝐶𝑙0𝑙1,𝑡 can be substantive, a facility will move only in extreme circumstances, i.e., only if 
the move increases its expected net profit. We denote by  𝑟𝑖𝑡 the binary indicator that equals 1 if 
facility i relocates at time t, and equals 0 otherwise, and by 𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗  the expected net benefit of the 






∗ (𝑀𝑙1𝑡, 𝒁𝒍𝟏𝒕, 𝑿𝒊𝒍𝟏𝒕
∗ , 𝒆𝒊𝒍𝟏𝒕) − 𝜋𝑖𝑙0𝑡
∗ (𝑀𝑙0𝑡, 𝒁𝒍𝟎𝒕, 𝑿𝒊𝒍𝟎𝒕
∗ , 𝒆𝒊𝒍𝟎𝒕) − 𝐶𝑙0𝑙1𝑡 > 0
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (2.2) 
We now discuss the relevant factors for our study that are hypothesized to contribute to the 
relocation decision of the facility. These factors include community pressure on toxic polluters, 
other location-specific characteristics, and facility characteristics.  
 
2.2.2 Community Pressure  
Facilities emitting toxic chemical pollutants can impose damages on their neighboring 
communities through various channels. They could generate odors and other nuisances from 
operations (EPA, 1979), increase the risk of accidental releases of hazardous waste,6 raise the 
probability of health problems for local residents (Currie, Davis, Greenstone, and Walker, 2015), 
and lower the local property values (Mastromonaco, 2015). Concerns about these damages can 
lead local residents to publicly oppose the facilities and impose pressures on them to reduce 
emissions that could take the form of bargaining for emission reduction or compensation, social 
ostracism of the facilities’ employees, adverse publicity, and lawsuits (Hamilton, 2005; 
Karkkainen, 2001; MacLean and Orum, 1992; World Bank, 1999). Communities can also pressure 
regulators and local political representatives to tighten the enforcement or monitoring on the 
polluters, which essentially regulates the polluters via formal regulatory pressure (Pargal and 
Wheeler, 1996; Earnhart 2004). These activities represent collective action supported by 
information about the polluters’ emissions and their potential damages. The extent of community 
pressure relies on the communities’ ability to organize collectively and their knowledge and 
evaluation on the potential health risks and decline in property-value caused by being located close 
                                                 
6 An illustrative example is the releases from a Union Carbide plant in West Virginia in 1985. 
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to a toxic releasing facility (Hamilton 1993, 1995b; Shadbegian and Wolverton 2010). Following 
the literature, we expect that the intensity of community pressure is related to the socio-economic 
characteristics of the community. 7 
We consider Income Level and Educational Attainment, of a community as a proxy for its  
willingness to pay for environmental amenities (Hamilton 1995b; Hausman 1993; Roe et al. 2001)  
and expect a community with a higher level of income and educational attainment to impose higher 
pressure on toxic facilities to relocate. Rich and high-educated groups are likely to have higher-
valued properties and more knowledge and ability to access information on the damages caused 
by toxic pollutants. Therefore, they are likely to invest more resources in pressuring the facilities 
to reduce emissions or relocate. We also follow Hamilton (1995b) and De Silva et al. (2016) and 
include Population Density as a proxy for community pressure, given that the “number of 
residents” in a neighborhood is a factor in the legal calculations of net present value of earnings 
streams in communities’ damage claims in the court. We expect a higher community pressure in 
more populated communities.  
        We include Voter Turnout as a proxy for the political activeness of a community, which 
reflects a community’s ability to organize collective action and to pressure regulators (as in 
Hamilton, 1995b; Arora and Cason, 1999; Wolverton, 2009). In the non-Coasian world, the high 
transaction cost of individual bargains makes the political process necessary for negotiations 
between community residents and polluting facilities (Hamilton, 1995b). Communities that are 
more politically active are able to voice their demand for environmental services more strongly 
than otherwise. Therefore, we expect a higher community pressure in communities with higher 
                                                 
7 As noted by Brooks and Sethi (1997) it is preferable to use community socio-economic characteristics instead of more direct 
measurements of pressure, such as the number of protests and law suits against polluters to measure community pressure. These 
direct indicators of pressure are outcomes of the bargaining between polluting facilities and the communities, and depend on 
historical performance, bargaining power and settlements between the facility and the community before public action is 
manifested. These indicators may underestimate the extent of pressure imposed by a community. 
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voter turnout. Some researchers also argue that the communities with more minorities or greater 
ethnic divisions are more difficult to organize collective actions because of unfamiliarity with local 
political process or language barrier (Mohai and Bryant, 1992). Therefore, we also include the 
proportion of minorities (usually measured by the Share of White) and the degree of ethnic division 
of a community 8 as additional proxies to measure community pressure on polluting facilities.  
Existing studies examining the effect of these community characteristics on the location 
choice of toxic facilities find mixed evidence. Hamilton (1995b) shows that hazardous-waste 
generating plants have a lower propensity to expand in large population centers. De Silva et al. 
(2016) also find a negative but insignificant relationship between population size and the 
likelihood of a TRI-reporting facility locating into a community. Wolverton (2009) finds a 
negative effect of income and a positive effect of educational attainment on the propensity of 
newborn facilities to locate in a community, whereas De Silva et al. (2016) find an insignificant 
effect of income and a negative effect of educational attainment.9 Wolverton (2009) also finds that 
communities with higher voter turnout are more likely to attract new toxic facilities, but Hamilton 
(1995b) obtains an opposite finding, that communities with higher voter turnout are less likely to 
observe expansion of hazardous-waste generating plants. These contradictory results suggest that 
characteristics like Income, Educational Attainment and Voter Turnout not only proxy for the 
pressure of local communities on polluters, but also reflect other information like land rent, labor 
cost and residents’ tendency to voice their demand for potential employment opportunities brought 
by toxic-releasing facilities (Wolverton, 2009). Therefore, it is important to consider the results of 
                                                 
8 See Hamilton (1995b), Cole, Elliott, and Khemmarat (2013), De Silva, Hubbard, and Schiller (2016) for examples in the 
literature. We did not show the regression with the index measuring the degree of ethnic division of a community in the 
regression result tables to save space. But we did find an insignificant effect of the degree of ethnic division on the relocation 
propensity of the facilities after controlling for the other factors.  
9 In subsequent work, Schiller et. al. (2018) break up facilities into those that are currently emitting toxic pollutants, and those 
that are in the same industry but are not currently emitting. The prevalence of the former is monotonically increasing in local per 
capita income, while the latter exhibit an inverse U-shaped pattern with respect to local per capita income.   
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different proxy variables jointly when evaluating the effect of the community pressure on the 
location of facilities (Arora and Cason, 1999). It is also important to control for the confounding 
effect of other factors that may influence the relocation decision of facilities and are correlated 
with the community characteristics.  
 
2.2.3 Location-specific Characteristics 
We control for various location characteristics that can explain the relocation decision of toxic-
releasing facilities. In addition to the effects of community pressure, the profitability of operating 
a facility at some location can also be influenced by the stringency of local environmental 
regulations and the local economic conditions. These factors can influence the facility’s pollution 
abatement and production costs.  
Existing environmental regulations, either targeted at toxic chemicals or other regulated 
pollutants, can lead to inspections and penalties by local environmental agencies on a toxic-
releasing facility. Existing or anticipated threats can also increase the facility compliance costs by 
requiring the adoption of a costly environmental management system or specific technologies 
(Khanna and Anton, 2002). These additional costs can lower profits and lead polluters to relocate 
to places with less stringent regulations. We use the Attainment Status of a county to the National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) as a proxy for the environmental regulatory stringency 
on a facility. The Clean Air Act (CAA) requires counties with a non-attainment status to be 
subjected to additional controls, and that includes forcing polluting plants in those counties to 
comply with a more stringent emission standard and use cleaner but more expensive 
technologies. 10  These requirements lower profits and make those counties less attractive to 
                                                 




relocating facilities, as is shown by List, McHone, and Millimet (2003). Becker and Henderson 
(2000) also found a smaller number of new manufacturing plants born in non-attainment counties.  
Economic conditions such as the availability and cost of labor and access to suppliers can 
also affect the desirability of specific locations. The cost of labor is an important determinant of 
the production cost of manufacturing firms and has been found to be a significant factor 
influencing plants’ location choice (Levinson, 1996a). Using the average Wage Rate of production 
workers to measure the labor cost, Bartik (1985) and Wolverton (2009) find a negative relationship 
between the level of local labor cost and the propensity of a toxic-releasing plant to locate in a 
community. Another relevant factor is the density of existing toxic facilities in a community, as it 
correlates with local agglomeration benefits such as easier access to suppliers and an industrially 
skilled labor pool (Puga, 2010), and also signals relative acceptability of pollution in an area 
(Wolverton, 2009). De Silva et al. (2016) shows that new toxic facilities in Texas tend to locate 
into census tracts with a larger number of pre-existing toxic facilities. We adopt the De Silva et al. 
(2016) measure of industrial density by using the Number of Existing Toxic Facilities in a 
community.    
 
2.2.4 Facility Characteristics 
The relocation decision of a facility is also be affected by its ability to bear the relocation cost and 
to benefit from the move, which are both are to a large extent facility-specific and depend on its  
characteristics (Grant et al., 2010; Holl, 2004; Schmenner, 1980). We consider three facility 
characteristics that may affect the costs and benefits of relocation.  
                                                 
CAA requires the EPA to assign an attainment status for each of the variables separately. We treat a county as “non-attainment” 
in this analysis when either of the six criteria pollutants shows non-attainment because we only use the attainment status as a 
measurement on the general regulatory pressure on the facilities and do not focus on the effect of one criteria pollutant. Most of 
the facilities emitting toxic chemicals also generate emission of the criteria pollutants and thus could subjected to the regulation 
of CAA. However, we did not find any specific relationship between the toxic chemical releases and criteria pollutant releases.   
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The first factor is Size. Small facilities typically have few employees, a simple organization, 
and few fixed production assets. These characteristics suggest a low relocating cost: it is easier to 
hire and train new workers, replace equipment, and search for an appropriate destination site since 
more sites could potentially accommodate the facility (McCann, 2001). Smaller facilities may also 
have lower local support to prevent relocation to avoid loss of jobs because they have a small 
number of employees (Pargal et al., 1997).  Van Dijk and Pellenbarg (2000) examine the migration 
of firms in the Netherland and find that small-sized firms (measured by the number of employees) 
have a higher tendency to relocate. Brouwer, Mariotti, and van Ommeren (2004) survey firms in 
21 European countries and also find a negative relationship between firms’ size and their relocation 
tendency.  
The second factor is the Financial Health of the parent firm. Firms that are not financially 
strong can have a larger incentive to move their manufacturing into locations with lower 
production costs. Many studies have found that financial markets reacted positively in the stock 
price when a business announced relocation with a goal of cost-savings or increased operational 
efficiency (Chan, Gau, and Wang, 1995; Ghosh, Rodriguez, and Sirmans, 1995). However, a weak 
financial standing can also limit the ability of businesses to pay for the (often substantial) 
relocating cost if it cannot obtain external finance for them, and limit the likelihood of relocation 
(van Dijk and Pellenbarg, 2000). The two opposing effects result in an ambiguous effect of the 
financial health on the propensity of a facility to relocate (Hu et al., 2008).  
The third factor is the Toxic Emission Level. Direct community pressure and indirect 
regulatory pressure are likely to be stronger on facilities with larger toxic releases. Many studies 
have shown that facilities with larger toxic releases suffered a heavier financial loss after the TRI 
disclosure (Hamilton, 1995a; Konar & Cohen, 1997; Khanna et al., 1998). Because relocation can 
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be an alternative to emission abatement as a way to reduce local community pressure and 
regulatory scrutiny, large polluters could have a strong incentive to relocate. But on the other hand, 
large polluters are also more able to resist community pressure and counter residents’ and workers’ 
claims (Cable, Shriver, and Mix, 2008). Equally importantly, large polluters may be subject to 
higher costs of relocation, not least because there are fewer locations which could be suitable 
physically and whose residents would be willing to accommodate them. Therefore, we expect a 
more complex relationship between the toxic emission level and relocation propensity. 
 
2.3 Empirical Model  
Our empirical model builds on equation (2.2) and predicts relocation, 𝑟𝑖𝑡, using a reduced-form 
discrete choice model with vectors of community characteristics  𝑴𝒍𝟎𝒕 , other location-specific 
factors 𝒁𝒍𝟎𝒕, and facility characteristics 𝑿𝒊𝒍𝟎𝒕 as exogenous variables to explain the likelihood of 
relocation by facility i from location 𝑙0 at time t. The underlying latent variable, 𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗ , is given by  
𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝑴𝒍𝟎𝒕 + 𝜸𝟏𝒁𝒍𝟎𝒕 + 𝜸𝟐𝑿𝒊𝒍𝟎𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒍𝟎𝒕         (2.3) 
where 𝒆𝒊𝒍𝟎𝒕  is a disturbance term and 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 1 if 𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0  and zero otherwise. The main difference 
between this specification and the framework described in Section 2.2 is that destination 
characteristics and relocation costs are absent from equation 2.3. Destination characteristics are 
only available for the subset of facilities that did relocate (and are used in Section 2.7). To arrive 
at specification (2.3), the implicit assumption is that the expected payoff in the best alternative 
location and the cost of relocation are both linear functions of current location and facility 
characteristics (possibly with zero slopes with respect to some variables).11 Then, the estimated 
                                                 
11 This linear relationship can contain a “disturbance” term. We implicitly assume that the firm relocates based on the expected 
payoff in the best location, not the actual payoff based on the characteristics of the chosen location.   
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coefficient for each of the variables in equation (2.3) is the contribution of that variable to the net 
payoff of moving to the best alternative location (that is, the payoff in the best alternative location 
minus the cost of relocation minus the payoff in the current location). It is in this sense that our 
analysis is reduced-form; we interpret our results accordingly. We next describe each variable set, 
before returning to the estimation of our empirical model.  
We define a community as a census tract and a ``relocation’’ as a move by a facility across 
census tracts or counties (depending on specification). The community characteristics (𝑴𝒍𝒕) as 
proxies for the community pressure are also measured at the census tract level (except for voter 
turnout which is measured at the county level). We measure Population Density by the total 
population per square mile, Income by per capita income in thousands of dollars, and Educational 
Attainment by the share of residents with a bachelor or higher degree. Compared to other narrow 
geographical units such as zip codes, the census tract has relatively stable boundaries over time 
(Been and Gupta, 1997) and therefore can be used to compare community characteristics 
consistently over years. Census tract level data also provide a reasonable approximation to the 
neighborhood characteristics of the area directly affected by the toxic releases of facilities and thus 
of the geographic area within which a facility might experience the effects of pressure from the 
local community.12 We cluster standard errors at the census tract level to adjust for the non-
independence in facilities’ behavior in the same location due to the potential demonstration effect 
among collocated facilities on environmental management, knowledge spillovers that may affect 
relocation (Gray and Shadbegian, 2007), and other common location-specific factors.  
                                                 
12
 Although Currie et al. (2015), notes that releases of the hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) monitored by the EPA since 1998 affect 
the local ambient air quality within a 1-mile radius circle around the facility. Public concerns about toxic pollution can spillover to 
adjacent areas, even across cities and regions, through the media reports and political activism (Hamilton 2005). A census tract, 
which is typically larger than a 1-mile radius circle is likely to provide the appropriate scale to capture public opposition to toxic 
releasing facilities, but it might be too fine in terms of spatial resolution in urban areas where census tracts can be much smaller.  
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The location-specific economic and regulatory characteristics (𝒁𝒍𝟎𝒕) as well as the Voter 
Turnout are measured at the county-level because of data restrictions. However, as Hamilton 
(1995b) has pointed out, the relevant geography for a firm’s labor inputs is broader than a census 
tract and can extend to a county or broader region.13 Because of the coarseness of the county-level 
data, we examine the cross-county and within-county relocations separately, and only include the 
county-level explanatory variables in the regressions explaining the cross-county moves. The 
analysis of within county moves is particularly important because they are clearly not driven by 
regulatory or market considerations, since these are largely invariant within a county.  
The elements of (𝑿𝒊𝒍𝟎𝒕) are all characteristics measured at the facility-level. We measure 
the Size of facilities using the number of employees and the Financial Health of facilities using 
the PayDex Score, a credit score similar to the FICO score for individuals but measured based on 
the payment history of businesses.14 Our data provide the max and min values of the PayDex score 
of a business in each year, with a low PayDex score indicating a higher probability of delayed 
payment of debt.15 We use the maximum PayDex score to control for the status of a facility’s 
payment capacity and additionally include the difference between the max and min as another 
proxy to control for the variation in the score which represents short-run volatility in the firm’s 
finances.16 For the Toxic Emission Level, we use the total toxic releases generated by aggregating 
the releases of each chemical reported to TRI by the facility. We do not weigh chemicals by 
                                                 
13 The average home-to-work commuting distance (one-way) of the US working class is about 15 miles according to the US 
Census in 2000. This distance is larger than the length of most census tracts’ radius. Facilities could also compensate employees 
for house moving. Therefore, the available labor pool for a facility should not be restricted to the local census tract.  
14 Some studies in the literature (e.g. Nakosteen & Zimmer, 1987) use the scales of both employment and sales as the measure of 
business size, in order to control for the input and output dimensions of a facility’s operations. However, our data only have a 
small portion of facilities with independently reported sales data; for the rest, their sales data were estimated from the 
employment data. This reduces the value of including sales as an additional proxy for Size in our analysis. 
15 A PayDex score of 80 indicates an on-time payment. A score higher than 80 means a payment ahead of the due date. Details of 
the methods for calculating the PayDex score can be found at https://www.nav.com/business- credit-scores/dun-bradstreet-
paydex/. 
16 It is possible that the level the score can be affected by strategic behavior of firms, which are weighing short-term costs of 
delayed payments to achieve financial stability in the longer run. 
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toxicity following the results from Arora and Cason (1999) who find that most chemicals on the 
TRI list have similar toxicity, and that the response of facilities’ total releases to the local 
community demographics is not sensitive to the weighting scheme. The Toxic Emission Level is 
left-censored because the TRI program only requires facilities to report if their emissions of a 
chemical exceed a threshold. We treat the missing values in the Toxic Emission Level as zero but 
add a binary indicator Zero-Emission in the regressions so that these facilities do not impact our 
estimates of the marginal effect of emissions on firm behavior above the threshold. This variable 
also accounts for the possibility that facilities that are not emitting in a particular year (or period) 
are qualitatively different than those that are emitting. Because emissions levels differ markedly 
across facilities, with the largest emitters emitting many times the level of the typical emitter, we 
use a linear spline to allow the Toxic Emission Level to enter the model in a flexible manner and 
allow the emission level to have a nonlinear effect on the relocation propensity of facilities.   
In the specification described by equation (2.3), the coefficient vector 𝜷 is of primary 
interest. It predicts the direction of the relationship between the community characteristics 𝑴𝒍𝒕 and 
the likelihood of facility relocation. An important concern in identifying 𝜷 is the possibility of 
reverse causality, as households may “vote with their feet” in response to the presence of toxic 
facilities, so that location demographics are determined by facility siting decisions rather than vice 
versa (Tiebout, 1956). We avoid this problem by using the 1990 value of the community 
demographics, 𝑴𝒍𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟎, to explain relocations after 1990 so that the demographic characteristics 
predate the relocation decision of facilities and can be treated as exogenous. To examine the 
heterogeneity of 𝜷 between heavy and light polluters, we also include in some specifications the 
interaction of the Toxic Emission Level with the community characteristics 𝑴𝒍𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟎.  
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We estimate two versions of the model in equation (2.3) via logit regression. First, we 
explain a facility’s cumulative probability of relocation over a period after the first TRI disclosure. 
The model uses 𝑴𝒍𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟎  and other covariates evaluated at 1990 to predict the likelihood of 
relocating within T years after 1990. We set the value of T at 5, 10 and 20 years. Defining by 𝑅𝑖𝑇 




) = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝑴𝒍𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟎 + 𝜸𝟏𝑿𝒊𝒍𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟎 + 𝜸𝟐𝒁𝒍𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟎 + 𝝀𝒔𝒍 + 𝝀𝒌𝒊          (2.4) 
The unit of observation is the individual facility; thus, this regression is of a cross-sectional nature. 
The model includes state fixed effects, denoted as 𝝀𝒔𝒍 , to control for the unobserved state 
characteristics such as local tax policies, transportation networks, and amenities that have been 
shown in the literature to influence facilities’ relocation decision. We did not use fixed effects at a 
finer spatial scale because many districts below the state level do not experience any facility 
relocation during the sampling period, and as a result, adding county or lower-level dummies 
would effectively eliminate a large part of our sample. We also include industry fixed effects 𝝀𝒌𝒊 
to control for unobserved industry-specific differences in business relocation.  
We then estimate a panel model that explains the annual probability of relocation and 
which adds time variation for some of the covariates. The community characteristics 𝑴𝒍𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟎 are 
still measured in 1990 given that most of these characteristics are only available in census years, 
and interpolating values would be subject to the reverse causality concern.17 This model is given 
by:  
                                                 
17 Nonetheless, there is remarkable stability in these variables across consecutive censuses. We regressed each of variable on its 
10-year lags, and found that the coefficients of the lags are quite close to unity: 0.97 for population density, 1.01 for educational 
attainment, and 0.90 for the share of white. The smallest coefficient is that for per capita income has a coefficient at 0.69, which 
means the 1990 income level may have a smaller explanatory power for relocations ten years later. Note that interpolated figures 
use the future values of these variables, which is inappropriate if they are determined by firm relocation decisions. However, 







) = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝑴𝒍𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟎 + 𝜸𝟏𝑿𝒊𝒍𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜸𝟐𝒁𝒍𝒕−𝟏 + 𝝀𝒔𝒍 + 𝝀𝒌𝒊 + 𝝀𝒕     (2.5) 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 in the panel model is a binary indicator of whether a facility i relocated in year t.
18 The 
facility-specific (𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏) and other location-specific (𝒁𝒍𝒕−𝟏) characteristics are time varying and 
lagged by one year since relocation decisions are executed with a lag. We also include year fixed 
effects 𝝀𝒕 to control for the influence of unobserved year-specific events (e.g. the 2008 financial 
crisis which was followed by a sharp increase in the relocation rate of facilities over several years).  
 
2.4 Data and Sample  
The sample consists of manufacturing facilities that reported to the TRI at least once during 1990 
to 2011 and also have their location data collected by the Duns and Bradstreet (DB) database over 
the same period. The Duns and Bradstreet data are obtained from the National Establishment Time-
Series (NETS) database (Walls, 2011) which did an annual snapshot of the DB data. The NETS 
database provides information on the location and relocation history, size, industry, subsidiary 
status, and other characteristics of the business establishments from 1990 to 2011. It identifies 
relocation by comparing the address of a facility in year t and year t + 1 and sets relocation at time 
t if the census tract of the addresses of the two years are different. The TRI data provide facility-
level information about the amount of toxic chemical releases, the facility name, address, and 
industry SIC code in each year since mid-1989, which was the first year the TRI was disclosed to 
the public. Not all of the existing facilities in our sample reported to the TRI when it was first 
disclosed; 36% of the facilities in our sample began reporting to the TRI after 1990.   
                                                 
18 We use all records of the facility stayers and the records of the facility movers before moving to predict the relocation of facilities. 
This model is similar to a hazard model with a probability of move that is independent of the facility’s age (a hazard model also 
has a different assumption on the error term in the latent variable model). We did not estimate a duration model because we have 




We merge the TRI and the NETS data by matching their common information on the 
facilities’ name, address, and 8-digit SIC code. Of the full set of 51,620 facilities reporting to the 
TRI during the sampling period, we were able to match 70.1% with the NETS data.19 Of the 
remaining facilities, we dropped the ones born after 1990, since their initial location choice was 
affected by the availability of TRI data, which may also impact the need for subsequent relocation. 
We also dropped the facilities with missing data for the locations where they were sited. As 
compared to the sample of all facilities that have ever reported to TRI, the facilities in our sample 
have a similar mean and median of toxic releases, and also similar values at other percentiles.  
The data on population density, per capita income, college degree, and racial composition 
are obtained from the US Census. We use the 1990 values as explained earlier. The data on voter 
turnout are obtained from the Dave Leip’s Atlas of the US presidential election, and the data on 
Wage Rate, Employment Level, and Attainment Status are obtained from the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (QCEW) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the EPA Greenbook, 
respectively. These datasets as well as the US Census data are merged with the TRI using 
geographic coordinates and the county FIPS code corresponding each facility.  
In the final sample, we have an unbalanced panel containing 23,427 toxic facilities, 1,554 
of which relocated across census tracts but within a county and 1,540 of which relocated across 
counties in some year from 1991 to 2010 (i.e. a total relocation rate of 13.2%). The locations of all 
facilities cover 13,376 census tracts in 2,219 counties. Summary statistics of the explanatory 
variables are shown in Table 2.1, which also compares the values for relocated and non-relocated 
                                                 
19 The TRI does not track facilities over their lifetime. The TRIFID, which is the identification number for each TRI-reported 
facility in the database, is attached to locations instead of facilities, will change when a facility relocates, and can be reassigned to 
another facility if one is established in the same location. We thus cannot identify the number of owner-specific facilities in the 
TRI dataset using its system of identification. There are 51,620 TRIFIDs in the raw TRI data from 1990 to 2011. Technical 
details about this identification system and on the methods for merging the data are provided in Appendix A. Further information 
is available from the authors upon request.  
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facilities. All variables are evaluated at their 1990 values, since some facilities stay in the sample 
for different number of years and others change locations during the period of study.  
  Table 2.1 shows that relocation is more likely to occur in communities with higher 
population density, income level, educational attainment, and also higher propensity to be in non-
attainment to the NAAQS. The wage rate and employment level are also on average higher in the 
communities of the relocated facilities. However, the share of white and the number of existing 
TRI facilities in those communities are lower. Table 2.1 also shows that relocated facilities are on 
average smaller and emit less than non-relocated facilities, whereas their emission intensity with 
respect to the labor inputs are not significantly different. Finally, relocated facilities tend to have 
lower and more volatile PayDex score, which indicate a relatively unstable financial status.  
 
2.5 Results 
Table 2.2 presents the results that explain the cumulative relocation probability of a facility within 
T years after 1990. Columns (1) to (4) show the results for T = 10 and Columns (5) to (8) show 
the results for T = 20.20 We find robust and statistically significant evidence for a positive effect 
of Population Density and Educational Attainment, two proxies for the local community pressure, 
on the likelihood of facility relocation. The effect of another proxy, Income Level, is also found to 
be positive and statistically significant on the likelihood of a facility relocation within 10 years but 
not significant for relocation within 20 years. The effect of Share of White is not statistically 
significant in most specifications. This accords with the findings from Hamilton (1995b) and 
Wolverton (2009) and provides no support for the hypothesis of discrimination by the owners of 
toxic facilities against minorities in their location decisions. We also do not find a significant effect 
                                                 
20 The results for T=5 are qualitatively similar to those reported here, but based on a much smaller number of relocations. They 
are omitted for brevity, but are available upon request.  
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of Voter Turnout on the likelihood of relocation. Recalling that voter turnout and other location 
characteristics are measured at the county level and thus exhibit no variation for within-county 
moves, we split relocations into cross-county and within-county moves and run the regressions 
separately on the two subsamples.21 In the results shown in Table 2.3, Voter Turnout shows a 
negative effect on the likelihood of a cross-county relocation, and the effect is significant at the 
90% level for relocation within 20 years. The negative sign and the weak significance reflect the 
complicated impact of political activism on the relocation of toxic facilities, as discussed earlier. 
Table 2.4 presents the results from the panel model that explain the annual probability of 
relocation. The results with respect to Population Density, Educational Attainment, and Share of 
White are consistent in terms of signs and significance with their counterparts in Tables 2.2 and 
2.3. The effects of Income Level and Voter Turnout narrowly miss being statistically significant. 
We use the coefficients in column (2) and calculate the marginal effects of Population Density and 
Educational Attainment on the relocation propensity of facilities at the means of other variables. 
We find that a 1% increase in the population density and the share of high-educated residents of a 
census tract in 1990 increases the annual relocation probability of a toxic facility by 0.1% and 
1.4 %, respectively. These effects, compared with the total relocation rate of 13.2% in the sample, 
are economically significant. The result shows that populated and high-educated communities are 
more likely to drive polluters out and suggests that local community pressure has a significant 
impact on the relocation decision of toxic-releasing facilities.  
Our results provide only very weak support for the notion that facilities with larger volume 
of emissions are more likely to relocate due to community pressure compared to those with 
                                                 
21 Facilities making cross-country moves are completely eliminated from the data in the analysis of within county moves. This 
introduces some truncation bias in this analysis, but it is of small magnitude since only a small fraction of facilities relocate 
across county lines. There is no truncation bias in the analysis of across county moves.  
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emitting a smaller level of emissions. We construct linear splines of the Toxic Emission Level with 
four knots. The first knot of the spline is set at the 65th percentile of the emission distribution, a 
high value, because the distribution is highly right-skewed; the other three knots are at the 75th, 
90th, and 95th percentiles. In the results shown in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3, we find that most of 
the spline slopes are not statistically significant. There are only some significant and negative 
effects for the 90th to 95th percentile and a weak positive significant effect for the 75th to 90th 
percentiles on within-county relocation. Similar results are obtained for the panel regression 
counterparts of these regressions. These results provide weak evidence that the relocation 
probability is somewhat higher for the large polluters but not the largest ones, which might be 
constrained by larger relocation costs. There is, however, some other minimal evidence showing 
that the largest polluters have a greater propensity to relocate when facing greater community 
pressure. Table 2.5 presents the results of the regressions that include the interactions between the 
spline of the Toxic Emission Level and the community demographic factors. Results in Column 
(4), (11), and (12) show that facilities in the 95th and higher percentile of the emission level are 
more likely to relocate within a county if they are located in areas with high Population Density 
or with high Educational Attainment. 22  These moves are important because they cannot be 
explained by access to markets or inputs. 
While the linear splines of the emission level mostly show insignificant effects, the Zero-
Emission dummy shows a positive and significant effect in all specifications. The positive sign 
indicates that non-polluting facilities or facilities with emissions below the TRI reporting threshold 
are more likely to relocate. However, this does not necessarily signal a higher sensitivity of small 
polluters to community pressure, as the interaction terms between Zero-Emission and the 
                                                 
22 The interaction of the spline with the demographic characteristics is done one demographic characteristic at a time to reduce 
collinearity. Even so, the results are generally not significant. 
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community characteristics in Table 2.5 show little significance. We find that these facilities have 
lower employment and sales than polluting facilities, which means they have a relatively small 
production scale with potential for growth (and need for a different site). These producers are also 
likely to have smaller costs of relocation because of their negligible current pollution levels which 
imply a smaller liability to clean-up toxic pollution at the original site (Levinson, 1996b) and 
possible ease of obtaining the necessary permits to locate at a new site. These factors could explain 
the higher propensity of small polluters to relocate.  
The county Attainment Status, as a proxy for the local environmental regulatory pressure, 
consistently shows a positive impact on the likelihood of relocation across county lines. The Wage 
Rate and the Employment level both show a positive correlation with relocation, indicating that 
facilities are more likely to leave from locations with high labor costs. Facilities that are moving 
within counties are also less likely to relocate from a census tract that has a higher density of 
existing toxic facilities23. Among the facility characteristics, the number of employees shows a 
negative and statistically significant effect on both the cross-county and within-county relocation 
of facilities, consistent with the literature that shows a lower relocation tendency of large-sized 
facilities that have a heavy burden of relocating costs. We also find in the panel regression that the 
PayDex score (Max – Min) and PayDex score (Max), both serving to measure Financial Health, 
show a significant positive and negative effect on the likelihood of relocation. This implies that 
facilities with unstable and low business credits have a higher propensity to relocate. 
We now investigate the possibility that facilities respond to TRI reporting prospectively, 
i.e., their relocation propensity is affected by the anticipation of reporting to the TRI rather than 
                                                 
23 We also consider the effect of land rent on the relocation of facilities. We use the median value of owner-occupied housing in a 
census tract as a proxy for land rent and do a robustness check on the results in Column (2) Table 4. The results are shown in 
Table C1 in the Appendix. We find that facilities in the tracts with higher housing value are more likely to relocate. The marginal 
effect of population density and educational attainment does not change in a statistically significant scale after adding this proxy 
for land rent in.  
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current inclusion in the TRI. We therefore identify the first year in which each facility in our 
sample reported to the TRI; in prior years, its emissions were below the threshold for the reported 
chemicals.24 We define an indicator variable that takes a value of one for the years preceding a 
facility’s first report to the TRI. For those years, the facility would be “invisible” to those browsing 
the TRI database. These facilities will become visible at a later point in time, when they exceed 
the TRI reporting threshold for one or more chemicals and are included in the TRI database. We 
added this variable with and without its interactions with the size of the facility and selected 
demographic characteristics to the panel data specifications in Column (2) and (4) of Table 2.4.25  
In these regressions, the coefficient of this indicator variable and its interaction compares the 
annual relocation probability of facilities that have not yet ever reported but will report in the future 
with that of the facilities that are not currently reporting, have reported in the past, and may or may 
not report in the future. This interpretation of the coefficient of this indicator variable follows from 
the observation that we also include a dummy variable for facilities that are not reporting now, 
regardless of the prior and future reporting studies. The results are presented in Table 2.7. The 
point estimate for the indicator for not yet having reported is positive, and the effect stronger for 
denser and more educated localities. Facilities that are not yet “on the radar” but anticipate that 
they will be in the future should indeed be more likely to depart from high community pressure 
locations compared to facilities whose emissions have dropped below the threshold and may not 
go above it again. If firms are forward looking, the former group would expect higher future levels 
of community pressure for its activities compared to the later. With relocation taking place on the 
                                                 
24 The list of included chemicals was expanded in 2001 to include lead and lead compounds, which led to the inclusion of 
approximately 3% of our sample. In 1998, seven industries were added to TRI, including metal mining, coal mining, electric 
utilities, affecting the inclusion of another 3% of our sample in that year. Both additions to the database operate in the same 
fashion as increases in emissions above the reporting level: they were partially anticipated future inclusions of facilities that were 
not included in prior years.    
25 Since the indicator variable on reporting history is time varying, using it in the cross-section regressions is not meaningful.   
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basis of future payoffs, it is the expected pressure that matters, not any pressure that the facility 
has faced in the past. 
 
2.6 Comparison between Origin and Destination Locations 
A relocating facility could in principle move to any location in the United States. But quite clearly, 
a firm does not consider all 74,000+ census tracts in the US as possible destinations; even if it did, 
formulating and estimating a suitable discrete choice model with that many alternatives would be 
a daunting exercise.26 In the absence of information of about each facility’s choice set or about 
how these choice sets are determined, we adopt a different approach based on the observations that 
(i) a moving facility relocates if it derives a higher payoff from being in the new location than 
remaining in the old one, and (ii) there is a sufficiently large number of possible destinations that 
the choice set can be approximated by a continuum with respect to the relevant location 
characteristics we consider in our analysis. Suppose the advent of the TRI changed the trade-off 
between a community characteristic associated with higher community pressure and the location’s 
other characteristics by making that characteristic “more expensive.” Then, we would expect the 
optimal bundle of characteristics in the new location will have less of the community features that 
are now more expensive. Of course, not all facilities would choose to move to the new optimal 
location, because of the presence of fixed costs. But those that do choose to move because the 
benefits outweigh the costs (possibly for reasons unrelated to environmental considerations), 
would “buy” a location with less of the expensive characteristics.27   
                                                 
26 Discrete choice methods for location choice, such as those using a conditional logit model, are far more conceptually appealing 
and computationally tractable for studies that focus on a narrower geographic scope (e.g. List et al., 2003). 
27 Molloy and Shan (2013) have adopted a similar reasoning when analyzing the impact of household relocation decisions in the 
face of higher fuel prices. 
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Based on this reasoning, we compare the values of each of the five community 
demographics and the Attainment Status in the new versus the old locations via pairwise t-tests 
and identify those characteristics whose value has decreased. To examine the heterogeneity in the 
destination choices among the facilities, the t-test on the differences is conducted separately for 
the small polluters, recognized as those with no TRI reported emission before moving, and the 
polluters with positive reported emission. Table 2.8a presents the results. We find that facilities 
are on average relocating into communities with lower population density, lower income level, 
and lower propensity of being non-attainment under NAAQS, especially for the cross-county 
movers. This relocation tendency is stronger for the small polluters, which also relocate into 
communities with lower educational attainment and lower voter turnout. In contrast, large polluters 
are found to relocate into communities with higher educational attainment, and higher voter 
turnout. Facilities are also found to relocate into communities with a higher share of white residents.  
The above results show that for large polluters, some characteristics associated with higher 
community pressure have smaller values in the new locations, but not all of them do. This could 
be due to two possible reasons. One is that these characteristics are associated with higher benefits 
for large facilities, compared to earlier years. For example, large facilities may be more complex 
and require a more highly trained workforce, or may obtain special incentives to choose a particular 
location, explaining their pattern of relocation towards locations with higher educational 
attainment and voter turnout. Another possibility is that the choice set is not as dense in terms of 
the combination of characteristics, especially for large facilities that have more stringent siting 
requirements, e.g., infrastructure and access to suppliers. Thus, their location choice involves 
trade-offs between the various observable characteristics. To address the second possibility, we 
construct an index score that integrates all the five proxies in one statistic to examine the “overall” 
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effect of community pressure on the location choice of the toxic facilities. The statistic is based on 
the premise that, even though a facility cannot choose any value of all individual characteristics at 
its new location, its set of choices is continuous in the index statistic, i.e., it is continuous after we 
allow for trade-offs between the characteristics. We take the estimated coefficients of the 
community characteristics (?̂?) from Column (2) of Table 2.4 as weights, and calculate the location 
score as the weighted summation of the level of those characteristics for the relocating origins 
(?̂?𝑴𝒍𝟎) and destinations (?̂?𝑴𝒍𝟏). Table 2.8b presents the pairwise comparisons between the origin 
and destination scores. We find that both small and large polluters are on average relocating into 
communities with significantly lower score for community pressure. The only exception are large 
polluters moving across counties, for which the change is not statistically significant, possibly for 
the reasons discussed earlier in this paragraph.  
 
2.7 Comparison of Facility Performance Pre- and Post- Relocation 
An open question related to our findings is whether relocation is associated with changes in the 
environmental performance of facilities. We briefly explore this issue using pairwise t-tests to 
examine the change in the facilities’ emission level, employment, and emission per employee 
following relocation. Because emissions are somewhat volatile, and because they may be 
transiently affected by the relocation process, we use the average of three years following the post-
relocation year and the average of the three years preceding the pre-relocation year in making the 
comparisons.28 Columns (1) to (3) of Table 2.9 show the changes in levels of those performance 
                                                 
28 When a facility has moved less than four years before the start or end of our sample, we use all available years to calculate the 
facility’s employment, emissions, and emissions per employee. This happens for 23% of the relocated facilities. However, we did 
not use the facilities with only one-year data before or after moving (8%) when calculating the figures reported in Table 2.9 because 




outcomes, while Columns (4) to (6) show these changes in logs.29 We calculate the changes by 
subtracting the value of an outcome in the destination location by its value in the original location. 
We also conduct the test separately for small and large polluters, partitioned on the basis of their 
pre-move emission levels.  
Comparisons of emissions of a facility across locations involve a simultaneous comparison 
across time, in fact one that spans 9 years given that we use multi-year averages and omit the years 
adjacent to the relocation year. Therefore, any secular trends in emissions might be mistaken for 
changes due to the relocation. A proper comparison would be of a difference-in-difference nature, 
which we perform by computing changes in these variables from placebo moves. For each facility 
that has not moved, we randomly assign a hypothetical “moving” year and compute the “change” 
in its emissions and employment around that year in the same manner that we would have if the 
facility had moved. We observe from these placebo moves that facilities tend to reduce emissions 
and employment over time, and also reduce emissions per employee; these trends are not surprising 
given the US trend towards more automated and cleaner industrial facilities. This pattern is not 
present for the facilities that are not initially reporting any emissions. Given the zero-lower bound, 
the emissions of these facilities cannot possibly go down and may go up; these facilities are also 
relatively small to begin with and thus do not exhibit any reduction in employment. Because of 
the dispersion in the size and emissions of facilities, the figures in levels exhibit relatively large 
                                                 
29 Some facilities report zero emissions for some year during the window used for calculating changes in emissions. These facilities 
constitute count for 6.7% of the sample (N = 210), and all observations involving them have been dropped when computing the 
figures for Columns (4) and (6). Facilities that do not report to the TRI because their emissions are below the reporting threshold 
constitute a larger portion of our data; observations involving them exceed 60% of our data, and thus it is not practical to eliminate 
all of them. Instead, we assume (but only for the purpose of Table 2.9) that their emissions level is at the reporting threshold of 0.5 
thousand pounds. For consistency of calculations in this table, we did the same when calculating ∆ Emis and ∆ Emis per Emp. This 
substitution may lead to an upward bias in ∆ Emis, ∆ Emis per Emp, ∆ log(Emis) and ∆ log (Emis per Emp), because the percentage 
of facilities with non-reported emission levels after relocations exceeds the corresponding percentage before relocation by 20.3%. 
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standard errors. The log changes, which reflect percentages and put all facilities in a similar scale, 
exhibit much smaller standard errors. We will thus generally focus our discussion on those.  
The placebo changes form the basis of comparison for the performance effects of actual 
movers.  Compared to these, we find that movers exhibit smaller reductions in emissions 
accompanied by an increase in employment. Emissions per employee follow the same trend as 
non-movers. It seems that moving facilities tend to grow; possibly the move is driven by a desire 
to increase the scale of production. Because they grow, they also emit more. But their pollution 
intensity is not affected. Facilities with no emissions prior to the relocation grow in size and 
emissions even more than the larger relocating facilities. But their emissions intensity exhibits the 
same trend.  A natural question is whether the performance effects associated with relocations 
within a county are different than those across county-lines. There seems to be little evidence that 
they do. However, a clear pattern emerges when we distinguish moves based on the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the destination locations relative to the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
origin locations. We have used the changes in demographic characteristics of the locations 
weighted by the parameter estimates of Column (2) of Table 2.4 to construct summary indexes 
associated with changes in community pressure. We find that facilities relocating to areas with 
lower community pressure grow more than those relocating to areas with higher community 
pressure, and their emissions change are much higher than those of the non-relocating facilities. In 
contrast, facilities that relocate to areas with higher community pressure exhibit a growth and 
emissions pattern that is more similar to the non-relocators.     
All these findings, taken together, suggest that relocation is associated with facility growth, 
and thus also with an increase in emissions. But emissions per employee do not change 
differentially for relocating facilities compared to those who stay in the same location. Thus, it 
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appears that facilities do not relocate to become “dirtier;” they relocate when they want to grow. 
When they do, they choose to move down the socioeconomic gradient. Moreover, the employment 
and emissions increases are more pronounced for facilities moving in more disadvantaged 
communities, but even in those cases emissions intensity does not increase. In brief, the adverse 
effects on environmental justice arise from the relocation pattern itself, and the fact that it is 
associated with facility (and emissions) growth, not from changes in facility behavior conditional 
on size.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
Environmental disclosure programs are meant to correct informational asymmetries and increase 
welfare by helping communities take actions based on solid facts. The notion that more 
information can increase efficiency is seductive, but might be erroneous. If the disclosure programs 
increase information but do so differentially across communities, they will lead to information 
asymmetries between them. Moreover, some communities may be better able to organize based 
on the information they receive and more effective in obtaining a response from policy makers. 
As a result, information disclosure may well lead to adverse outcomes for those “disadvantaged” 
communities, and might potentially reduce welfare for their residents.  
Though we cannot perform welfare analysis with the data in our disposal, we are able to 
provide evidence of detrimental outcomes for communities of low socioeconomic status. One 
channel through which these adverse effects materialize is the relocation of toxic facilities from 
communities of high socioeconomic status to those of low socioeconomic status. Toxic facilities 
are more likely to relocate from communities with high population density and high educational 
attainment. The causes of relocation may include community pressure arising from greater 
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information availability, but quite likely other factors are more important. The facilities that do 
relocate tend to move into communities with lower population density, income, and educational 
attainment. This “migration” of toxic facilities down the socioeconomic gradient results in adverse 
distribution effects. 
Our results show that facilities that are not yet reporting to the TRI but anticipate that they 
will be in the future are also likely to depart from high community pressure locations. This implies 
that environmental disclosure programs affect not only existing facilities but also have an 
anticipatory effect on location choices of facilities that expect to increase their emissions in the 
future. On a more positive note, we do find that relocation does not appear to have been associated 
with facilities becoming dirtier and increasing emissions per employee; instead it appears to be 
motivated by a desire for growth by facilities. However, this does indicate that relocation can be 
expected to increase emissions, especially for communities with disadvantaged socioeconomic 
groups, for which post-relocation facility growth is particularly high.  
Overall, our findings provide empirical evidence that the public disclosure of TRI has a 
negative side effect on environmental justice by inducing facilities to relocate into socio-
economically disadvantaged areas and potentially increasing their toxic emissions. These findings 
have direct implications for the design and implementation of information disclosure programs 
such as the TRI. Policy makers need to consider the potential side effect of such a regulatory tool 
on distributional justice and strengthen the channels for vulnerable populations to voice their 
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Table 2.1. Summary Statistics: Relocating versus non-Relocating Facilities 
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Number of Facilities units 3,094 20,333  1,540 21,887  1,554 20,333  
Note: 1. Standard deviations in brackets. Standard errors in parentheses. Summery statistics are computed for the 1990 values corresponding to each facility.  
2. We treat facilities relocated within counties as non-relocated facilities when calculating the means in Column (5).  
3. The income level and wage rate are converted to constant 2012 dollars using the CPI from 1990 to 2011.  
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Table 2.2. Analysis of the Effects of Community Pressure on the Likelihood of Facility 
Relocation 
 
 Moved in 10 years Moved in 20 years 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Community Characteristics in 1990         
Population Density in log 0.191 0.182 0.203 0.210 0.170 0.165 0.179 0.179 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Per capita Income (1000 $) 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
% Bachelor Degree or Higher  3.048 3.042 2.913 2.644 3.090 3.101 3.008 2.832 
 (0.333) (0.338) (0.338) (0.366) (0.284) (0.287) (0.287) (0.309) 
Share of white resident  -0.158 -0.172 -0.194 -0.247 0.011 0.013 -0.002 -0.056 
 (0.129) (0.131) (0.132) (0.139) (0.105) (0.106) (0.106) (0.111) 
County avg. Voter turnout  0.668 0.529 0.527 0.402 0.395 0.271 0.286 0.131 
 (0.466) (0.474) (0.474) (0.509) (0.371) (0.375) (0.376) (0.402) 
Location Characteristics in 1990         
Industry-specific Wage Rate in log 0.034 0.189 0.209 0.251 0.057 0.186 0.199 0.188 
 (0.127) (0.131) (0.130) (0.139) (0.101) (0.104) (0.103) (0.111) 
Employment Level in log 0.128 0.116 0.102 0.099 0.124 0.114 0.104 0.105 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) 
CAA Attainment Status 0.261 0.219 0.189 0.138 0.244 0.208 0.188 0.189 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.095) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.075) 
Num. of Facilities in Census Tract. -0.040 -0.041 -0.038 -0.038 -0.020 -0.021 -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Facility Characteristics in 1990         
Number of Employees in log  - -0.380 -0.315 -0.367 - -0.288 -0.238 -0.280 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.024)  (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) 
PayDex Score Diff. - - - 0.006 - - - 0.004 
    (0.003)    (0.003) 
PayDex Score Max - - - -0.006 - - - -0.004 
    (0.003)    (0.003) 
Zero-Emis. Indicator (1 = YES) - - 0.980 1.004 - - 0.634 0.629 
   (0.101) (0.107)   (0.075) (0.079) 
Emission < 65th percentile - - 0.044 0.059 - - -0.007 0.008 
   (0.043) (0.045)   (0.033) (0.034) 
Emission > 65th and < 75th percentile - - 0.003 0.004 - - 0.008 0.008 
   (0.014) (0.014)   (0.011) (0.011) 
Emission > 75th and < 90th percentile - - 0.003 0.004 - - 0.003 0.003 
   (0.003) (0.003)   (0.002) (0.002) 
Emission > 90th and < 95th percentile - - -0.008 -0.008 - - -0.005 -0.006 
   (0.002) (0.003)   (0.001) (0.002) 
Emission > 95th percentile - - -0.000 -0.000 - - 0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
         
         
Observations 23,427 23,427 23,427 20,519 23,427 23,427 23,427 20,519 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Note: 1. Robust standard errors clustered at the census tract level are reported in parentheses.  
2. 1,963 facilities relocated across census tracts within 10 years after 1990, and 3,094 facilities relocated across census tracts within 20 years.  
3. The number of facilities in Column (4) and (8) is smaller than the total number of facilities in the sample because of missing values in the PayDex 
Score. We did not drop these facilities when constructing the sample because some of them only have missing values in 1990 but not for subsequent 
years, and thus we are able to use them in our panel analysis, and also for regression where the PayDex score is not used.  
4. The percentiles of the toxic emission level are 4.2 thousand pounds in the 65th percentile, 17.2 thousand pounds in the 75th percentile, 84.7 





Table 2.3. Analysis of the Determinants of Cross-county vs. Within-county Moves 
 
 Cross-county Moves Within-county Moves 
 Moved in 10 years Moved in 20 years Moved in 10 years Moved in 20 years 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Community Characteristics in 1990         
Population Density in log 0.078 0.077 0.069 0.064 0.360 0.386 0.354 0.367 
 (0.033) (0.037) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.032) (0.024) (0.027) 
Per capita Income (1000 $) 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.001 0.010 0.015 0.006 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
% Bachelor Degree or Higher  3.245 2.824 3.202 2.885 3.519 3.137 3.489 3.276 
 (0.450) (0.490) (0.361) (0.385) (0.425) (0.471) (0.369) (0.410) 
Share of white resident  -0.415 -0.470 -0.177 -0.209 -0.139 -0.186 -0.065 -0.116 
 (0.181) (0.193) (0.142) (0.150) (0.168) (0.180) (0.138) (0.146) 
County avg. Voter turnout  -0.605 -0.888 -0.692 -0.948 - - - - 
 (0.645) (0.685) (0.495) (0.521)     
Location Characteristics in 1990         
Industry-specific Wage Rate in log  0.101 0.184 0.119 0.152 - - - - 
 (0.178) (0.189) (0.133) (0.142)     
Employment Level in log  0.052 0.034 0.018 0.012 - - - - 
 (0.039) (0.043) (0.030) (0.032)     
CAA Attainment Status  0.545 0.454 0.475 0.452 - - - - 
 (0.124) (0.130) (0.091) (0.097)     
Num. of Facilities in Census Tract -0.022 -0.021 -0.004 -0.006 -0.033 -0.034 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) 
Facility Characteristics in 1990         
Number of Employees in log  - -0.356 - -0.221 - -0.363 - -0.316 
  (0.034)  (0.025)  (0.032)  (0.027) 
PayDex Score Diff. - 0.007 - 0.003 - 0.004 - 0.005 
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
PayDex Score Max - -0.006 - -0.006 - -0.006 - -0.001 
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Zero-Emis. Indicator (1 = YES) - 0.888 - 0.520 - 1.070 - 0.704 
  (0.152)  (0.106)  (0.146)  (0.108) 
Emission < 65th percentile - 0.072 - 0.037 - 0.048 - -0.021 
  (0.063)  (0.046)  (0.062)  (0.048) 
Emission > 65th and < 75th percentile - 0.016 - 0.004 - -0.009 - 0.010 
  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.020)  (0.016) 
Emission > 75th and < 90th percentile - -0.000 - 0.002 - 0.008 - 0.004 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Emission > 90th and < 95th percentile - -0.005 - -0.004 - -0.010 - -0.008 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Emission > 95th percentile - -0.000 - 0.000 - -0.000 - 0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
         
Observations 23,427 20,519 23,427 20,519 21,887 19,183 21,887 19,183 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: 1. Robust standard errors clustered at the census tract level are reported in parentheses.  
2. The number of facilities Column (5) to (8) is smaller than the number in full sample size because we did not include the cross-county movers 




Table 2.4. Analysis of the Effects of Community Pressure on the Annual Relocation Probability 
 
 All Moves 
Moved in year t 
Cross-county Moves 
Moved in year t 
Within-county Moves 
Moved in year t 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Community Characteristics in 1990       
Population Density in log  0.184 0.168 0.102 0.088 0.353 0.330 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) 
Per capita Income (1000 $) 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% Bachelor Degree or Higher  2.918 2.593 3.396 3.083 3.382 3.093 
 (0.258) (0.269) (0.352) (0.369) (0.347) (0.366) 
% White Residents  0.008 -0.000 -0.163 -0.179 -0.046 -0.042 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.142) (0.144) (0.134) (0.137) 
County avg. Voter turnout  0.482 0.382 -0.659 -0.557 - - 
 (0.357) (0.361) (0.505) (0.507)   
Location Characteristics (1-year lag)       
Industry-specific Wage Rate in log 0.082 0.220 0.163 0.221 - - 
 (0.085) (0.087) (0.120) (0.122)   
Employment Level in log 0.140 0.116 0.075 0.044 - - 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.030) (0.031)   
CAA Attainment Status  0.100 0.084 0.221 0.227 - - 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.079) (0.081)   
Num. of Facilities in census tact -0.028 -0.026 -0.017 -0.015 -0.020 -0.019 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Facility Characteristics (1-year lag)       
Number of Employees in log - -0.241 - -0.248 - -0.249 
  (0.016)  (0.024)  (0.023) 
PayDex Score (Max - Min)  - 0.007 - 0.007 - 0.006 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Max PayDex Score - -0.010 - -0.013 - -0.007 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Zero-Emis. Indicator (1 = YES)  - 0.987 - 0.897 - 1.096 
  (0.077)  (0.104)  (0.114) 
Emission < 65th percentile - 0.023 - -0.001 - 0.039 
  (0.036)  (0.048)  (0.051) 
Emission > 65th and < 75th percentile - -0.016 - -0.011 - -0.021 
  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.019) 
Emission > 75th and < 90th percentile - 0.004 - 0.004 - 0.004 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Emission > 90th and < 95th percentile - -0.005 - -0.004 - -0.007 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Emission > 95th percentile - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
       
Observations 344,507 318,900 344,507 318,900 327,471 303,176 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: 1. Robust standard errors clustered at the census tract level are reported in parentheses.  





Table 2.5. Analysis of Effects of Toxic Releases Interacted with Community Characteristics on the Likelihood of Relocation  
 All Moves Cross-county Moves Within-county Moves 
VARIABLES Moved in 10 years Moved in 20 years Moved in 10 years Moved in 20 years Moved in 10 years Moved in 20 years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Interaction Terms Pop. Des. Edu. Att. Pop. Des Edu. Att. Pop. Des Edu. Att. Pop. Des Edu. Att. Pop. Des Edu. Att. Pop. Des Edu. Att. 
Zero-Emis. Indicator (1 = YES) 0.126 0.341 0.045 0.142 0.118 0.264 -0.000 0.291 0.092 0.335 0.064 -0.021 
 (0.072) (1.099) (0.052) (0.844) (0.097) (1.604) (0.071) (1.089) (0.104) (1.439) (0.073) (1.167) 
Emission < 65th percentile 0.015 -0.413 0.011 -0.317 0.022 0.214 0.016 0.207 0.011 -1.012 0.012 -0.860 
 (0.032) (0.507) (0.023) (0.398) (0.046) (0.698) (0.032) (0.483) (0.042) (0.643) (0.032) (0.540) 
Emission > 65th and < 75th percentile 0.001 0.072 -0.008 0.075 0.001 -0.290 -0.010 -0.138 -0.001 0.409 -0.006 0.293 
 (0.010) (0.164) (0.007) (0.129) (0.015) (0.222) (0.010) (0.160) (0.012) (0.210) (0.010) (0.178) 
Emission > 75th and < 90th percentile 0.001 0.006 0.001 -0.020 -0.002 0.050 0.000 -0.020 0.003 -0.047 0.001 -0.021 
 (0.002) (0.032) (0.001) (0.026) (0.003) (0.040) (0.002) (0.033) (0.003) (0.043) (0.002) (0.035) 
Emission > 90th and < 95th percentile -0.003 -0.018 -0.001 -0.008 -0.002 -0.034 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 0.015 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.028) (0.001) (0.020) (0.002) (0.038) (0.001) (0.024) (0.003) (0.037) (0.002) (0.029) 
Emission > 95th percentile -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Community Characteristics in 1990             
Population Density in log 0.114 0.211 0.158 0.179 -0.007 0.077 0.078 0.064 0.302 0.387 0.316 0.368 
 (0.071) (0.027) (0.050) (0.020) (0.095) (0.037) (0.068) (0.026) (0.101) (0.032) (0.069) (0.027) 
Per capita Income (1000 $) 0.011 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.015 0.008 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
% Bachelor Degree or Higher  2.646 2.687 2.834 3.046 2.807 2.924 2.886 2.906 3.144 3.175 3.289 3.624 
 (0.366) (1.077) (0.309) (0.819) (0.487) (1.572) (0.384) (1.044) (0.471) (1.385) (0.411) (1.117) 
Share of white resident  -0.248 -0.242 -0.057 -0.051 -0.465 -0.465 -0.204 -0.204 -0.187 -0.180 -0.124 -0.112 
 (0.140) (0.139) (0.111) (0.111) (0.194) (0.193) (0.150) (0.150) (0.180) (0.180) (0.146) (0.146) 
County avg. Voter turnout  0.403 0.396 0.128 0.117 -0.845 -0.894 -0.935 -0.971 - - - - 
 (0.510) (0.509) (0.404) (0.403) (0.685) (0.686) (0.521) (0.523)     
Location Characteristics in 1990             
Industry-specific Wage Rate in log  0.253 0.247 0.191 0.187 0.181 0.181 0.149 0.158 - - - - 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.111) (0.111) (0.190) (0.190) (0.142) (0.142)     
Employment Level in log  0.100 0.100 0.106 0.105 0.033 0.035 0.013 0.014 - - - - 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.024) (0.025) (0.043) (0.043) (0.032) (0.032)     
CAA Attainment Status  0.136 0.138 0.188 0.189 0.457 0.454 0.452 0.449 - - - - 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.075) (0.075) (0.130) (0.130) (0.097) (0.097)     
Num. of Facilities in Census Tracts -0.038 -0.038 -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.021 -0.005 -0.006 -0.034 -0.034 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) 
Facility Characteristics in 1990             
Number of Employees in log  -0.369 -0.366 -0.280 -0.279 -0.357 -0.354 -0.221 -0.219 -0.364 -0.363 -0.318 -0.316 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.034) (0.034) (0.025) (0.025) (0.032) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027) 
PayDex Score Diff. 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
PayDex Score Max -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Zero-Emis. Indicator (1 = YES) 0.082 0.962 0.309 0.612 0.033 0.854 0.524 0.482 0.377 1.030 0.225 0.706 
 (0.542) (0.168) (0.387) (0.123) (0.723) (0.252) (0.520) (0.168) (0.794) (0.219) (0.552) (0.170) 
Emission < 65th percentile -0.054 0.108 -0.075 0.045 -0.088 0.046 -0.077 0.011 -0.035 0.161 -0.108 0.077 
 (0.245) (0.072) (0.176) (0.056) (0.348) (0.106) (0.236) (0.075) (0.318) (0.092) (0.243) (0.075) 
Emission > 65th and < 75th percentile -0.002 -0.004 0.063 -0.000 0.005 0.051 0.077 0.021 -0.003 -0.055 0.052 -0.023 
 (0.076) (0.023) (0.056) (0.018) (0.110) (0.032) (0.074) (0.024) (0.093) (0.031) (0.077) (0.025) 
Emission > 75th and < 90th percentile -0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.005 0.012 -0.006 -0.001 0.004 -0.014 0.013 -0.007 0.006 
 (0.015) (0.005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.019) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.023) (0.007) (0.018) (0.005) 
Emission > 90th and < 95th percentile 0.010 -0.006 0.002 -0.006 0.009 -0.002 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.012 -0.014 -0.008 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.022) (0.005) (0.016) (0.004) 
Emission > 95th percentile 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Observations 20,519 20,519 20,519 20,519 20,519 20,519 20,519 20,519 19,183 19,183 19,183 19,183 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
            Notes: 1. Robust standard errors clustered at the census tract level reported in parentheses. 
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Table 2.6. Analysis of the Effects of Toxic Releases Interacted with Community Characteristics 
on the Likelihood of Relocation  
 
 All Moves 
Moved in year t 
Cross-county Moves 
Moved in year t 
Within-county Moves 
Moved in year t 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Interaction Terms Pop. Des. Edu. Att. Pop. Des Edu. Att. Pop. Des Edu. Att. 
Zero-Emis. Indicator (1 = YES)  0.054 0.619 -0.018 1.957 0.141 -0.307 
 (0.052) (0.855) (0.073) (1.239) (0.074) (1.147) 
Emission < 65th percentile 0.043 0.013 -0.009 0.366 0.112 -0.238 
 (0.026) (0.362) (0.036) (0.521) (0.036) (0.483) 
Emission > 65th and < 75th percentile -0.015 0.006 -0.008 -0.101 -0.023 0.084 
 (0.010) (0.126) (0.013) (0.181) (0.016) (0.167) 
Emission > 75th and < 90th percentile 0.002 0.026 0.000 0.034 0.003 0.017 
 (0.002) (0.032) (0.003) (0.051) (0.004) (0.037) 
Emission > 90th and < 95th percentile -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.025 -0.005 -0.057 
 (0.001) (0.023) (0.002) (0.030) (0.003) (0.041) 
Emission > 95th percentile 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Community Characteristics in 1990       
Population Density in log 0.173 0.168 0.103 0.089 0.325 0.330 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) 
Per capita Income (1000 $) 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% Bachelor Degree or Higher 2.596 2.657 3.079 3.274 3.099 3.082 
 (0.269) (0.289) (0.368) (0.397) (0.365) (0.391) 
Share of White Residents  0.004 0.000 -0.172 -0.176 -0.031 -0.040 
 (0.101) (0.102) (0.145) (0.145) (0.137) (0.137) 
County avg. Voter turnout 0.390 0.375 -0.520 -0.566 - - 
 (0.361) (0.361) (0.507) (0.508)   
Location Characteristics (1-year lag)       
Industry-specific Wage Rate in log 0.219 0.220 0.218 0.221 - - 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.121) (0.121)   
Employment Level in log 0.116 0.115 0.045 0.043 - - 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031)   
CAA Attainment Status  0.084 0.084 0.227 0.226 - - 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.081) (0.081)   
Num. of Facilities in Census tracts -0.025 -0.026 -0.014 -0.015 -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Facility Characteristics (1-year lag)       
Number of Employees in log -0.241 -0.241 -0.248 -0.248 -0.249 -0.248 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
PayDex Score (Max - Min) 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Max PayDex Score, -0.010 -0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Zero-Emis. Indicator (1 = YES)  0.593 0.914 1.024 0.667 0.057 1.134 
 (0.386) (0.124) (0.535) (0.172) (0.549) (0.176) 
Emission < 65th percentile -0.288 0.022 0.066 -0.042 -0.804 0.068 
 (0.198) (0.056) (0.261) (0.077) (0.275) (0.077) 
Emission > 65th and < 75th percentile 0.090 -0.017 0.046 0.000 0.156 -0.031 
 (0.077) (0.020) (0.095) (0.028) (0.121) (0.028) 
Emission > 75th and < 90th percentile -0.007 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.019 0.003 
 (0.017) (0.005) (0.020) (0.007) (0.031) (0.006) 
Emission > 90th and < 95th percentile 0.011 -0.005 0.001 -0.007 0.027 -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.017) (0.005) 
Emission > 95th percentile -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 318,900 318,900 318,900 318,900 303,176 303,176 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 




Table 2.7. Analysis of the Effects of Prospective Reporting on the Likelihood of Relocation 
 
 All Moves 
Moved in year t 
Cross-County Moves 
Moved in year t 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Community Demographics in 1990       
Population Density in log  0.178 0.216 0.178 0.097 0.203 0.096 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.019) (0.026) (0.039) (0.026) 
Per capita Income (1000 $) 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% Bachelor Degree of Higher  2.563 2.935 2.535 3.059 3.658 3.001 
 (0.269) (0.364) (0.269) (0.369) (0.509) (0.369) 
Share of White Residents  0.013 0.010 0.005 -0.168 -0.171 -0.187 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.145) (0.145) (0.144) 
County avg. Voter turnout  0.309 0.304 0.289 -0.627 -0.608 -0.669 
 (0.362) (0.363) (0.363) (0.510) (0.514) (0.511) 
Facility Characteristics (1-year lag)       
Binary indicator for no prior TRI report 0.838 0.329 1.416 0.756 -0.472 1.833 
 (0.053) (0.219) (0.141) (0.075) (0.311) (0.199) 
No prior TRI report * Population density in log  - 0.060 - - 0.154 - 
  (0.029)   (0.041)  
No prior TRI report * Education level  - 0.608 - - 0.992 - 
  (0.404)   (0.567)  
No prior TRI report * Number of Employees in log - - -0.150 - - -0.286 
   (0.034)   (0.050) 
Number of Employees in log  -0.211 -0.210 -0.313 -0.224 -0.221 -0.424 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.044) 
PayDex Score (Max - Min)  0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Max PayDex Score  -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Zero-Emis. Indicator (1 = YES)  0.721 0.723 0.725 0.674 0.679 0.684 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.108) (0.107) (0.107) 
Emission > 46th and < 65th percentile  0.027 0.027 0.028 0.004 0.003 0.005 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Emission > 65th and < 75th percentile  -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.008 -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Emission > 75th and < 90th percentile  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Emission > 90th and < 95th percentile  -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Emission > 95th percentile  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Location Characteristics (1-year lag)       
Wage Rate in log  0.194 0.195 0.195 0.199 0.202 0.203 
 (0.087) (0.088) (0.087) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) 
Employment Level in log  0.123 0.123 0.122 0.050 0.051 0.048 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
CAA Attainment Status  0.093 0.092 0.095 0.233 0.231 0.238 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) 
Num. of Facilities in the census tract  -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
       
Observations 318,900 318,900 318,900 318,900 318,900 318,900 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 




Table 2.8. Comparison of Origin vs Destination Community Characteristics  




















All Moves        








































Cross-county Moves        








































Within-county Moves        































Note: 1. 𝛥𝑋 = 𝑋𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑇𝑟+1 − 𝑋𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑇𝑟. 𝑇𝑟 is the relocation year. A negative number in ∆X means X decreases after moving.  
2. No report before moving = reported zero emission to TRI or under the TRI reporting threshold before moving.  
3. Units of variables: ∆Pop Density (∆ people per sq. mile), ∆Income (∆ in 1000$), ∆Attn. Status (∆ in the dummy of Attainment status with 1 = 
Non-attainment), the others (∆%).  
4. Standard errors from the t-test on the mean differences are shown in parentheses.  
 
(b) Community Characteristic Score at Origin and Destinations of Relocating Facilities 
 N  ?̂?𝒁𝟏   ?̂?𝒁𝟐  
















































Cross-county Moves        




































Within-county Moves        






- - - 






- - - 






- - - 
Note: 1. 𝑍1 is calculated using the community characteristics - population density, income level, educational attainment, share of white, and voter 
turnout. 𝑍2 is calculated using the community characteristics in 𝑍1 and the proxy for the regulatory pressure - attainment status under NAAQS. 2. 
?̂? is obtained from the coefficients in Column (2), Table 2.4.  
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Note: 1. 𝛥𝑋 = 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑋)𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑋)𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 = 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑋)𝑇𝑟+2≤𝑡≤𝑇𝑟+4 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑋)𝑇𝑟−4≤𝑡≤𝑇𝑟−2 , where 𝑇𝑟  is the relocation year. 
Facilities with only one year of data following relocation are not included. See text for details.  
2. log(Emis) and log(Emis per Emp) cannot be calculated if a facility reported zero emission or did not reported to TRI. Facilities that report zero 
emissions are excluded from the figures reported in Column (4) and (6). Facilities that do not report to the TRI because their emissions are below 
the reporting threshold are assumed to report at the threshold level for the purpose of figures reported in this Table. See text for relevant discussion. 
3. 𝑍1 is calculated using the community characteristics - population density, income level, educational attainment, share of white, and voter turnout. 
𝑍2 is calculated using the community characteristics in 𝑍1 and the proxy for the regulatory pressure - attainment status under NAAQS. The value 
of  ?̂? is obtained from the coefficients in Column (2), Table 2.4.  









3.1 Introduction  
Environmental regulations in the United States on toxic chemical releases rely on information 
disclosure and other incentive-based programs that induce facilities to voluntarily reduce 
emissions (Bi and Khanna, 2012; Harrison and Antweiler, 2003; Khanna, Quimio, and Bojilova, 
1998). The basic tenet of environmental disclosure is that publicly available information on the 
environmental performance of facilities can correct informational asymmetries that may exist 
between facilities and stakeholders, such as local households, environmental groups, and investors; 
these parties can use the disclosed information to monitor toxic releases of facilities and based on 
which, discipline the poor performers through channels such as targeted collective action, threat 
of liabilities for health and environmental damages, and reducing investments. One of the most 
prominent environmental disclosure programs targeting at toxic releases in the US is the Toxic 
Release Inventory (TRI). Initiated by the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act (EPCRA) of 1986, the TRI mandates large polluting facilities that processed more than 25,000 
pounds or otherwise used more than 10,000 pounds each year of certain hazardous chemicals to 
report their emissions. These data are routinely publicized by the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) since June 1989. Much anecdotal evidence has been found that the data benefit 
various strategies of communities to act against the polluting facilities and fight for improving 
environmental quality30.  
                                                 
30 See MacLean (1996), Karkkainen (2001) page 316, Hamilton (2005) Page 79, Page 219 for examples on how the TRI information 
was used by community residents and environmental groups to pressure facilities using direct negotiation, lobbying politicians for 
more stringent regulations, law suits, and so on. Liabilities of facilities from these pressures can also be transferred in the financial 
market to the stock prices of the facilities’ firms. See Hamilton (1995a) for evidence on the effect of TRI on the stock price of 




Between 1988 to 2014, the TRI reported emissions fell by approximately 40%31. Although 
this dramatic reduction has made the TRI attractive and be supported by regulators 32 , many 
researchers doubt whether the mobilization of communities after the disclosure contributes 
significantly to the emission reduction. Studies such as Bui and Mayer (2003) and Mastromonaco 
(2015) showed that the local housing price had only small response to the information on changes 
in toxic emission levels of facilities in neighborhoods, indicating a limited attention of 
communities to the complex information about the performance of facilities. Studies from 
Wolverton (2009), De Silva et al. (2016), and Wang et al. (2018) also showed that after the TRI 
disclosure, facilities were locating or re-locating into communities with lower pressure, which 
might further reduce the power of community pressure on regulating the releases of facilities.   
         In this paper, we study the impact of information disclosure on the toxic releases of 
facilities by examining whether re-location of facilities hurts the effect of community pressure on 
reducing the releases of facilities. Various studies have found that communities that are poor, less-
educated, and with more minorities received less emission reduction in the first twenty years of 
the TRI (Bui and Mayer, 2003; Shapiro, 2005; Kalnins and Dowell, 2015) 33. Plenty of evidence 
has been found that the community socio-economic characteristics are important in explaining the 
number of new-built facilities (De Silva, Hubbard, and Schiller, 2016; Hamilton, 1995b), local 
ambient pollution level (Arora and Cason, 1999; Shapiro, 2005), and emission levels of individual 
facilities (Gray and Shadbegian, 2004)34. As explained by Hamilton (1995), the poor, less educated, 
                                                 
31 This number is calculated from the TRI data. The TRI reporting started in year 1987 although the data were first disclosed to 
the public in mid-1989. However, subsequent information has shown that the 1987 data are unreliable, and most studies on the 
TRI emissions of facilities started with 1988 as the base year (Konar and Cohen, 1997).  
32 See Bui and Mayer (2003) for details on the presidential memos that shows how the TRI gains support by administrators.  
33 Results from Kalnins and Dowell (2015) showed that counties in the highest income quartile had a 68% decrease in toxic 
releases, while counties in the lowest quartile had only 18%. These differences are not affected by the sorting of residents, as the 
authors used demographics in the same base year to examine the emission reduction in different communities. See also Shapiro 
(2005) and Freudenberg, Pastor, and Israel (2011) for evidence based on different measurements of toxic exposure.  
34 There are also studies examining the pollution abatement expenditure of facilities and the local regulatory enforcement efforts 
(Gray and Shadbegian, 2004). 
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and minority communities could have relatively low pressure on toxic-releasing facilities “because 
their compensation demand are low, they are willing to trade-off exposure to risks for lower 
housing price and jobs, or because of their failure to engage in collective action”. Recently, Wang, 
Deltas, Khanna, and Bi (2018) studied the re-location of TRI-reporting facilities in response to 
community pressure. We found that facilities that faced higher community pressure in 1990 (the 
first year after the first TRI disclosure) were more likely to move out from their host communities 
in the next twenty years; and for the 13.2% facilities that have relocated, they were on average 
moving into low-income, less educated, and less populated communities.  
However, the effect of relocation on the environmental performance of facilities has been 
largely overlooked, despite the mixed evidence from the literature that environmental concerns 
might in fact be less important than economic reasons, such as land and labor costs, in driving 
facilities to move into the socio-economically disadvantaged communities (Anderton, 1994; 
Downey, 2005; Wolverton, 2009). Knowing the drivers is important for evaluating the efficiency 
of environmental disclosure programs that take advantages of community pressure to regulate 
polluting facilities. Moreover, it is also useful for devising policies to redress the uneven 
distribution of toxic exposure across communities, or the environmental “injustice”, caused by the 
moving of facilities. A direct way to test whether environmental concerns are important in driving 
the relocation of facilities is to look at the environmental performance of those facilities after 
moving, and compare it with what the facilities would have performed if had not moved. 
This study extends Wang et al. (2018) on the relocation of facilities and examines whether 
the relocated facilities generated more pollution because of their moving into new communities. 
We analyze the causal effect of relocation on the toxic emission levels of facilities and also 
examine how this effect varies by the relocations that have pressure-decrease, pressure-increase, 
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or no large change in pressure; as shown by Wang et al. (2018), some facilities trade-off high 
pressure in high income and high educated communities for economic benefits. This analysis 
draws on a balanced panel of 10,851 facilities that have reported to the TRI during 1990 to 2011. 
14.93% of the facilities relocated across census tracts, with nearly half beyond county borders and 
a mean moving distance of 10 miles. Toxic emissions include the total releases of all TRI-listed 
chemicals via air, water, landfill, and offsite underground injection.  
We construct the counterfactual emission levels of facilities using the synthetic control 
method introduced by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). This method generates a “synthetic” 
outcome of the emission levels for each relocated facility (treated unit) by weighting the observed 
emission levels of the facility stayers (called “donors” by Abadie et al., 2003). The weights are 
chosen by approximating the pre-moving emission levels of the relocated facility. This method has 
an advantage over the traditional methods for correcting sample selection (e.g. propensity score 
matching and the Heckman’s model) that it relaxes assumptions on the errors. This is primarily 
done by allowing the temporal variations of the pre-treatment outcome to enter the calculation of 
the counterfactual, and the outcome variable contains the information on the unobserved factors 
(Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2015). However, this method relies on data with a long pre-
treatment period, so our analysis focuses on the facilities relocated between 2002 to 2007. This 
results in a restricted sample of 321 relocated facilities. Our test on the relationship between the 
treatment effect of relocation and the change in community characteristics caused by the relocation 
is based on this sample.  
         We find a statistically insignificant average treatment effect of relocation on the emission 
levels of facilities. A complementary analysis on the production scales, measured by the number 
of employees of facilities show similar results. This is not surprising since facilities may update 
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sites and technologies along with relocation, which can improve production efficiency and reduce 
waste and inputs and cancel out the effect of changes in community pressure on releases. Some 
facilities may also trade-off high community pressure on pollution for economic benefits. We find 
evidence that relocation has a larger effect on increasing emissions of the facilities which move 
into communities with lower pressure, characterized by a lower educational attainment, income, 
and population density. This is especially true for the large polluters that have high pre-moving 
emission levels. Tests on the employment scales of the facilities, however, do not show the same 
pattern. But we find the same pattern on the toxic waste generated per output, measured by 
thousand pounds of waste per million dollars sales. This implies that facilities relocating into 
communities with low pressure may generate more emissions because of more waste during 
production.  
Our findings provide supportive evidence that environmental concerns are important 
drivers of the relocation of toxic-releasing facilities. The findings also contribute to explaining the 
disproportionate emission reduction after the TRI. Combining with the findings from Wang et al. 
(2018), our results show that toxic facilities are not only locating into communities with poor and 
less educated communities, but also tend to make use of the low community pressure in those areas 
and generate more toxic emissions.  
         This study also contributes to the literature on the relocation of firms. Previous studies on 
firm relocation primarily focused on the financial response of firms to relocation (Chan, Gau, and 
Wang, 1995; Ghosh, Rodriguez, and Sirmans, 1995; Gregory, Lombard, and Seifert, 2005; 
Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1987). Although some studies examined the production scales of 
manufacturing facilities (Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1987), no studies have discussed the 
environmental performance. We are the first paper examining the effect of relocation on the level 
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of toxic emissions of facilities.  
         This study additionally extends the literature on the synthetic control method with an 
application to a large sample. Since the initial work of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), the 
synthetic control method has been widely used in comparative case studies where an exogenous 
event affects a single treated unit (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2010; Billmeier and 
Nannicini, 2013; Coffman and Noy, 2012). Later, the method was applied to multiple treated units 
(Cavallo, Galiani, and Noy, 2013; Kreif et al., 2016) and with the treatment being endogenously 
assigned (Bilgel and Galle, 2015). Our application is based on these new developments and focuses 
the causal effect of an endogenous treatment on a larger sample, which has hundreds of treated 
units and thousands of controls. In the estimation, we managed the computational problem caused 
by the large sample size using matching by covariates as a preparation step. We also carried out a 
post-estimation analysis on the heterogeneity of the treatment effects on a large number of treated 
units.  
 
3.2 Conceptual Framework 
We consider a profit-maximizing facility i (i = 1, 2, ..., I) in location 𝑙0 that is generating toxic 
releases. In the absence of public information about its pollution, residents in the neighborhood 
are expected to be unware or to underestimate the facility’s toxic releases. In June 1989, the TRI 
started to disclose information on the releases of facilities, which is expected to induce pressure 
from local communities on the facilities to improve environmental performance. Facility i can 
respond to the pressure from its local community 𝑙0 by reducing toxic releases (𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙0) and re-
optimizing its profit at 𝑙0. However, even after considering possible adjustment, facility i may still 
find 𝑙0 no longer matching its operating requirements and thus may decide to shutdown operations 
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at 𝑙0 and relocate to some new location 𝑙1. Although can be triggered by the high community 
pressure at 𝑙0, relocation is likely to be a multi-purpose decision that optimizes the profit of a 
facility through moving along the gradient of many profit determinants. Facilities may also 
consider the benefits from decrease in environmental regulatory pressure and better economic 
conditions, such as lower labor cost or land rent. They will estimate their performance under the 
new conditions as well as the cost of relocation arising from immobility of fixed assets, the 
transaction costs of rehiring or relocating employees, and transporting mobile assets. Facility i will 
weigh the costs and benefits of staying in 𝑙0 with those of relocating. Relocation will only happen 
when it is profitable, i.e. the optimal profit in location 𝑙0 is lower than the optimal profit in the best 
alternative location 𝑙1 net of the relocation cost.  
After relocation, facility i will adjust its operation based on the characteristics in location 
𝑙1 to achieve its optimal profit. The resulted environmental performance of facility i in 𝑙1 forms a 
comparison with what the facility would perform if it had stayed in the original location 𝑙0. We 
define the treatment effect of relocation (𝑇𝐸𝑖) on the toxic emission level (𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙) of the relocated 
facility i as the difference between the actual emission level 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙1  and the counterfactual 
emission level 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙0 in the post-relocation period (𝑡 > 𝑇𝑟). Since 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙0,𝑡>𝑇𝑟 is not observed, 
we estimate it using the synthetic control method (next section).  
The sign of 𝑇𝐸𝑖 on 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙 is theoretically ambiguous because of the multi-purpose nature 
of the relocation decision. To the extent that facility i moves to a location with weaker community 
or regulatory pressure, the facility may experience a lower cost of polluting in 𝑙1 and thus generate 
more emissions than its counterfactual. However, relocation that targets at better economic 
conditions may also lower the cost of labor, land, and transportation, which encourages production 
and an increase in total production waste. Cheaper labor perhaps also increases labor-intensive 
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pollution control activities. Relocation targets at facility expansion (e.g. the small-size and fast-
growing facilities) may increase levels of production waste. However, if the relocation is also 
accompanied with changes in management, operations, or producing technology of the facility, it 
could increase or decrease the costs of production and pollution abatement, depending on whether 
the changes bring higher or lower efficiency35. 
Based on the above discussion, we model the treatment effect of relocation on the emission 
levels of facilities as a reduced-form function  
𝑇𝐸𝑖 = 𝑓(𝚫𝑴𝒍𝟎𝒍𝟏 , 𝚫𝒁𝒍𝟎𝒍𝟏 , 𝑿𝒕𝟎)      (3.1) 
, where 𝚫𝑴𝒍𝟎𝒍𝟏 denotes the difference between the community pressure in 𝑙0 and that in 𝑙1, 𝚫𝒁𝒍𝟎𝒍𝟏 
denotes the difference between the environmental regulatory pressure and the economic conditions 
that can affect the facility’s profit in 𝑙0  and those in 𝑙1 , 𝑿𝑻𝒓  denotes the facility-specific 
characteristics before moving.  
We hypothesize a higher propensity of a positive 𝑇𝐸𝑖 on 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙 if relocation lowers the 
local community pressure on pollution (𝚫𝑴𝒍𝟎𝒍𝟏 = 𝑴𝒍𝟏 − 𝑴𝒍𝟎 > 0). Following Wang et al. (2018), 
we measure community pressure in four dimensions: 1) the strength of concerns about toxic 
releases in the neighboring community, 2) ethnicity of the community, 3) abilities of the 
community to organize itself collectively, and 4) the potential for liability for damages to human 
health. We use Income Level and Educational Attainment as proxies for the strength of concerns 
about toxic releases. Income Level is measured by per capita income and Educational Attainment 
is by the fraction of residents with a bachelor’s or higher degree. These two factors capture the 
information on people’s ability to access and interpret the disclosed data on facilities, concerns of 
                                                 
35 Atkeson, Kehoe, and Pindyck (1999) provides an empirical analysis that suggests facilities change when new capacity is 
replacing the old one, rather than through slow adjustments of existing capacity. 
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potential decrease in property values caused by pollution, and access to political resources to voice 
their demands (Hamilton 1993, 1995b; Gray and Shadbegian, 2004; Shadbegian and Wolverton 
2010; Boone et al., 2014). We use the Share of Non-Hispanic White as a proxy for ethnicity of 
communities. Communities with more minority populations or greater ethnic divisions are likely 
to find it more difficult to organize collective action because of unfamiliarity with local political 
process or language barrier (Mohai and Bryant, 1992; Hamilton, 1995, Cole, Elliott, and 
Khemmarat, 2013; De Silva et al., 2016). We use Voter Turnout and the fraction of voting for the 
Democratic presidential candidate (Democrats) as the proxies for the tendency of a community to 
act collectively for environmental causes. Communities that are more politically active and have 
well developed mechanisms for information gathering and dissemination are more likely to be 
able to organize themselves and impose pressure on toxic releasing facilities (Hamilton, 1993). A 
high willingness to organize collectively for an environmental cause is traditionally thought to be 
the Democrat’s domain (Becker, 2004). Finally, we use Population Density that measures the 
number of potential victims to the toxic emissions in neighborhoods as a proxy for the liability of 
a facility for damages to human health. The number of residents in a neighborhood is a factor in 
legal calculations of the net present value of earnings streams in communities’ damage claims in 
courts (Hamilton, 1995b). 
We control for the formal regulatory pressure and a number of location economic 
characteristics in 𝚫𝒁𝒍𝟎𝒍𝟏. We follow Wang et al. (2018) and use the Attainment Status of a county 
to the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) as a measure for regulatory pressure. The 
NAAQS regulates six criteria air pollutants (Ozone, NOx, SO2, CO, PM10, PM2.5) but many 
toxic pollutants are precursors to the criteria pollutants. We expect a community with “non-
attainment” status to impose higher pressure on the toxic facilities. We control for local labor cost 
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and land rent using average Wage Rate of production workers and the median value of owner-
occupied housing (Housing Value). We control for the preference of toxic facilities to operate in 
the vicinity of other industrial activity, by including the number of other Toxic Facilities. We also 
control for overall availability of infrastructure and public services which affects the ease and cost 
of conducting business by including the variable Urban which is defined as the fraction of urban 
population. The effect of this variable is ambiguous since urban areas are also likely to have a 
higher tax rate and crime rate. The transportation costs of operating at a location is controlled by 
including the miles of Highways and miles of Railways in each community. 
We control for the effect of initial Emission level, Size, and Growth rate of facilities in 𝑿𝑻𝒓. 
Large polluters could have a higher propensity of a positive 𝑇𝐸𝑖 on 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙 since it may benefit 
more from a lower community pressure or regulatory pressure caused by the move. We follow 
Wang et al. (2018) and measure the initial Emission level of facilities using the total toxic releases 
which aggregate the releases of all reported chemicals by a facility36. We measure the Size of a 
facility using the number of employees and the Growth rate by the annual growth of sales by 
facilities.  Facilities in a small Size or with a high Growth rate before moving are expected to have 





                                                 
36 The TRI chemical list has a major change in year 1995 which has an increase in the number of reporting chemicals from 333 to 
619. The newly added chemicals are selected by the EPA based on the chemicals’ toxicity and potential harms to human health, 
which thereby tends to be exogenous to the relocation decisions of facilities. We therefore include the emissions of these newly 
added chemicals when calculating Toxic Emission Level, and use them to measure the potential emission reduction pressure from 
local communities who tend to react to what they can observe from the TRI disclosure. This issue, however, will not affect our 
cross-sectional model that uses the 1990 emission levels as covariates.  
 
 57 
3.3 Empirical Model 
3.3.1 Treatment Effect of Relocation 
We use the synthetic control method developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et 
al. (2010) to estimate 𝑇𝐸𝑖 – the treatment effect of relocation on the emission levels of facilities. 
Specifically, we let index 𝐽 = (1,2, … 𝐽 + 1) denote facility mover i and the facilities stayers, with 
𝑗 = 1 for facility i and (2, … , 𝐽 + 1) corresponding to the stayers that serve as controls, which are 
called “donors” by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). We assume the treatment starts at 𝑇0𝑖 = 𝑇𝑟𝑖 −
2 so that the anticipation effect of relocation on facilities’ performance (e.g. the preparation work 
of cutting labor and reducing production scale in 1 or 2 years before relocation) will not affect the 
orthogonality between the treatment and the pre-treatment outcome. We define 𝑮𝟏  as a 𝑔 ∗ 1 
vector with elements including the outcome performance of facility i in the pre-treatment years 
(𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑡<𝑇0𝑖) and 𝑷𝒊, a 𝐾 ∗ 1 vector of variables that predicts the emission levels of facilities. 𝑷𝒊 
includes facility characteristics and the socio-economic, regulatory, and economic characteristics 
of facility i’s local community37 . Similarly, we define a 𝑔 ∗ 𝐽  matrix 𝑮𝟎  as the collection of 
comparable vectors for the stayers in the donor pool. The synthetic control method identifies a 
convex combination of the 𝐽 facility stayers that best approximates the pre-treatment outcomes of 
facility i. We define 𝑊 = (𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝐽+1) as the weighting vector with 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 and ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2 = 1. 
𝑊∗ is chosen by solving  
min
𝑊
(𝑮𝟏 − 𝑮𝟎𝑾)′𝑽(𝑮𝟏 − 𝑮𝟎𝑾)   (3.2) 
s.t. 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 and 𝑤1 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝐽 = 1 
, where 𝑽 is a diagonal positive semi-definite weighting matrix with diagonal elements providing 
                                                 
37 Details on variables in P can be found in the appendix.  
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the importance weights of variables in G in achieving the min. This minimization relies on the 
information in G, especially on the pre-treatment outcomes of facility i. Therefore, a long pre-
treatment period is required to generate the synthetic controls. We thus only focus on the facilities 
relocated after 2002. We also end the time window at 2007 so that we can also estimate the long-
term effect of relocation; some facilities may take several years to fully resume production after 
relocating. The counterfactual outcome 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑗=1𝑙𝑡
0  is calculated by ∑ 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑙𝑡𝑤𝑗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2  (t = 1990, …, 
2011).  
We address two specific issues in this process. First, the outcome variable 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡  is 
detrended using the median in the pre-treatment years 38. This normalization solves the problem 
brought by extreme values in the emission data: the outliers have few donors close to them in the 
space G and thus make it hard to successfully matched by a synthetic control. Second, given a 
large number of facility stayers (N = 9,230), we select a subset of them before conducting the 
synthetic control estimation using matching by Euclidean distance39. We select 50 facility stayers40 
with the shortest Euclidean distance to the facility mover i in space P, where the distance 𝐷 
between the mover (j = 1) and a facility stayer j is 
𝐷1𝑗 = ∑ 𝑑1𝑗𝑡
𝑇𝑟−2
𝑡=1990








    (3.3) 
. 𝑑1𝑗𝑡 is the distance with respect to the variables valued in year t, m is the number of variables in 
P, and 𝑥𝑚𝑡
0  is calculated from 𝑥𝑚𝑡 in P by normalizing 𝑥𝑚𝑡 using the mean and standard deviations 
of 𝑥𝑚𝑡 over the pre-treatment years. This selection has three functions. First, it narrows the gap 
                                                 
38 We do not use de-mean because those outliers can also affect the mean of the outcome.  
39 We also did the propensity score matching and the Mahalanobis distance matching. These approaches generate different donor 
pools, but the synthetic control estimation results obtained from those donor pools are quite similar.  
40 We tried to use 30, 50, and 100 nearest neighbors to do the matching. We find that 50 is a number that can both save the 
computing time of the synthetic control program and also guarantee a reasonably good quality of the pre-treatment imitation of 
the synthetic controls to the outcome of the treat units.   
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between facility i and its donors in space P and thus reduces the interpolation bias in ‖𝑮𝟏 − 𝑮𝟎𝑾‖ 
that may arise from a possible non-linear relationship between the outcome variable and its 
predictors in P. Second, it restricts the size of the donor pool and tremendously saves computing 
time for the synthetic control estimation. Third, it avoids overfitting that may happen when a 
treated unit is artificially matched by combining idiosyncratic variations of a large number of 
controls (Abadie et al., 2015).  
 The statistical inference on the estimated treatment effect is based on the placebo test idea 
introduced by Abadie et al. (2010). Placebo tests in general evaluate the significance of estimates 
by calculating the frequency of getting a treatment effect estimate of a certain large magnitude 
under the null hypothesis purely by chance. In our case, since we have a large number of controls 
in the donor pool, we are able to improve the test idea by calculating a confidence interval using 
the mean and standard deviations of the placebo effects on the donors. Specifically, we assign a 
placebo “relocation” to the donors of facility mover i at the same year as facility i’s relocation. 
Then, we iteratively apply the synthetic control method to each donor and obtain 50 placebo 
treatment effects (𝑃𝑇𝐸). We then calculate the 5th and 95th percentile41 of the placebo effects and 
use them as the lower and upper bound of the confidence interval for 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡. The confidence interval 
is used in judging the quality of the match between the movers and their synthetic controls in terms 
of the pre-treatment outcomes and in finding the significance of 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 in the post-relocation period. 
An effect is treated as statistically significant if it lies outside of the confidence interval. More 
technical details on the synthetic control estimation, the choice of 𝑷, and the statistical inference 
can be found in the Appendix B.      
 
                                                 
41 We also tried to use the mean + / - the standard deviation of the APTE as an alternative way to calculate the confidence 
interval. Results on the inference are quite similar to the current method.  
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3.3.2 Heterogeneity in the Treatment Effect 
Based on Equation (3.1), we model the treatment effect of relocation on the performance outcomes 
of a facility (𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠) as a linear function of the difference in the community socio-economic 
characteristics (𝚫𝑴𝒍𝟎𝒍𝟏), regulatory pressure and other location characteristics (𝚫𝒁𝒍𝟎𝒍𝟏) between 
the moving origin 𝑙0 and the destination 𝑙1, as well as the facility’s characteristics (𝑋𝑖𝑙0,𝑇𝑟−2) at two 
years prior to the moving. Since facilities relocated in different years, we normalize the pre- and 
post- relocation periods relative to each facility’s relocation year (𝑇𝑟𝑖) and denote the periods as p 
= …, -1, 0, 1, 2..., 𝑇 − 𝑇𝑟𝑖, where p = 0 is for the relocation year. The equation of 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑝
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠 in a 
period after relocation is 
𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑘𝑙0𝑙1𝑝
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏Δ𝑴𝑙0𝑙1 + 𝜷𝟐Δ𝒁𝑙0𝑙1 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒍𝟎𝒕=𝑻𝒓𝒊−𝟐 + 𝜆𝑝 + 𝜆𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑝                       (3.4) 
with 𝑝 > 𝑇𝑟 . k denotes the industry of facilities, 𝜆𝑝 and 𝜆𝑘 denote the period and industry dummies, 
and 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑝 denotes the unobserved facility- and period- specific characteristics that may affect the 
treatment effects. Because facilities relocated in 2007 only have 4 years’ data in the post-relocation 
period, we only include the estimated treatment effect of all facilities in the first 4 post-relocation 
years42 to avoid the effect composition on the estimations.  Δ𝑴𝒍𝟎𝒍𝟏 is calculated as the difference 
between the origin and destination communities’ demographics in 2000, i.e. 𝚫𝑴𝒍𝟎𝒍𝟏 = 𝑴𝒍𝟏𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟎 −
𝑴𝒍𝟎𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟎. We use the 2000 value because our data on community socio-economic characteristics 
are obtained from the decennial Census, and the 2000 data is the best approximation to the 
characteristics around the relocation years, which range from 2002 to 200743. Δ𝒁𝒍𝟎𝒍𝟏 is calculated 
as 𝒁𝒍𝟎𝒍𝟏 = 𝒁𝒍𝟏𝑻𝒓+𝟏 − 𝒁𝒍𝟎𝑻𝒓.  
                                                 
42 We also tried to additionally control for year fixed effects to catch effects of unobserved events happened in specific years on 
the performance of facilities. The year dummies do not show significant effect conditional on the period dummies. 
43 We also considered using values interpolated from the 2000 and 2010 values of the demographics. This method is theoretically 
problematic because the interpolation values contain information on the 2010 demographics, which could be affected by the 
migration of residents in response to the moving of the facilities.  
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      We estimate equation (3.4) using OLS regression with the dependent variable being the 
treatment effects obtained from the synthetic control estimation. Since the treatment effects on 
some facilities are not statistically significant, we do a robustness check by constructing another 
dependent variable where the insignificant effects are replaced by zero. One potential caveat in the 
OLS regression is that we cannot normalize 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑘𝑝 by the initial emission level, which have many 
zeros, to eliminate the scale effect. We therefore do an ordered Probit regression which simply 
explains the treatment effect using the sign of Δ𝑴𝒍𝟎𝒍𝟏 and Δ𝒁𝒍𝟎𝒍𝟏. We define a dependent variable 
𝑆(𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑝) that equals to 1 if 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑝 is positive and statistically significant, equals to -1 if 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑝 is 
negative and significant, and equals to 0 if 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑝  is insignificant. We define 𝑆(𝛥𝑀𝑛𝑙0𝑙1)  and 
𝑆(𝛥𝑍𝑛𝑙0𝑙1) that equal 1 if a factor n in M or Z has a positive change, equal to -1 if a negative 
change, and equal to 0 if the change is smaller than 20%; a small change in a characteristic may 
not reflect a real change in community pressure or market economic conditions on facilities but 
can generate huge noise in the regression44. 
 
3.4 Data and Sample 
Our data are compiled from multiple sources. Information about toxic chemical releases and waste 
management of facilities in each year is obtained from the 1990 to 2011 TRI data. Information 
about other facility characteristics is obtained from the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) 
data (Walls, 2011). The NETS provides annual snapshots of the Duns and Bradstreet (DB) 
database on the relocation history, employment, sales, industry SIC code, and other characteristics 
                                                 
44 We did regressions on both 10% and 20% cutoffs and got similar results. We use 1% as the cutoff for voter turnout and 
Democrats as they have very small variation across counties. Using this cutoff, 72% of facilities will have a non-zero value in the 




of establishments since 1990. We merge the TRI and the NETS data through matching the street 
address, name, and industry SIC code of facilities in the two datasets45. Information on community 
socio-economic characteristics of census tracts is obtained from the US Census. We use the 1990 
and 2000 Census as stated earlier. Information on voting for the US presidential elections of 
counties are obtained from the Dave Leip’s Atlas. Information on the county-average wage rate 
and county attainment status to NAAQS are obtained from the Quarterly Census of Employment 
and Wages (QCEW) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the EPA Greenbook, respectively. 
Information on the highway miles and railway miles are obtained from the National Highway 
Planning Network and the National Transportation Atlas database. These datasets are merged with 
the TRI using geographic coordinates and the county FIPS code corresponding to each facility. 
Our sample builds upon Wang et al. (2018)’ sample, which consists of facilities that 
reported to the TRI at least once during 1990 to 2011 and have their facility and location data 
collected by the NETS and the Census over the same period. We eliminate facilities born after 
1990 or shutdown before 2011 and obtain a balanced panel in order to compare the changes in 
performance of facility stayers within the same temporal window and to satisfy the identification 
requirement of the synthetic control method. We also eliminate facilities belonging to industries 
that were added to the TRI reporting list in 199846. As compared to the sample of all facilities ever 
reported to TRI, facilities in our sample have a similar mean and median of toxic emission levels 
in 1990 but a 75% lower mean in 2010. It indicates that our sample tends to include facilities that 
are major emission reducers. The final sample has 10,851 facilities with 9,230 stayers and 1,621 
movers (i.e. a total relocation rate of 14.9%). The locations of facilities cover 7,966 census tracts 
                                                 
45 For the details on how we merge the data, refer to Wang et al. (2018, manuscript) at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3264740 
46 These industries include coal mining, metal mining, electric utilities, commercial hazardous waste treatment, chemicals and 
allied products-wholesale, petroleum bulk terminals and plants-wholesale, solvent recovery services. Facilities in these industries 
were required to report to TRI after year 1998.  
 
 63 
and 1,208 counties. The synthetic control estimation uses the 321 facilities that relocated between 
2002 to 2007 and 9,230 facility stayers.   
Table 3.1 shows the variables used in the empirical test, their measures, and the comparison 
of their statistics between the movers and the stayers47. Specifically, column (3) shows the mean 
difference between the two groups before the Euclidean distance matching. On average, the 
movers are smaller in Size and Emission levels and are more likely to be stand-alone facilities not 
owned by other firms. They also have worse Financial Health shown by a lower Paydex score 
than the stayers. Their original communities show characteristics of a lower community and 
regulatory pressure than those communities of the stayers, including lower Population Density, 
Income Level, Educational Attainment, and propensity of being non-attainment to NAAQS. They 
also show characteristics of a harsher economic conditions for business, such as high Wage Rate, 
less Railways, and high land rents (proxied by Housing Values). Column (4) shows the mean 
difference of these variables between the movers and the stayers selected by the Euclidian distance 
matching. There is a significant improvement in the balance between the two groups in terms of 
both the facility and the location characteristics, despite a few factors are still out of balance.  
In Figure 3.1, we check the balance between the movers and the stayers in terms of the 
unobserved factors. We plot the trajectory of Emission levels the movers and their matched stayers 
over time, both unconditional and conditional on the covariates for matching. The divergence of 
lines for the two groups at about 6 years before relocation suggests a risk of imbalance in terms of 
the unobserved factors and thus a violation of the parallel trend assumption. This is the main 
motivation for us to use the synthetic control method. Similar trend can be seen in Figure 3.2 for 
the Size of the facilities.  
                                                 





Figure 3.3 present the synthetic control estimation results on the effect of relocation on emission 
levels of facility movers. In Figure 3.3a, we plot the mean of the emission levels of facility movers 
(solid line) and their synthetic controls (dashed line) from 11 years prior to relocation to 9 years 
after relocation48. We show the standard errors of the means by the shaded area49. The gap between 
the two lines represents the treatment effect of relocation on emission levels of the facilities. 
Consistent with Figure 3.1, we find that facility movers were decreasing their emissions over time 
on average. Compared with the synthetic controls, the movers show a lower emission level at two 
years before relocation, which accords with our expectation that facilities’ production might be 
temporarily affected prior to the move. The average emission of the movers gradually went closer 
to that of the synthetic controls and surpassed it 5 years after relocation, indicating a potential long-
term positive impact of relocation on facilities’ emission levels. It is worth noticing that the mean 
of the emission levels in the post-treatment periods are calculated from different sets of facilities. 
Facilities moving in 2007 only have 4 years’ worth of data while facilities moving in 2002 have 9 
years’ worth of data. Thus, the means at 5 or more years after relocation contain composition 
effects.  
         Figure 3.3b presents results of the placebo tests, with average treatment effects shown by 
the solid line and confidence intervals shown by the shaded area. The treatment effects before two 
                                                 
48 The sample runs from as far as 17 periods prior to and 9 years after relocation. Facility movers and their synthetic controls 
have good match in the outcome variables from period -17 to -12.  
49 When computing these statistics, we refine the sample and include only facilities that have a good pre-treatment fit in the 
outcome variable with their synthetic controls. The fit is measured with the pre-treatment root mean squared prediction error 
(RMSPE) following Abadie et al. (2015). RMSPE is calculated as ||𝑌1𝑡≤T0 − 𝑌0𝑡≤𝑇0𝑊||, where Y denotes an outcome variable. It 
measures the fit between the outcome of the treated unit and its synthetic counterpart over time. A large RMSPE signals a bad fit. 
Facilities with a pre-treatment RMSPE greater than the Mth percentile of the distribution of RMSPE are excluded. M is a 
reasonably large number that can ensure the average outcome of facility movers and their synthetic controls in the pre-treatment 
period are not significant different. We use M = 95 to calculate the results shown in the figures.  
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years prior to relocation stay within the confidence intervals, which suggest no significant 
difference between the emission levels of movers and their synthetic controls in the pre-treatment 
periods. The treatment effect falls out of the lower bound of confidence intervals and keeps below 
zero until 4 years after relocation. At 5 or more years, the effect increases above zero but still stays 
within the confidence interval. These results suggest that, on average, relocation has a statistically 
significant temporary negative impact on the emission levels of facilities, but the impact in the 
long term is not significant. However, relocation can affect facilities’ emission levels through 
multiple channels, including changing the pressure of surrounding communities on facilities’ 
emissions and motivating technology updates based on new plants in the destination communities. 
Effects of these factors are mixed together in the above estimated treatment effect. We decompose 
the treatment effect into constituent parts using regressions below.  
  Figures 3.3c and 3.3d present results for the small-size facilities. These facilities have a 
smaller number of employees that is lower than the 25th percentile of the sample distribution. The 
small-size movers do not show lower emission levels than the synthetic controls shortly before 
moving. Compared with the results on all movers, this result is perhaps because small-size 
facilities have more flexibility to move, less preparation work, and shorter preparation time for the 
moves. After moving, the small polluters’ emission levels keep staying above the synthetic 
controls’, resulting in a gap of about 1500 pounds between the real and synthetic control emissions 
in the first 5 years and growing into about 2000 pounds afterwards. This large difference, however, 
is not statistically significant, as shown by the placebo test results in Figure 3.3d. But this 
differential behavior of the small-size facilities suggests potential heterogeneity in the treatment 
effects of relocation across different facilities. Figure 3.4 presents the estimated treatment effects 
of relocation on the employment scales of facility movers. Compared with Figure 3.3, a similar 
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pattern is shown in terms of the trend over time, and the sign and significance of the treatment 
effects. This result corresponds to our expectation that facilities’ emission levels have a strong 
correlation with their production scales (proxied by employment scales).  
    Table 3.2 presents results from the OLS regression in which we decompose the treatment 
effects of relocation on emission levels (𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠) of facility movers50. Columns (1) to (2) show the 
results from different specifications of covariates. The emission level of facilities at 2 years before 
moving shows a negative and significant effect, indicating a higher 𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠on small polluters. 
Conditional on emission level, the size of facilities shows a positive effect; meanwhile, the Growth 
rate of facilities shows a negative effect although not statistically significant. This indicates a lower 
𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠 on the small and fast-growing facilities. One potential reason behind this result is that the 
growers are more likely to have updates in site and technologies along with relocating, and this 
may increase production efficiency and reduce production waste. The other potential reason is that 
the facilities are small in production scales, and 𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠 is positively correlated with the production 
scales. The ordered Probit regression manages this confounding scale effect by focusing only on 
explaining the sign of 𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠. We will show the results later.  
 Effects of the difference in the socio-economic characteristics between moving destination 
and origin communities do not show much significance on average. In columns (3) to (5), we 
include interactions between the differences in Population Density, Income Level, and Educational 
Attainment with facilities’ pre-moving emission levels. We found that significant and negative 
effects of these interactions. This indicates that large polluters are more likely to take advantage 
of the potential lower community pressure brought by relocation and adjust their emissions to a 
higher level. Attainment Status does not show a consistently significant effect on 𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠. Wage 
                                                 
50 We also do regressions with insignificant TEs replaced by 0. The results are robust. See results in tables C2 and C3.  
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Rate and Housing Value show a negative effect on 𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠, indicating that higher wage rate and 
land rent in the moving destinations are associated with a negative adjustment of facilities in 
emissions. Railways also shows a negative and significant effect. It indicates that facilities are 
more likely to reduce emissions if the moving destinations have a lower transportation cost, which 
could be because of a lower cost for transferring waste for offsite treatment. 
    Table 3.3 presents results from the ordered Probit regression explaining the sign of the 
treatment effect in response to the sign of the difference in community characteristics between 
moving origins and destinations51. Consistent with the OLS results, we find a negative effect of 
facilities’ pre-moving emission levels. The sales growth rate of facilities shows the same negative 
sign as in the OLS, indicating that technology updates could be a more important reason behind 
the lower 𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠 of fast-growing facilities. Population Density, Income Level, and Educational 
Attainment still show no or a weak significant base effect but a negative and significant incremental 
effect on large polluting facilities. We also see negative and significant effects of Non-Hispanic 
White, and Democrats after removing the scale effect in the ordered Probit regression. The effect 
of Wage Rate is still significant, but not for the effect of Housing Value and Railways.  
To explore whether the pattern on the emission response of facilities to community 
characteristics is related to changes in production scales of the facilities, we conduct the same test 
on the treatment effect of relocation on the Size of the facilities. Table 3.4 presents results from 
the OLS regression. Similar to the results on Emission levels, the pre-moving employment scales 
of facilities shows a negative and significant effect, indicating a higher TE on employment of 
small-size facilities. The Growth rate of facilities shows a positive and significant effect on 𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑝. 
Combining with effect of the Growth rate on 𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠 , these results indicate that fast-growing 
                                                 
51 In Figure C1 and Figure C2, we show the number of facilities with statistically significant treatment effect of relocation on 
their emission levels and employment scales in each post-relocation period, respectively. 
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facilities tend to expand their production scales but not necessarily increase emission levels along 
with moving. This again supports our previous claim that facilities may update their technology 
and have improvements in production efficiency along with relocation.  
Community characteristics, however, do not show the same pattern as in the regression on 
emission levels. As shown by numbers in Column (3), conditional on the impacts of location 
economic characteristics, Population Density, Income Level, and Non-Hispanic White show a 
positive effect. The base effect of Educational Attainment is super large, perhaps because of noise 
from large- or small-size outliers. This noise is properly address in the ordered Probit Regression, 
shown in Table 3.5, and we see a positive effect of Educational Attainment. Democrats also shows 
a positive effect in Table 3.5, which suggests that the Size of facilities tends to response positively 
to relocations into more Democratic locations. We also observe a positive effect of Attainment 
Status. The interactions between facilities’ pre-moving employment scale and Population Density, 
Income Level, and Educational Attainment all show a positive effect, indicating that the small-size 
facilities are more likely to have expansion in size because of relocating into communities with 
lower pressure. These results indicate a weak effect of the difference in local communities’ 
pressure and regulatory pressure caused by relocation on the employment scale of facilities. Wage 
Rate shows a consistently negative sign, which confirms our expectation that high labor costs after 
moving may negatively affect the production scales of facilities.  
The above results on the Size of facilities imply that facilities seem not adjust their emission 
levels in response to changes in community pressure in relocation by adjusting production scales. 
To explore whether instead the facilities adjust their amount of toxic waste generated from 
production, we did a similar test on the Unit Waste (total waste generated per million dollars sales) 
of facilities. Table 3.6 presents the OLS regression results. We find that Population Density shows 
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a positive effect in most specifications, while the other proxies for community pressure all show 
negative effects. Population Density, Income Level, and Educational Attainment all show a 
negative incremental effect on large polluters, which is consistent with the case for Emission levels. 
In the ordered Probit regression shown in Table 3.7, these incremental effects are more statistically 
significant, and the base effect of population density also turns negative. It is also interesting that 
the Growth rate shows a positive and significant effect, although only in the ordered Probit 
regression. This positive effect signals that fast-growing facilities are more likely to increase their 
toxic waste per output because of relocation. As discussed above, the fast-growers seem to reduce 
toxic Emission by updating technologies along with relocation. The result on Unit Waste further 
suggests that the updates are likely to be on the pollution control technologies which manage the 




Environmental disclosure programs are believed to improve the involvement of the society in 
regulating facilities that generate toxic chemical releases, especially after the success of the Toxic 
Release Inventory (TRI) program. However, evidence in the literature on the strategic reaction of 
facilities to the pressure from communities raises questions about the efficiency of the information 
disclosure program on regulating the toxic releases. Specifically, recent studies on the location 
choice of toxic-releasing facilities after the TRI find a tendency of the facilities to move into socio-
economically disadvantaged communities which are likely to have lower pressure on their 
pollution. This motivates our study in this paper on whether the relocation of facilities hurts the 
effect of community pressure on reducing the releases of facilities.  
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 Based on a sample of 10,851 facilities, we analyze the causal effect of relocation on the 
toxic emission levels of facilities and examine how this effect varies by the relocations that have 
pressure-decrease, pressure-increase, or no large change in community pressure on pollution. The 
causal inference is drawn upon the estimated counterfactual emission levels of each relocated 
facility in the sample in the case where they were supposed to stay in the original communities in 
the post-relocation years. We do the estimation using the synthetic control method, during which 
we manage the computational problem caused by the large sample size using matching by 
covariates as a preparation step. 
 Although we did not find that relocation on average increases the emission levels of 
facilities, we find that the large polluting facilities that have relocation with pressure-decrease tend 
to increase their emission levels. These facilities were relocating into low-income, less-educated, 
and less populated areas. Complementary analyses show that their increase in emissions is not 
likely to be a result of production expansion but of an increase in the waste generated during 
production. We also find indirect evidence that the small and fast-growing facilities have less of 
such tendency, perhaps because they tend to have technology updates that improve pollution 
control along with relocation.  
 Our findings suggest that relocation is indeed likely to hurt the effect of community 
pressure on reducing the toxic releases of facilities. The findings suggest policy makers to consider 
strategic reactions of facilities when assess the efficiency of information disclosure programs. The 
findings also contribute to explaining the disproportionately lower emission reduction in the socio-
economically disadvantaged communities after the TRI. It suggests a potential side effect of 









(a) Emission Level    (b) Residuals (conditional on variables in P) 
 
Figure 3.1. Emission Levels of Movers and the Selected Stayers from Matching 
 
Note: 1. Figure (b) shows the difference in emission levels of movers and stayers conditional on the predictors of relocation 
propensity of facilities. We run OLS regression of Emission on the covariates in P used in the Euclidean distance matching and 







   
(a) Employment Scale   (b) Residuals (conditional on variables in P) 
 





(a) Average Emission Levels:  










(c) Average Emission Levels:  
Movers vs. Synthetic Controls (Small-size Facilities)  
 
 
(d) Placebo Test: Average Treatment Effect on 
Emission Level (Small-size Facilities) 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Synthetic Control Estimation Results on Emission Levels 
 
Note:  
1. In figures (b) and (d), the upper bound of the shaded area shows the 95th percentile of the 50 average placebo effects (average 
across facilities), and the lower bound shows the 5th percentile of the 50 average placebo effects. 
2. The small-size facilities are those having the number of employees below the 25th percentile of the employee number of facilities 






(a) Average Employment Scales:  
Movers vs. Synthetic Controls 
  
 




(c) Average Employment Scales:  




(d) Placebo Test: Average Treatment Effects on 
Employment Scales (Small-size Facilities) 
 
 





Table 3.1. Summary Statistics on Characteristics of Facilities and their Communities 
 












Facility Characteristics (2 years before moving)     










Unit Waste Toxic wastes in 1000 pounds per 

































Financial Health Paydex Score (80 = Standard 
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Location Characteristics (in 1990)     








Income Level Log per capita income in 













































Attainment Status Attainment status under NAAQS (1 









Toxic Facilities Number of toxic facilities in a 









Wage Rate Log industry-specific wage rate 

































Housing Value Median Housing Value in 1000$ in 









Number of Facilities  321 9,230 9,551 5,855 
1. Standard deviations in brackets. Standard errors in parentheses.  
2. Figures of the stayers’ characteristics are calculated using the data in 2000 to 2005.  




Table 3.2. Post-Synthetic Control Analysis: Treatment Effect of Relocation on Emission – OLS 
Regression 
 
Dep. Var.: Estimated Treatment Effect on Emission 
(in 1000 pounds) 
     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Facility Chars. 2 yrs before Moving      
Emission -0.621*** -0.607*** -0.670*** -0.247 -0.511*** 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.129) (0.233) (0.174) 
Size 0.002 0.004** 0.004** 0.003* 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Growth -0.862 0.113 0.118 -0.998 -0.752 
 (0.715) (0.798) (0.773) (1.080) (0.977) 
Difference in Community Characteristics 
(Destination - Origin) 
     
Diff. in Population Density 0.001 0.065 0.331* -0.426** -0.148 
 (0.174) (0.166) (0.189) (0.209) (0.159) 
Diff. in Income Level -0.178 -0.039 -0.291 0.813* 0.188 
 (0.186) (0.391) (0.396) (0.449) (0.384) 
Diff. in Educational Attainment -2.042 10.184** 10.296** 11.052** 12.509** 
 (1.958) (4.684) (4.676) (4.770) (4.862) 
Diff. in Non-Hispanic White -0.072 0.674 0.633 -0.642 -0.271 
 (1.411) (1.527) (1.493) (1.392) (1.309) 
Diff. in Voter Turnout  2.634 0.162 2.696 7.416 2.352 
 (7.294) (7.693) (7.272) (6.411) (7.143) 
Diff. in Democrats -0.634 4.680 4.081 5.025 5.437 
 (3.713) (3.574) (3.652) (3.440) (3.577) 
Interaction Terms      
Population Density * Emission in 𝑇𝑟 − 2   -0.115**   
   (0.045)   
Income Level * Emission in 𝑇𝑟 − 2    -0.612***  
    (0.221)  
Edu. Attainment * Emission in 𝑇𝑟 − 2     -2.249** 
     (1.105) 
Difference in Covariates      
Diff. in Attainment Status  2.222 2.345 2.256 2.471* 2.186 
 (1.523) (1.538) (1.495) (1.386) (1.414) 
Diff. in Wage Rate  -5.196*** -5.397*** -3.633*** -4.769*** 
  (1.702) (1.735) (1.263) (1.546) 
Diff. in Urban  -1.571*** -1.539*** -1.249*** -1.433*** 
  (0.375) (0.372) (0.362) (0.365) 
Diff. in Housing Value  -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Diff. in Toxic Facilities  0.056 0.065 0.008 0.022 
  (0.057) (0.057) (0.047) (0.049) 
Diff. in Highways  0.051 0.050 0.038 0.050 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) 
Diff. in Railways  -0.092*** -0.081*** -0.086*** -0.095*** 
  (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
      
Observations 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 
R-squared 0.290 0.312 0.318 0.346 0.323 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Note: 1. Standard errors are clustered at the census tract level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
2. 75 percent of facility movers are under the TRI reporting threshold or reported zero releases at 2 years before relocating. Emissions reported 
also have a large variance: 85th percentile is 1.41, 90th percentile is 4.71, 95th percentile is 11.78, and the maximum is 87.5. 
3. We only include TE within 4 years after relocation in this analysis.  
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Table 3.3. Post-Synthetic Control Analysis: Treatment Effect of Relocation on Emission  
– Ordered Probit Regression 
 
Dep. Var.: Sign of TE on Emission   
(0 = Insignificant, 1 = Positive Signf.,  
-1 = Negative Signf.) 
     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Facility Chars. 2 yrs before Moving      
Emission -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.090*** -0.065*** -0.077*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
Size -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Growth -0.259*** -0.224*** -0.102 -0.275*** -0.288*** 
 (0.083) (0.086) (0.089) (0.096) (0.091) 
Difference in Community Characteristics 
(Destination - Origin) 
     
Diff. in Population Density -0.059 0.015 0.103 0.018 -0.035 
 (0.057) (0.065) (0.069) (0.067) (0.067) 
Diff. in Income Level -0.133* -0.093 -0.085 -0.028 -0.075 
 (0.072) (0.071) (0.074) (0.072) (0.070) 
Diff. in Educational Attainment -0.112* -0.039 -0.102 -0.034 0.051 
 (0.063) (0.074) (0.079) (0.075) (0.077) 
Diff. in Non-Hispanic White -0.067 -0.085 -0.081 -0.100 -0.142* 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.080) (0.078) (0.081) 
Diff. in Voter Turnout  0.015 -0.006 0.045 0.047 0.013 
 (0.100) (0.095) (0.096) (0.093) (0.097) 
Diff. in Democrats -0.287*** -0.260*** -0.236*** -0.240*** -0.262*** 
 (0.081) (0.084) (0.087) (0.086) (0.088) 
Interaction Terms      
Population Density * Emission in 𝑇𝑟 − 2   -0.046***   
   (0.011)   
Income Level * Emission in 𝑇𝑟 − 2    -0.025**  
    (0.013)  
Edu. Attainment * Emission in 𝑇𝑟 − 2     -0.039*** 
     (0.012) 
Difference in Covariates      
Diff. in Attainment Status  0.232 0.305 0.098 0.206 0.344 
 (0.240) (0.241) (0.259) (0.247) (0.249) 
Diff. in Wage Rate  -0.333*** -0.388*** -0.317*** -0.336*** 
  (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.114) 
Diff. in Urban  -0.149 -0.127 -0.167 -0.154 
  (0.100) (0.102) (0.104) (0.106) 
Diff. in Housing Value  -0.105 -0.141 -0.086 -0.086 
  (0.091) (0.094) (0.093) (0.092) 
Diff. in Toxic Facilities  0.082 0.086 0.055 0.023 
  (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) 
Diff. in Highways  0.094 0.094 0.103 0.096 
  (0.064) (0.067) (0.064) (0.063) 
Diff. in Railways  -0.090 -0.108 -0.050 -0.030 
  (0.067) (0.070) (0.066) (0.067) 
      
Observations 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 
R-squared YES YES YES YES YES 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE 0.309 0.324 0.347 0.333 0.343 




Table 3.4. Post-Synthetic Control Analysis: Treatment Effect of Relocation on Size - OLS Regression 
 
Dep. Var.: Estimated TE of Reloc. 
on Employment Scale 
     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Facility Chars. (2 years before Moving)      
Size -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.048*** -0.066*** -0.084*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) 
Growth 10.482*** 13.821*** 14.594*** 13.705*** 15.017*** 
 (2.800) (3.115) (2.990) (3.152) (3.098) 
Difference in Community Characteristics 
(Destination - Origin) 
     
Diff. in Population Density 0.165 0.127 -1.777 0.334 0.457 
 (1.049) (1.125) (1.283) (1.124) (1.113) 
Diff. in Income Level 0.479 2.607 3.484* -0.516 3.125* 
 (1.731) (1.809) (1.800) (1.961) (1.837) 
Diff. in Educational Attainment -32.073** -10.873 -9.176 -19.419 -78.648*** 
 (14.760) (19.736) (19.491) (19.452) (20.029) 
Diff. in Non-Hispanic White 40.385*** 38.528*** 37.937*** 38.551*** 34.926*** 
 (8.471) (7.969) (8.020) (7.985) (7.737) 
Diff. in Voter Turnout  -30.036 -42.120 -42.908 -45.826 -59.981 
 (41.370) (39.421) (39.462) (39.353) (38.764) 
Diff. in Democrats 23.914 37.741 34.736 28.727 36.964 
 (29.940) (27.627) (27.276) (26.562) (27.265) 
Interaction Terms      
Population Density * Size in 𝑇𝑟 − 2   0.017*   
   (0.010)   
Income Level * Size in 𝑇𝑟 − 2    0.054**  
    (0.026)  
Edu. Attainment * Size in 𝑇𝑟 − 2     0.548*** 
     (0.121) 
Difference in Covariates      
Diff. in Attainment Status  15.486*** 15.687*** 14.086** 15.840*** 15.212*** 
 (5.747) (5.674) (5.635) (5.627) (5.437) 
Diff. in Wage Rate  -27.116** -26.245** -26.688** -26.358** 
  (11.066) (11.147) (11.229) (11.094) 
Diff. in Urban  6.707*** 8.535*** 13.126*** 8.819*** 
  (1.605) (2.093) (3.797) (1.718) 
Diff. in Housing Value  -0.026 -0.028 -0.023 -0.020 
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Diff. in Toxic Facilities  -0.890* -0.853* -0.953** -0.811* 
  (0.484) (0.471) (0.482) (0.455) 
Diff. in Highways  0.191 0.188 0.241* 0.252* 
  (0.138) (0.140) (0.141) (0.137) 
Diff. in Railways  -0.005 -0.010 0.017 -0.079 
  (0.132) (0.132) (0.131) (0.129) 
      
Observations 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198 
R-squared 0.098 0.117 0.120 0.123 0.141 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: 1. Standard errors are clustered at the census tract level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  




Table 3.5. Post-Synthetic Control Analysis: Treatment Effect of Relocation on Size 
 – Ordered Profit Regression 
 
Dep. Var.: Sign of TE on Employment 
(0 = Insignificant, 1 = Positive Signf., -1 = Negative Signf.) 
     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Facility Chars. (2 years before Moving)      
Size -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Growth 0.201** 0.244*** 0.248*** 0.247*** 0.260*** 
 (0.085) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) 
Difference in Community Characteristics  
(Destination - Origin) 
     
Diff. in Population Density -0.087* -0.039 -0.103* -0.042 -0.028 
 (0.049) (0.055) (0.059) (0.055) (0.056) 
Diff. in Income Level 0.020 0.005 0.000 -0.074 -0.005 
 (0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.067) (0.055) 
Diff. in Educational Attainment 0.099* 0.074 0.085 0.066 -0.044 
 (0.053) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.064) 
Diff. in Non-Hispanic White 0.071 0.014 0.017 0.020 -0.009 
 (0.065) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
Diff. in Voter Turnout  -0.116* -0.084 -0.085 -0.086 -0.088 
 (0.070) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) 
Diff. in Democrats 0.125 0.198*** 0.195*** 0.191*** 0.202*** 
 (0.076) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
Interaction Terms      
Population Density * Size in 𝑇𝑟 − 2   0.001*   
   (0.000)   
Income Level * Size in 𝑇𝑟 − 2    0.001**  
    (0.000)  
Edu. Attainment * Size in 𝑇𝑟 − 2     0.001*** 
     (0.000) 
Difference in Covariates      
Diff. in Attainment Status  0.612*** 0.607*** 0.561*** 0.603*** 0.675*** 
 (0.154) (0.161) (0.167) (0.162) (0.159) 
Diff. in Wage Rate  -0.428*** -0.416*** -0.432*** -0.430*** 
  (0.092) (0.093) (0.091) (0.092) 
Diff. in Urban  -0.093 -0.082 -0.069 -0.076 
  (0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) 
Diff. in Housing Value  0.158*** 0.150** 0.166*** 0.170*** 
  (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Diff. in Toxic Facilities  -0.045 -0.044 -0.044 -0.043 
  (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Diff. in Highways  0.014 0.013 0.017 0.022 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Diff. in Railways  0.053 0.048 0.057 0.045 
  (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) 
      
Observations 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 
Pseudo R2 YES YES YES YES YES 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE 0.102 0.122 0.124 0.125 0.128 





Table 3.6. Post-Synthetic Control Analysis: Treatment Effect of Relocation on Unit Waste  
– OLS Regression 
 
Dep. Var.: Estimated Treatment Effect on Waste per 
Million Dollar Sales (in 1000 pounds per Million $) 
     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Facility Chars. 2 yrs before Moving      
Emission -0.002 -0.006 0.023 0.005 -0.012 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.041) (0.034) (0.026) 
Size -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003* -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Growth 0.873 -0.295 -0.461 -0.406 -0.409 
 (0.962) (1.650) (1.633) (1.653) (1.708) 
Difference in Community Characteristics 
(Destination - Origin) 
     
Diff. in Population Density 0.441 1.137** 1.265** 1.033** 1.102** 
 (0.312) (0.475) (0.491) (0.474) (0.466) 
Diff. in Income Level 0.748 -0.504 -0.642 -0.318 -0.470 
 (0.610) (1.340) (1.333) (1.328) (1.322) 
Diff. in Educational Attainment 6.896 -9.972 -9.671 -9.948 -9.463 
 (4.864) (11.672) (11.716) (11.669) (11.324) 
Diff. in Non-Hispanic White 1.312 -1.267 -1.210 -1.487 -1.407 
 (0.964) (1.811) (1.832) (1.824) (1.891) 
Diff. in Voter Turnout  -14.146** -0.833 -0.186 0.489 -0.440 
 (6.150) (11.660) (11.496) (11.714) (11.874) 
Diff. in Democrats -4.514* -2.846 -2.917 -3.005 -2.849 
 (2.678) (3.099) (3.110) (3.124) (3.098) 
Interaction Terms      
Population Density * Emission in 𝑇𝑟 − 2   -0.022   
   (0.015)   
Income Level * Emission in 𝑇𝑟 − 2    -0.104**  
    (0.051)  
Edu. Attainment * Emission in 𝑇𝑟 − 2     -0.363 
     (0.316) 
Difference in Covariates      
Diff. in Attainment Status  2.109 1.691 1.631 1.789 1.694 
 (1.525) (1.653) (1.593) (1.666) (1.651) 
Diff. in Wage Rate  -4.133** -4.180** -3.690** -4.018** 
  (1.843) (1.855) (1.798) (1.828) 
Diff. in Urban  1.896** 1.842** 1.974** 1.918** 
  (0.804) (0.813) (0.811) (0.815) 
Diff. in Housing Value  0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Diff. in Toxic Facilities  -0.177 -0.159 -0.190 -0.184 
  (0.153) (0.158) (0.155) (0.158) 
Diff. in Highways  0.170*** 0.159** 0.172*** 0.172*** 
  (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) 
Diff. in Railways  -0.015 -0.014 -0.011 -0.014 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) 
      
Observations 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 
R-squared 0.044 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.064 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: 1. Standard errors are clustered at the census tract level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.      
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Table 3.7. Post-Synthetic Control Analysis: Treatment Effect of Relocation on Unit Waste  
– Ordered Probit Regression 
 
Dep. Var.: Sign of TE on Unit Waste   
(0 = Insignificant, 1 = Positive Signf.,  
-1 = Negative Signf.) 
     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Facility Chars. 2 yrs before Moving      
Emission -0.006** -0.006** -0.007** -0.000 -0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Growth 0.144** 0.157** 0.159** 0.126* 0.148** 
 (0.069) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.071) 
Difference in Community Characteristics 
(Destination - Origin) 
     
Diff. in Population Density -0.087* -0.155*** -0.161*** -0.145*** -0.187*** 
 (0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) 
Diff. in Income Level -0.065 -0.039 -0.037 0.018 -0.021 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Diff. in Educational Attainment 0.063 0.085 0.086 0.094* 0.124** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) 
Diff. in Non-Hispanic White 0.004 0.019 0.015 0.004 -0.025 
 (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.073) 
Diff. in Voter Turnout  -0.087 -0.069 -0.077 -0.060 -0.098 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.074) (0.075) (0.077) 
Diff. in Democrats 0.136* 0.151* 0.148* 0.121 0.135* 
 (0.079) (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) 
Interaction Terms      
Population Density * Emission in 𝑇𝑟 − 2   0.002   
   (0.004)   
Income Level * Emission in 𝑇𝑟 − 2    -0.023***  
    (0.006)  
Edu. Attainment * Emission in 𝑇𝑟 − 2     -0.014*** 
     (0.004) 
Difference in Covariates      
Diff. in Attainment Status  -0.002 0.019 0.025 0.041 0.046 
 (0.145) (0.140) (0.139) (0.143) (0.143) 
Diff. in Wage Rate  -0.081 -0.083 -0.076 -0.108 
  (0.098) (0.098) (0.102) (0.099) 
Diff. in Urban  0.117 0.117 0.084 0.115 
  (0.088) (0.088) (0.090) (0.089) 
Diff. in Housing Value  -0.104* -0.102* -0.071 -0.090 
  (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) 
Diff. in Toxic Facilities  -0.073 -0.072 -0.078 -0.083 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.052) (0.053) 
Diff. in Highways  0.018 0.020 0.039 0.027 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) 
Diff. in Railways  -0.090 -0.093 -0.061 -0.098 
  (0.063) (0.062) (0.061) (0.063) 
      
Observations 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 
R-squared YES YES YES YES YES 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE 0.0809 0.0879 0.0882 0.107 0.102 
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CHAPTER 4: Effect of Community Socio-Economic Characteristics on the Toxic Releases of 
Facility Stayers 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Publicly available information about the toxic chemical releases from facilities in the US has 
grown following the mandatory reporting of these releases by facilities and the disclosure of the 
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) since June 1989. The TRI information has enhanced transparency 
of stakeholders such as local communities, environmental groups, and investors, enabling these 
parties to monitor the toxic releases of facilities and based on which, discipline the poor performers 
through channels such as targeted collective action, threat of liabilities for health and 
environmental damages, and reducing investments. Much anecdotal evidence has been found that 
the TRI data benefit various strategies of local communities for improving environmental quality52. 
This paper examines the effect of pressure from local communities on reducing the toxic releases 
by facilities in the first two decades of the TRI from 1990 to 2011.  
          A large body of literature has examined the ways that facilities react to local communities’ 
pressure on polluting activities. Some studies showed the importance of various community socio-
economic characteristics in explaining the siting and re-locating of facilities (Hamilton, 1995; 
Wolverton, 2009; De Silva et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2018). They found that high-income, high 
educated, and densely populated communities had less new siting and more moving-out of 
facilities. Other studies examined the pollution abatement expenditure and the level of toxic 
releases of facilities in response to the community characteristics (Becker, 2004; Harrison and 
                                                 
52 See MacLean (1996), Karkkainen (2001) page 316, Hamilton (2005) Page 79, Page 219 for examples on how the TRI information 
was used by community residents and environmental groups to pressure facilities using direct negotiation, lobbying politicians for 
more stringent regulations, law suits, and so on. Liabilities of facilities from these pressures can also be transferred in the financial 
market to the stock prices of the facilities’ firms. See Hamilton (1995a) for evidence on the effect of TRI on the stock price of 




Antweiler, 2003; Gamper-Rabindran, 2006). Despite of mixed findings on the effect of specific 
community characteristics53, their results showed that facilities located in the socio-economically 
disadvantaged communities spent less on pollution abatement and generated less pollution 
reduction. Specifically, Harrison and Antweiler (2003) used income and population density as 
measures for the community pressure on facilities, and found a positive effect of population density 
(but no effect of income) on local facilities’ efforts in reducing releases. There are also mixed 
findings from studies examining the location aggregate outcomes, such as local regulatory 
enforcement efforts (Gray and Shadbegian, 2004) and local ambient pollution levels (Arora and 
Cason, 1999; Shapiro, 2005; Cole et al., 2013). Some of the above studies are also linked to the 
literature on environmental injustice, where researchers focus on the question of whether socio-
economically disadvantaged communities are disproportionally more exposed to toxic releases. 
Effects of particular community characteristics such as income and race are of key interest to those 
studies. The findings that the poor, less educated, and minority areas have more facility move-ins 
and less pollution abatement spending support the hypothesis on the “injustice” (Hamilton, 1995; 
Wolverton, 2009; De Silva et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2018); but these opposite findings of 
insignificant effects of those characteristics on local environmental outcomes support the null 
(Anderton, 1994; Downey, 2005).  
         This paper contributes to the literature by examining whether local community pressure 
affects the toxic emission levels and employment scales of toxic-releasing facilities and the 
changes of these outcomes over years after the first disclosure of the TRI. The main difference 
between our paper and Harrison and Antweiler (2003) is that we test in more details on the effect 
                                                 
53 For example, Becker (2004) showed that facilities in pollution-intensive industries spent more on pollution abatement if 
located in high-income areas. Harrison and Antweiler (2003), however, found no effect of income but found facilities making 
greater effort in reducing releases if located in populated areas. 
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of community pressure on facility-level environmental outcomes. Specifically, we control for 
various economic factors that have been shown in the literature to affect production scales and 
toxic emission levels of facilities. We also distinguish the channels that community pressure may 
affect facilities’ emissions using different groups of community socio-economic characteristics as 
proxies. The inclusion the socio-economic factors other than only income and population allows 
us to test the environmental injustice hypothesis regarding factors such as race and education level.  
Our paper does not evaluate the impact of the TRI program on facility emissions (because 
we do not have the pre-TRI data). But our analysis on facilities’ behavior after the TRI can yield 
lessons on the potential negative side effect of the TRI program on environmental injustice. 
Kalnins and Dowell (2015) has shown that in the first 20 years of TRI, counties in the highest 
income quartile had a 68% decrease in toxic releases while counties in the lowest quartile had only 
18% (the numbers for educational attainment are 59% and 17%)54. Our paper provides knowledge 
on the potential mechanisms behind this by examining whether facilities located in socio-
economically disadvantaged areas generated less emission reduction.  
         Our analysis draws upon a balanced panel of 9,230 facilities that have reported to the TRI 
during 1990 to 2011. Using a cross-sectional model, we test whether the change in emission levels 
of the facilities from 1990 to 2011 responses to the 1990 socio-economic characteristics of the 
census tracts where the facilities are located. We use the 1990 value to avoid the potential reverse 
causality issue arising from residents’ migration in response to changes in local environmental 
quality. Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) has shown that an increase in toxic exposure of a community 
was associated with a decrease in local population density and with the community becoming 
                                                 
54 These differences are not affected by sorting of residents, as the authors used demographics in the same base year to examine 
the emission reduction in different communities. See Shapiro (2005) and Freudenberg, Pastor, and Israel (2011) for evidence based 
on different measurements of toxic exposure.  
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poorer and less white. Since we focus on the effect of the 1990 baseline characteristics on the 
facilities’ long-term change in emission levels, we exclude facilities that moved across census 
tracts during the sampling period. We use Tobit regressions to correct for the potential bias from 
the censoring due to the TRI reporting threshold.   
         We find significant evidence that facilities located in the communities with high educational 
attainment had more reduction in toxic emissions from 1990 to 2011, with a 1 percent increase in 
the share of college-educated residents associated with 1.6 percent more decrease in emissions (or 
less increase). We also find evidence that facilities located in high populated communities also 
tend to generate more emission reduction. Our findings suggest an environmental injustice against 
the less educated population after the TRI. It highlights the importance of policies to consider the 
distributional effect of policy benefits among different socio-economic groups and protect the 
vulnerable less-educated groups.  
 
4.2. Conceptual Framework  
We consider a profit-maximizing facility i (i = 1, 2, ..., I) in location 𝑙0 that is generating toxic 
releases. In the absence of public information about its pollution, residents in the neighborhood 
are expected to be unware or to underestimate the facility’s toxic releases. In July 1989, the TRI 
started to disclose information on the releases of facilities, and this was expected to induce pressure 
from local communities on the facilities to improve environmental performance. The pressure can 
be expressed on the facilities’ side in the forms of compensation demands and other liabilities (or 
expected liabilities) from operation, which can raise the operating costs of the facilities. The 
expected cost increase can further be transmitted via well-functioning financial markets and affect 
the stock prices of the firms.  
         Facility i can respond to the pressure from its local community 𝑙0 by reducing toxic releases 
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(𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙0) through reducing production scale (𝑄𝑖𝑙0), or at a given level of 𝑄𝑖𝑙0, through adopting 
more efficient technologies or improving waste management. Suppose that facility i adjusts 𝑄𝑖𝑙0 
and 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙0 to re-optimize its profit at location 𝑙0 subject to facility internal characteristics (𝑿𝒊𝒍𝟎) 
(e.g. initial size and emission level), pressure from local communities on pollution (𝑴𝒍𝟎), pressure 
from local regulatory agencies on pollution (𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑙0), and other location economic factors (𝒁𝒍𝟎) that 
may decide the cost of production, operations, and pollution control at 𝑙0.We expect the adjustment 
to 𝑄𝑖𝑙0 (to reach 𝑄𝑖𝑙0
∗ ) after the TRI as a function of (𝑋𝑖𝑙0 , 𝑴𝒍𝟎 , 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑙0, 𝒁𝒍𝟎) and the adjustment to 
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙0 as a function of the change in 𝑄𝑖𝑙0 and also (𝑋𝑖𝑙0 , 𝑴𝒍𝟎 , 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑙0, 𝒁𝒍𝟎). The adjustment to 𝑄𝑖𝑙0 
and 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙0  (denoted as Δ𝑄𝑖𝑙0  and Δ𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙0 ) via adopting new techs or environmental 
management systems may take years. So, we test for the changes in 𝑄𝑖𝑙0 and  𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙0 within 20 
years after the start of the TRI and expect Δ𝑄𝑖𝑙0 and Δ𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙0to respond to the lagged community, 
regulatory, and location economic factors in year 1990. 
We use community socio-economic characteristics as proxies for the pressure of 
communities on toxic pollution. Following Wang et al. (2018), we measure community pressure 
in four dimensions: 1) the strength of concerns about toxic releases in the neighboring community, 
2) ethnicity of the community, 3) abilities of the community to organize itself collectively, and 4) 
the potential for liability for damages to human health. We use Income Level and Educational 
Attainment as proxies for the strength of concerns about toxic releases. Income Level is measured 
by per capita income and Educational Attainment is by the fraction of residents with a bachelor’s 
or higher degree. These two factors capture the information on people’s ability to access and 
interpret the disclosed data on facilities, concerns of potential decrease in property values caused 
by pollution, and access to political resources to voice their demands (Hamilton 1993, 1995b; Gray 
and Shadbegian, 2004; Shadbegian and Wolverton 2010; Boone et al., 2014). We use the Share of 
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Non-Hispanic White as a proxy for ethnicity of communities. Communities with more minority 
populations or greater ethnic divisions are likely to find it more difficult to organize collective 
action because of unfamiliarity with local political process or language barrier (Mohai and Bryant, 
1992; Hamilton, 1995, Cole, Elliott, and Khemmarat, 2013; De Silva et al., 2016). We use Voter 
Turnout and the fraction of voting for the Democratic presidential candidate (Democrats) as the 
proxies for the tendency of a community to act collectively for environmental causes. 
Communities that are more politically active and have well developed mechanisms for 
information gathering and dissemination are more likely to be able to organize themselves and 
impose pressure on toxic releasing facilities (Hamilton, 1993). A high willingness to organize 
collectively for an environmental cause is traditionally thought to be the Democrat’s domain 
(Becker, 2004). Finally, we use Population Density that measures the number of potential victims 
to the toxic emissions in neighborhoods as a proxy for the liability of a facility for damages to 
human health. The number of residents in a neighborhood is a factor in legal calculations of the 
net present value of earnings streams in communities’ damage claims in courts (Hamilton, 1995b). 
 It is important to consider the results of different proxy variables jointly because these 
factors can also contain other information that is hard to control (e.g. Voter Turnout may also 
reflect residents’ tendency to voice for employment opportunities brought by facilities (Wolverton, 
2009)). We hypothesize that facilities would reduce more emissions in T years after 1990 if located 
in communities with low population density, low income, low educational attainment, small share 
of white, low voter turnout, or small share of voting for Democrats in 1990.  
We measure regulatory pressure  𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑙0  by the Attainment Status of a county to the National 
Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS). The NAAQS regulates six criteria air pollutants (Ozone, 
NOx, SO2, CO, PM10, PM2.5) but many toxic pollutants are precursors to the criteria pollutants. 
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Many studies have found evidence that facilities have more pollution reduction and more 
investment on pollution abatement if located in counties with a non-attainment status since the 
1990 Amendment on CAA (Auffhammer, Bento, and Lowe, 2009; Lee and Alm, 2004). We expect 
a community with “non-attainment” status to impose higher pressure on the toxic facilities. We 
control for local labor cost using average Wage Rate of production workers, which may affect the 
cost of production or labor-intensive pollution control activities (Morgenstern, Pizer, and Shih, 
2002). We control for local market size using the average Employment Level. We also control for 
the preference of toxic facilities to operate in the vicinity of other industrial activity, by including 
the number of other Toxic Facilities. The transportation cost that may affect facilities’ cost of 
shipping products, inputs, and waste for offsite treatment is controlled by including the miles of 
Highways and miles of Railways in each community. 𝑋𝑖𝑙0 includes the initial employment and 
toxic emission levels of the facilities. More discussion on 𝑋𝑖𝑙0 is provided in the next section.  
 
4.3. Empirical Tests 
Our empirical model builds upon the analysis on Δ𝑄𝑖𝑙 and Δ𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙, and we use a cross-sectional 
model to explain the difference in production scales and toxic emission levels of facilities between 
1990 and 2011. We measure the production scale Q using the number of employees (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑙) of a 
facility55. We measure the toxic emission level 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙 using the total toxic releases generated by 
aggregating releases of each toxic chemical reported to TRI by a facility56. The TRI chemical list 
                                                 
55 Some studies in the literature (e.g. Nakosteen & Zimmer, 1987) use the scales of both employment and sales as the measure of 
production scale, in order to control for the input and output dimensions of a facility’s operations. However, our data only have a 
small portion of facilities with independently reported sales data; for the rest, their sales data were estimated from the 
employment data. Our regressions using sales as a measure for production scale generate qualitatively similar results.  
56 We do not weigh chemicals by toxicity following the results from Arora and Cason (1999) who find that most chemicals on the 
TRI list have similar toxicity, and that the response of facilities’ total releases to the local community demographics is not 




had several changes during 1988 to 1995 and then was relatively stable until 2011 57 . For 
consistency, we only use the chemicals in the 1988 TRI chemical list to construct 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙. We also 
do an analysis on 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙 constructed with chemicals in the 1995 updated TRI chemical list but 
focus on the difference in 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙 between 1995 and 2010. The later includes information on 
facilities’ change in emissions of the newly added chemicals after 1988, which include over 50% 
of the chemicals on the updated TRI chemical list58.  
         We predict 𝛥𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑙  and 𝛥𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙  using a reduced form linear model with vectors of 
community socio-economic characteristics 𝑴𝒍 and location economic and regulatory factors 𝒁𝒍 as 
exogenous variables and a number of controls. The equations on 𝛥𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑙 and 𝛥𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙 are  
𝛥𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑙 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏𝑴𝒍𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟎 + 𝜷𝟐𝒁𝒍𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟎 + 𝛾1𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑙1990 + 𝜆𝑙 + 𝜆𝑘 + 𝝐𝒊𝒌𝒍
𝑬𝒎𝒑
  (4.1) 
and  
𝛥𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑙 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏𝑴𝒍𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟎 + 𝜷𝟐𝒁𝒍𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟎 + 𝛾1𝛥𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑙 + 𝛾2𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑙1990 + 𝛾3𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑙1990 + 𝜆𝑙
+ 𝜆𝑘 + 𝝐𝒊𝒌𝒍
𝑬𝒎𝒊𝒔                                                                                               (4.2) 
, where k denotes industries of facilities, 𝛥 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑙 denotes the observed change in employment of 
facility i, 𝜆𝑘 and 𝜆𝑙 denote the industry and location dummies, and 𝝐𝒊𝒌𝒍 denotes the unobserved 
facility-specific factors that may affect the change in employment or emission levels of facilities.  
        𝑴𝒍  includes the community characteristics that we use as proxies for the community 
pressure on the pollution of facilities. We define communities at the census-tract level. Census 
tracts provide a reasonable approximation to the neighborhoods directly affected by the toxic 
                                                 
57 The TRI chemical list contained 296 chemicals in the 1988 list. 37 chemicals were added between 1990 to 1994, and 286 
chemicals were added in 1995. In 1998, 7 industries were started to be required to report. We do not include facilities in these 
industries in our analysis. In 2000, the permanent bio-accumulative toxic (PBT) chemicals are added, but these chemicals are 
reported in grams and the releases of these chemicals are typically very small comparing to the releases of other chemicals, which 
are reported in pounds. We consider the measurement error caused by the releases of PBT chemicals to be relatively small. In 
2011, 16 chemicals are added to the list.  
58 We only do the regressions for the stayers. For the movers, the changes in the TRI chemical list affect both themselves and 




chemicals emitted by facilities and thus of the geographic area within which facilities might 
experience the effect of pressure from local communities59. The coefficient 𝜷𝟏 of 𝑴𝒍 is of primary 
interest in both regressions. It predicts the direction of the relationship between community socio-
economic characteristics and the change in emission levels or employment scales of facilities. An 
important concern in identifying 𝜷𝟏 is the possibility of a reverse causality issue: residents may 
migrate in response to the change in emission levels or job opportunities from facilities, so location 
demographics are determined by the facilities’ change in performance rather than vice versa 
(Tiebout, 1956). We use the 1990 value of the community demographics 𝑴𝒍𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟎  to explain 
facilities’ change in emission and employment from 1990 to 2011, so that the demographic 
characteristics predate the performance change of facilities and can be treated as exogenous.  
          𝒁𝒍 includes the location regulatory (𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑙0) and economic factors as discussed above. In 
explaining the change in employment scale in equation (4.1), we also control for the initial level 
of employment of facilities in 1990 (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑙1990) to catch the effect of the unobserved facility-
specific factors that determine both the employment scale and its future change rate of facilities. 
In explaining the change in emission levels in equation (4.2), we instead control for the initial level 
of both the employment and emissions (𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑙1990). We additionally include Δ 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑙, and this 
leads our regression to explain the change in emission levels of facilities conditional on the change 
in employment scales. In this way, we interpret the coefficients of 𝑴 and Z as the effect of the 
location characteristics on facilities’ emission levels through affecting facilities’ efforts other than 
increase or decrease production scales. We include industry and state-level location fixed effects 
                                                 
59 Although Currie et al. (2015), notes that releases of eight most common toxic chemicals affect the local ambient air quality within 
a 1-mile radius circle around the facility, public concerns about toxic pollution can spillover to adjacent areas, even across cities 
and regions, through the media reports and political activism (Hamilton 2005). A census tract, which is typically larger than a 1-
mile radius circle is likely to provide the appropriate scale to capture public opposition to toxic releasing facilities, but it might be 
too fine in terms of spatial resolution in urban areas where census tracts can be much smaller. 50% of the facilities located in census 
tracts smaller than 3.12 sq. mile, about the area of a 1-mile radius circle. 99% of the census tracts in our sample are smaller than 
200 sq. mile, about the area of an 8-mile radius circle.  
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in both equations to control for unobserved factors, such as environmental regulations on industries, 
local tax policies, and public amenities that have been shown in the literature to influence facilities’ 
expansion or environmental performance. We cluster standard errors at the census tract level to 
adjust for the non-independence in facilities’ performance in the same location due to common 
location-specific factors and the demonstration effect among collocated facilities on environmental 
management (Gray and Shadbegian, 2007).  
         We first use an OLS regression to estimate equation (4.1) and (4.2). Since the distribution 
of employment and the TRI-reported emissions are approximately log-normal, we use the log of 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑙  and 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙  to construct the dependent variables. 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙  is left-censored and with many 
zeros in each year, as the TRI only requires facilities to report if their releases of a chemical exceed 
a reporting threshold. The zeros result in missing values in log emissions and thus cause an 
exclusion of many facilities from this regression. To minimize the impact of this issue, we use a 
5-year lagged average emissions and construct the dependent variable Δ log(𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠)𝑖𝑙 , which 
results in Δ log(𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠)𝑖𝑙  as the mean of log (𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠)𝑖𝑙  during 2007 to 2011 minus the mean of 
log (𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠)𝑖𝑙 during 1990 to 1994
60. For consistency, we also use lagged average employment to 
construct the dependent variable on Δ log(𝐸𝑚𝑝)𝑖𝑙  and the initial levels 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑙,𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 90 𝑡𝑜 94  and 
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙,𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 90 𝑡𝑜 94.  
         We then use a Tobit regression and a set of quantile regressions at high quantiles to estimate 
equation (4.1) and (4.2) to manage the censoring problem on 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙
61. Quantile regressions at 
high quantiles are not affected much by the unobserved values in emissions. Because the censoring 
is on emission levels rather than change in emissions, we use log(𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠)𝑖𝑙,𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 07 𝑡𝑜 11  as the 
                                                 
60 Similarly, in the analysis on change in emissions between 1995 and 2010, we calculate Δ log 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙 as 
log (𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙 , 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 2006 𝑡𝑜 2010) minus log (𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑙 , 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 1995 𝑡𝑜 1999).  
61 The censoring threshold is set at log (500). The threshold for TRI reporting varies by chemicals, but the highest threshold is 
500 pounds.  
 
 91 
dependent variable and add log(𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠)𝑖𝑙,𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 90 𝑡𝑜 94 as an explanatory variable in these regressions.  
 
4.4 Data and Sample  
Our data are compiled from multiple sources. Information about toxic chemical releases and waste 
management of facilities in each year is obtained from the 1990 to 2011 TRI data. Information 
about other facility characteristics is obtained from the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) 
data (Walls, 2011). The NETS provides annual snapshots of the Duns and Bradstreet (DB) 
database on the relocation history, employment, sales, industry SIC code, and other characteristics 
of business establishments since 1990. We merge the TRI and the NETS data through matching 
the street address, name, and industry SIC code of facilities in the two datasets62. Information on 
population density, per capita income, college degree, and racial composition of census tracts is 
obtained from the US Census data. We use the 1990 Census as stated earlier. Information on voting 
for the US presidential elections of counties are obtained from the Dave Leip’s Atlas. Information 
on the county-average wage rate, employment level, and county attainment status to NAAQS are 
obtained from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics and the EPA Greenbook, respectively. Information on the highway miles and 
railway miles are obtained from the National Highway Planning Network and the National 
Transportation Atlas database. These datasets are merged with the TRI using geographic 
coordinates and the county FIPS code corresponding to each facility. 
         Our sample builds upon Wang et al. (2018)’ sample, which consists of facilities that 
reported to the TRI at least once during 1990 to 2011 and have their facility and location data 
collected by the NETS and the Census over the same period. We eliminate facilities born after 
                                                 
62 For the details on how we merge the data, refer to Wang et al. (2018, manuscript) at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3264740 
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1990 or shutdown before 2011 and obtain a balanced panel in order to compare the changes in 
performance of facility stayers within the same temporal window. Facilities relocated during the 
sampling period as also eliminated to reduce the potential noise from relocation decisions on the 
performance change of facilities. We also eliminate facilities belonging to industries that were 
added to the TRI reporting list after 199063. As compared to the sample of all facilities ever 
reported to TRI, facilities in our sample have a similar mean and median of toxic emission levels 
in 1990 but a 75% lower mean in 2010. It indicates that our sample tends to include facilities that 
are major emission reducers. The final sample has 9,230 facilities. The locations of facilities cover 
6,217 census tracts and 1,153 counties.  
 Table 4.1 shows the variables used in the empirical test, their measures, and their mean and 
standard deviations. Comparison on the numbers of emission levels in 1990 and 2010 shows an 
emission reduction of the facilities, both in terms of the 1988 and the 1995 TRI-listed chemicals. 
Figure 4.1 presents a clearer trend of the decrease in emissions. Emissions of both the 1988 listed 
and the 1995 listed chemicals decrease smoothly. But the 1995-chemical releases decrease by more 
than 50%, about 30000 pounds from 1995 to 2010, while the 1988-chemical releases decrease by 
less than 10000 pounds. Figure 4.2 presents the employment scales of the facilities over years, 
showing a gradual increase before 2000 and then a sharper decrease until 2011. However, the 
overall average decrease in employment scale is only about 15%, far less than the emission level. 
Table 4.1 also shows large variations in the total waste amount, sales, and growth rate of facilities, 
as well as the fraction of white of the located communities. Some location characteristics such as 
income and voter turnout have only small variations.  
                                                 
63 These industries include coal mining, metal mining, electric utilities, commercial hazardous waste treatment, chemicals and 
allied products-wholesale, petroleum bulk terminals and plants-wholesale, solvent recovery services. Facilities in these industries 




Table 4.2 presents results from the OLS regression explaining the change in emissions of the 1988 
TRI listed chemicals of facility from 1990 to 2011. Facilities under the reporting threshold from 
1990 to 1994 or from 2007 to 2011 are not included in this regression because of their missing 
values in the dependent variable Δ log(𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠)𝑖𝑙 . Excluding these facilities makes this analysis 
more focused on the “large” polluters with high emissions. Given the double log functional form 
(for most factors), reported coefficients are elasticities64. 
 Columns (1) to (5) in Table 4.2 present results from different specifications of covariates 
and fixed effects. As expected, facilities’ change in emission levels has a positive correlation with 
their change in employment scales (proxy for the production scale). However, since the number of 
employees in the sample has been steady over time, the change in employment scales have not 
contributed much to the change in emission levels (coefficient < 0.4). The 1990 to 1994 mean 
emission levels show a negative and significant effect, indicating that large polluting facilities 
tended to have more decrease in emissions over time. The 1990 to 1994 mean employment scales 
show a positive effect, indicating that facilities with large production scales may have more 
increase in emissions over time. Community socio-economic characteristics do not show 
significant effects in most specifications. Population Density shows a negative and significant 
effect only before industry fixed effects are controlled. Educational Attainment shows a negative 
and significant effect before the controls and fixed effects are added. The interaction between 
Educational Attainment and emission levels of facilities shows a negative effect in Column (7) 
and (8), indicating a stronger response of large polluting facilities to local education level. 
                                                 
64 Tables on emissions of 1988 TRI listed chemicals and change in emissions of facilities from 1995 to 2010 are shown in the 
appendix. Similar results are found on facilities’ change of emissions from 1995 to 2010. Results on facilities’ change in 
emission of the 1988 TRI listed chemicals show weaker significance in some coefficients, perhaps because of a lack of variations 
over years in the 1988 listed chemicals.  
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However, in total, these results indicate a relatively weak effect of community pressure on the 
facilities’ emission of the 1988 TRI listed chemicals.  
        Table 4.3 presents results from the OLS regression explaining the change in emission levels 
of the 1995 TRI listed chemicals of facilities from 1995 to 2010. Perhaps because of more 
variations in the dependent variable, effects of the location characteristics such as Population 
Density and Educational Attainment start to show some significance. Population Density shows a 
negative effect and only loses significance in column (5) where controls of location economic 
factors are added. Educational Attainment shows a significant effect in all specifications. The 
robust negative effect Educational Attainment accords with Shapiro (2005), and suggests that 
facilities may change emission levels in response to local residents’ knowledge on pollution and 
ability to process complex information. Based on the coefficient in column (5), we calculate that 
1 percent increase in the share of residents with a college degree in a census tract is associated 
with 1.6 percent decrease in the emission growth rate of a toxic facility. We do not find significant 
incremental effects of Population Density or Educational Attainment on large polluting facilities.  
 In Appendix C, we present results of a complementary regression examining impacts of 
community characteristics on facilities’ waste management on the chemicals in the 1995 list. We 
examine facilities’ production-related waste per unit of sales (Unit Waste) and end-of-pipe waste 
treatment, measured by the percent of waste being treated, burned for energy recovery, or recycled 
(Waste Managed). We find that facilities located in less populated and less educated communities 
are more likely to increase their Unit Waste and less likely to increase Waste Managed from 1995 
to 2010 (see Table C4). Both findings are consistent with our previous results on the effect of 
community characteristics on the emissions (waste not managed). They provide indirect evidence 
that increase in production waste and less pollution control could be reasons behind the increase 
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in toxic emission of the facilities located in less populated and low educated areas.   
 In both Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, Income Level and Non-Hispanic White do not show a 
significant effect, which provides no support for the environmental injustice hypothesis that 
conditional on other location characteristics, facilities reduce less emission in poor and minority 
areas. Voter turnout and Democrats also do not show a significant effect, suggesting minimal 
effects of communities’ ability to take political / collective action or residents’ political ideologies 
on the change in emissions of facility. Attainment Status to NAAQS, as a proxy for pressure from 
regulation agencies, also shows no significant effect. By contrast, the economic factors, Wage Rate 
and Railways show positive and significant effects. This indicates less emission reduction of 
facilities in the communities with high labor cost and low transportation cost. As stated earlier, 
this could be because many pollution control activities are labor-intensive and that more 
production-related waste is generated due to a low cost of transporting materials and output 
products.  
 Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 present results from the Tobit regression. We restrict the coefficient 
of facilities’ initial emission level as 1 in order to generate comparable results to the OLS 
regression, which has the change in emission levels as the dependent variable. Table 4.4 presents 
the results for the 1988 TRI-listed chemicals emission. After correcting for the censoring bias, 
Population Density shows a stronger and significant effect in the specifications with industry fixed 
effects. Educational Attainment also show a significant effect conditional on state fixed effects. 
However, effects of these two factors are still insignificant after the economic controls are added. 
In Table 4.5 for the emission of the 1995 listed chemicals, the effect of Population Density and 




         Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 present results from the Tobit regression without constraints on 
the coefficient of the initial emission level. In both tables, the initial emission level has a strong 
prediction power on the emission level at the end of the study period, showing a consistent 
emission pattern of facilities over time. The change in employment scales and the initial 
employment scales of facilities also show a positive and significant effect, similar to that in the 
OLS regression. Educational Attainment shows a stronger and significant effect in Table 4.6 on 
the emission of the 1988 chemicals, perhaps because of its correlation with the scale of facilities’ 
emission levels. Conditional on this correlation, the effect of the interaction between Educational 
Attainment and the initial emission level of facilities does not show significance anymore. In Table 
7 for the emission of the 1995 chemicals, Educational Attainment shows a similar stronger effect.  
         Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 present results from the quantile regressions at the 0.75 and 0.9 
quantile of the distribution of log(𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠)𝑖𝑙,𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 07 𝑡𝑜 11 . Population Density and Educational 
Attainment show stronger and significant effects on the emission levels of facilities at the higher 
quantile in both tables. This accords with our previous results and suggests that large polluting 
facilities might be more affected by community pressure. At the 0.75 quantile in columns (3) to 
(5) in Table 4.8, Democrat also shows a negative and significant effect, which indicates an impact 
of communities’ political ideologies on the emission level of relatively small polluting facilities.  
        Table 4.10 presents results from the OLS regression on the change in employment scales of 
facilities from 1990 to 2011. Facilities’ change in employment scales shows a negative correlation 
with their initial employment scales in the early 1990s, suggesting a slower growth of large-size 
facilities. Population Density and Democrat also show a negative effect, suggesting a smaller 
employment increase of facilities located in communities with more people affected by pollution 
and with a higher propensity of supporting government spending on environmental affairs. 
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Educational Attainment and Voter Turnout show positive effects. This accords with Wolverton 
(2009) and suggests that high Educational Attainment and Voter Turnout may contain other 
information such as high labor quality and residents’ tendency to voice demand for employment 
opportunities, which may favor industrial activities. The mixed effects of the community 
characteristics suggest a relatively weak effect of community pressure on the employment scales 
of facilities. 
 Together, the above results show that facilities that are located in communities with lower 
pressure on pollution tend to reduce less emission in the first twenty years of the TRI. However, 
the response of facilities’ employment scales to community pressure, especially to the Educational 
Attainment of communities, are not in the same direction. This indicates that facilities may not 
change their emission levels mainly through altering production scales.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the differential environmental performance of toxic-
releasing facilities in response to the pressure on pollution in their located communities. We draw 
evidence from facilities under the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), which increases information 
transparency between the toxic-releasing facilities and local communities, and is believed to 
increase pressure from communities on the facilities to reduce emission. We examine the effect of 
the community pressure, proxied by community socio-economic characteristics, on the change in 
toxic emission levels of the facilities from 1990 to 2011. We find that facilities located in the high 
educated and densely populated communities have more emission reduction from 1990 to 2011. 
 Although the high emission reduction of facilities in the populated areas suggests 
efficiency of the market in allocating environmental resources, our findings on the robust effect of 
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educational attainment on explaining the emission reduction suggest an injustice against the less 
educated population. Given that most literature (in these years) on environmental injustice has 
focused on the sorting of residents in response to the pollution distribution pattern (Banzhaf and 
Timmins, 2019), this paper from the perspective of polluting facilities is particularly useful to 
policy makers. It suggests regulators to refocus on the impact of the pollution generators’ behavior. 
It also highlights the importance of policies to consider the distributional effect of policy benefits 
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Figure 4.2. Employment Scales of Facilities over Years  
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Table 4.1. Summary Statistics on Characteristics of Facilities and their Communities 
 
 
Variables Measure Mean [S.D.] 
Facility Characteristics in 1990   
Emission (1988 TRI-listed Chemicals) in 1990 Toxic emission level in 1000 pounds  22.4  
[162.8] 
Emission (1988 TRI-listed Chemicals) in 2010  13.8  
[207.2] 
Emission (All TRI-listed Chemicals) in 1990  101.2  
[2182.7] 
Emission (All TRI-listed Chemicals) in 1990  26.5  
[407.4] 
Emp in 1990 Number of Employees (Person) 193.9  
[589.0] 
Emp in 2010  168.9  
[347.1] 
Waste Total toxic waste generated in 1000 pounds 283.9  
[4675.2] 
Sales Sales amount in Million $ 37.6  
[122.9] 
Growth Annual sales Growth Rate (%) 0.08  
[0.41] 




Single Dummy for standalone facility  
(1= Not owned by other firms) 
0.35  
[0.48] 
   
Location Characteristics (in 1990)   
Population Density Log population per sq. mile 6.70  
[1.57] 
Income Level Log per capita income in 1000$ (Year 2012 value) 9.25  
[0.64] 
Educational Attainment Fraction bachelor’s degree or higher  0.10 
[0.07] 
Non-Hispanic White Fraction non-Hispanic White 0.86  
[4.30] 
Voter Turnout Fraction voting in presidential election (county) 0.40 
[0.06] 








Toxic Facilities Number of toxic facilities in a census tract  3.58 
[3.52] 
Wage Rate Log industry-specific wage rate ($ per week, county)  6.94  
[0.30] 
Employment Level Employment Level in log. Persons, county average 12.1  
[1.5] 
Miles of Highways Highway miles in census tract 14.0  
[16.4] 
Miles of Railways Railway miles in census tract 12.0  
[11.9] 
Number of Facilities  9,230 
Notes: 1. Standard deviations in brackets.  
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Table 4.2. Cross-sectional Model on Change in Emissions– OLS Regression 
(1988 Chemicals, 1990 to 2011) 
 
         
Dep. Var. = ∆ log(𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠)𝑖𝑙 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Emission Levels in log (Mean, 90 to 94)  -0.551*** -0.556*** -0.576*** -0.579*** -0.624*** -0.543*** -0.590*** 
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.083) (0.030) (0.086) 
Change in Employment Scale (diff in log) 0.356*** 0.161** 0.156** 0.203*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.211*** 0.210*** 
 (0.068) (0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
Employment in log (Mean, 90 to 94)   0.216*** 0.214*** 0.343*** 0.324*** 0.324*** 0.326*** 0.326*** 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Community Char. (1990 value)         
Population Density (in log) -0.049 -0.135*** -0.086** -0.063 0.005 -0.045 0.005 -0.047 
 (0.047) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.063) (0.115) (0.063) (0.116) 
Per capita Income (in log) -0.013 0.116 0.021 -0.026 -0.095 -0.094 -0.095 -0.094 
 (0.121) (0.104) (0.106) (0.104) (0.109) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) 
Share of College Degree 0.047 -1.588* -0.821 -0.345 0.235 0.229 3.041* 3.057* 
 (0.978) (0.817) (0.815) (0.789) (0.816) (0.816) (1.839) (1.835) 
Share of White 0.026 0.192 0.281 0.298 0.343 0.341 0.337 0.335 
 (0.292) (0.255) (0.276) (0.276) (0.277) (0.277) (0.277) (0.277) 
Voter Turnout   1.256 0.733 2.403 2.845 2.552 2.507 2.644 2.598 
 (1.559) (1.340) (1.786) (1.775) (1.808) (1.806) (1.816) (1.814) 
Share of Democrats vote -1.568 -0.664 -0.840 -1.973 -2.061 -2.047 -2.186 -2.173 
 (1.953) (1.649) (1.846) (1.833) (1.871) (1.870) (1.875) (1.874) 
Interaction Terms         
Pop. Density * Emis (Mean 90 to 94)      0.007  0.007 
      (0.012)  (0.012) 
Share of College * Emis (Mean 90 to 94)       -0.397* -0.400* 
       (0.226) (0.225) 
Other Location Chars. in 1990         
Attainment Status to NAAQS 0.083 0.140 0.127 0.020 0.051 0.051 0.044 0.043 
 (0.150) (0.128) (0.157) (0.155) (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) 
Industry-specific Wage Rate in log     0.596* 0.611* 0.564* 0.580* 
     (0.317) (0.318) (0.317) (0.318) 
County-avg. Employment Level in log     -0.077 -0.077 -0.071 -0.071 
     (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Num. of TRI-reporting Facilities      0.037** 0.037** 0.036** 0.036** 
     (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Miles of Highways      -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
     (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Miles of Railways     0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 
     (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
         
State FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,533 2,533 2,533 2,533 2,533 2,533 2,533 2,533 
R-squared 0.012 0.279 0.310 0.345 0.348 0.349 0.349 0.349 
 
Note: 1. Standard errors clustered at the census tract level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
2. Emissions of chemicals on the 1988 TRI chemical list only.  
3. Facilities without TRI reporting or with all reported emission being zero during 1990 to 1994 are not included in this regression as we cannot 
have a benchmark to judge how much the facilities have changed their emission. Facilities with the same censoring problem in the emissions 




Table 4.3. Cross-sectional Model on Change in Emissions– OLS Regression 
(1995 Chemicals, from 1995 to 2010)  
 
         
Dep. Var. = ∆ log(𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠)𝑖𝑙 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Emission Levels in log (Mean, 95 to 99)  -0.313*** -0.319*** -0.338*** -0.343*** -0.427*** -0.339*** -0.423*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.072) (0.030) (0.076) 
Change in Employment Scale (diff in log) 0.041 -0.030 -0.029 0.029 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.037 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
Employment in log (Mean, 95 to 95)   0.029 0.027 0.132*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 
  (0.036) (0.036) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Community Char. (1990 value)         
Population Density (in log) -0.054* -0.121*** -0.092*** -0.070** -0.042 -0.152 -0.041 -0.152 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.044) (0.106) (0.044) (0.106) 
Per capita Income (in log) -0.054 0.025 0.001 -0.013 -0.040 -0.038 -0.040 -0.038 
 (0.087) (0.078) (0.079) (0.081) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) 
Share of College Degree -1.193* -2.147*** -1.868*** -1.763** -1.584** -1.590** -1.192 -1.136 
 (0.708) (0.669) (0.692) (0.692) (0.717) (0.716) (2.332) (2.339) 
Share of White 0.011 0.081 0.138 0.230 0.261 0.254 0.260 0.253 
 (0.204) (0.192) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.210) 
Voter Turnout   -0.496 -0.639 -0.925 -0.337 -0.605 -0.671 -0.600 -0.666 
 (1.051) (0.968) (1.260) (1.263) (1.282) (1.282) (1.282) (1.281) 
Share of Democrats vote 0.767 1.089 0.510 -0.262 -0.594 -0.549 -0.601 -0.557 
 (1.300) (1.211) (1.336) (1.334) (1.374) (1.372) (1.375) (1.373) 
Interaction Terms         
Pop. Density * Emis (Mean 95 to 99)      0.013  0.013 
      (0.010)  (0.010) 
Share of College * Emis (Mean 95 to 99)       -0.046 -0.054 
       (0.257) (0.258) 
Other Location Characteristics in 1990         
Attainment Status to NAAQS 0.121 0.072 0.203* 0.138 0.137 0.136 0.136 0.135 
 (0.103) (0.095) (0.111) (0.112) (0.117) (0.117) (0.116) (0.116) 
Industry-specific Wage Rate in log     0.616*** 0.635*** 0.614*** 0.634*** 
     (0.231) (0.231) (0.232) (0.232) 
County-avg. Employment Level in log     -0.036 -0.037 -0.036 -0.036 
     (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Num. of TRI-reporting Facilities      0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
     (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Miles of Highways      -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
     (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Miles of Railways     0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 
     (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
         
State FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,524 3,524 3,524 3,524 3,524 3,524 3,524 3,524 
R-squared 0.003 0.121 0.142 0.173 0.175 0.176 0.175 0.176 
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Table 4.4. Cross-sectional Model on Emission Levels– Tobit Regression with Coefficient 
Restriction (1988 Chemicals, 1990 to 2011) 
 
     
Dep. Var. = log(𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠. , 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 2007 𝑡𝑜 2011)𝑖𝑙 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Emission Levels in log (Mean 1990 to 1994) *Coefficient restricted to 1  
     
Change in Employment Scale (diff in log) 0.596*** 0.568*** 0.662*** 0.667*** 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.099) (0.099) 
Employment in log (Mean 1990 to 1994)  0.121** 0.101* 0.278*** 0.248*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.062) (0.064) 
Community Characteristics in 1990     
Population Density (in log) -0.230*** -0.171*** -0.148*** -0.065 
 (0.053) (0.055) (0.056) (0.080) 
Per capita Income (in log) 0.150 0.016 -0.040 -0.109 
 (0.135) (0.137) (0.138) (0.144) 
Share of College Degree -3.888*** -2.388** -1.356 -0.731 
 (1.194) (1.191) (1.161) (1.198) 
Share of White 0.170 0.322 0.297 0.343 
 (0.357) (0.386) (0.386) (0.394) 
Voter Turnout   1.436 2.093 2.516 2.104 
 (1.747) (2.309) (2.271) (2.306) 
Share of Democrats vote -1.818 0.140 -2.859 -3.041 
 (2.162) (2.395) (2.375) (2.466) 
Other Location Characteristics in 1990     
Attainment Status to NAAQS 0.318* 0.310 0.059 0.096 
 (0.167) (0.205) (0.203) (0.215) 
Industry-specific Wage Rate in log    0.827** 
    (0.422) 
County-avg. Employment Level in log    -0.080 
    (0.077) 
Number of TRI-reporting Facilities in census tract    0.021 
    (0.022) 
Miles of Highways     0.001 
    (0.007) 
Miles of Railways    0.015* 
    (0.008) 
     
State FE NO YES YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO YES YES 
Observations 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 






Table 4.5. Cross-sectional Model on Emission Levels– Tobit Regression with Coefficient 
Restriction (1995 Chemicals, 1995 to 2010) 
 
     
Dep. Var. = log(𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠. , 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 2007 𝑡𝑜 2011)𝑖𝑙 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Emission Levels in log (Mean 1990 to 1994) *Coefficient restricted to 1  
     
Change in Employment Scale (diff in log) 0.214*** 0.218*** 0.286*** 0.291*** 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) 
Employment in log (Mean 1990 to 1994)  0.029 0.028 0.164*** 0.147*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.039) (0.040) 
Community Characteristics in 1990     
Population Density (in log) -0.164*** -0.137*** -0.114*** -0.094** 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.045) 
Per capita Income (in log) -0.001 0.000 -0.023 -0.066 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) (0.088) 
Share of College Degree -1.697** -1.522** -1.412** -1.308* 
 (0.683) (0.706) (0.694) (0.713) 
Share of White 0.069 0.236 0.330 0.381 
 (0.215) (0.236) (0.233) (0.237) 
Voter Turnout   -0.803 -0.103 0.479 0.296 
 (1.079) (1.382) (1.339) (1.360) 
Share of Democrats vote 1.742 1.698 -0.019 -0.453 
 (1.322) (1.451) (1.423) (1.472) 
Other Location Characteristics in 1990     
Attainment Status to NAAQS 0.257** 0.317** 0.198 0.154 
 (0.105) (0.125) (0.123) (0.132) 
Industry-specific Wage Rate in log    0.641** 
    (0.254) 
County-avg. Employment Level in log    -0.011 
    (0.047) 
Number of TRI-reporting Facilities in census tract    0.016 
    (0.014) 
Miles of Highways     0.001 
    (0.004) 
Miles of Railways    0.003 
    (0.005) 
     
State FE NO YES YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO YES YES 
Observations 5,087 5,087 5,087 5,087 
Note: 1. White sandwich robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.6. Cross-sectional Model on Emission Levels– Tobit Regression  
(1988 Chemicals, 1990 to 2011) 
 
        
Dep. Var.: log(𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠. , 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 2007 𝑡𝑜 2011)𝑖𝑙 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Emission Levels in log (Mean, 90 to 94) 0.544*** 0.526*** 0.488*** 0.480*** 0.528*** 0.494*** 0.540*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.093) (0.032) (0.095) 
Change in Employment Scale (diff in log) 0.498*** 0.473*** 0.554*** 0.559*** 0.559*** 0.560*** 0.559*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) 
Employment in log (Mean, 90 to 94)  0.353*** 0.346*** 0.540*** 0.504*** 0.504*** 0.503*** 0.503*** 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Community Characteristics (1990 value)        
Population Density (in log) -0.224*** -0.158*** -0.147*** -0.093 -0.039 -0.093 -0.040 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.060) (0.124) (0.060) (0.124) 
Per capita Income (in log) 0.202* 0.099 0.050 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 
 (0.108) (0.110) (0.107) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) 
Share of College Degree -4.373*** -3.147*** -2.258** -1.739* -1.737* -0.584 -0.620 
 (0.935) (0.922) (0.876) (0.893) (0.892) (2.182) (2.178) 
Share of White 0.181 0.409 0.432 0.456 0.459 0.453 0.455 
 (0.283) (0.300) (0.292) (0.295) (0.295) (0.296) (0.295) 
Voter Turnout   0.499 1.299 1.595 0.869 0.887 0.878 0.895 
 (1.377) (1.793) (1.711) (1.727) (1.724) (1.727) (1.724) 
% Democrat -0.745 0.989 -1.593 -1.710 -1.717 -1.730 -1.735 
 (1.695) (1.849) (1.781) (1.835) (1.834) (1.835) (1.833) 
Interaction Terms        
Pop. Density * Emis (in log, mean 90 to 94)     -0.007  -0.007 
     (0.014)  (0.014) 
Share of College * Emis (in log, mean 90 to 94)      -0.156 -0.151 
      (0.262) (0.261) 
Other Location Chars. in 1990        
Attainment Status to NAAQS 0.316** 0.322** 0.080 0.117 0.117 0.115 0.115 
 (0.132) (0.160) (0.156) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) 
Industry-specific Wage Rate in log    1.129*** 1.115*** 1.123*** 1.109*** 
    (0.321) (0.323) (0.321) (0.323) 
County-avg. Employment Level in log    -0.108* -0.108* -0.107* -0.106* 
    (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Num. of TRI-reporting Facilities in census tract    0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
Miles of Highways     -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Miles of Railways    0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
        
State FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 




Table 4.7. Cross-sectional Model on Emission Levels– Tobit Regression 
(1995 Chemicals, from 1995 to 2010) 
 
        
Dep. Var.: log(𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠. , 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 2006 𝑡𝑜 2010)𝑖𝑙 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Emission Levels in log (Mean, 95 to 99) 0.750*** 0.737*** 0.720*** 0.711*** 0.654*** 0.710*** 0.654*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.085) (0.035) (0.089) 
Change in Employment Scale (diff in log) 0.224*** 0.226*** 0.292*** 0.300*** 0.300*** 0.300*** 0.300*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
Employment in log (Mean, 95 to 99)  0.155*** 0.160*** 0.305*** 0.284*** 0.283*** 0.284*** 0.283*** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Community Characteristics (1990 value)        
Population Density (in log) -0.189*** -0.156*** -0.134*** -0.104** -0.184 -0.104** -0.184 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.041) (0.125) (0.041) (0.125) 
Per capita Income (in log) 0.049 0.051 0.023 -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 
 (0.076) (0.078) (0.077) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) 
Share of College Degree -2.274*** -2.043*** -1.885*** -1.736*** -1.734*** -1.856 -1.742 
 (0.632) (0.647) (0.630) (0.644) (0.644) (2.672) (2.679) 
Share of White 0.045 0.246 0.349* 0.403* 0.398* 0.403* 0.398* 
 (0.197) (0.214) (0.210) (0.213) (0.213) (0.213) (0.213) 
Voter Turnout   -1.114 -0.461 0.102 -0.308 -0.329 -0.309 -0.329 
 (0.984) (1.257) (1.205) (1.218) (1.220) (1.218) (1.221) 
% Democrat 2.012* 2.206* 0.635 0.259 0.272 0.261 0.272 
 (1.205) (1.318) (1.281) (1.320) (1.321) (1.322) (1.322) 
Interaction Terms        
Pop. Density * Emis (in log, mean 95 to 99)     0.009  0.009 
     (0.013)  (0.013) 
Share of College * Emis (in log, mean 95 to 99)      0.014 0.001 
      (0.292) (0.292) 
Other Location Characteristics in 1990        
Attainment Status to NAAQS 0.226** 0.296*** 0.160 0.137 0.136 0.137 0.136 
 (0.096) (0.113) (0.110) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) 
Industry-specific Wage Rate in log    0.904*** 0.916*** 0.904*** 0.916*** 
    (0.231) (0.232) (0.232) (0.232) 
County-avg. Employment Level in log    -0.045 -0.046 -0.045 -0.046 
    (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Num. of TRI-reporting Facilities in census tract    0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
    (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Miles of Highways     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Miles of Railways    0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
        
State FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 






Table 4.8. Cross-sectional Model on Emission Levels– Quantile Regression (1988 Chemicals, 1990 to 2011) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dep. Var.: log(𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠. , 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 2007 𝑡𝑜 2011)𝑖𝑙 Q = 0.75 Q = 0.75 Q = 0.75 Q = 0.75 Q = 0.75 Q = 0.9 Q = 0.9 Q = 0.9 Q = 0.9 Q = 0.9 
           
Emission Levels in log (Mean, 90 to 94) 0.789*** 0.746*** 0.696*** 0.688*** 0.714*** 0.454*** 0.451*** 0.415*** 0.404*** 0.422*** 
 (0.025) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (0.129) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.074) 
Change in Employment Scale (diff in log) 0.764*** 0.777*** 0.962*** 1.028*** 1.029*** 0.352*** 0.397*** 0.482*** 0.495*** 0.513*** 
 (0.078) (0.081) (0.125) (0.115) (0.112) (0.067) (0.063) (0.061) (0.049) (0.054) 
Employment in log (Mean, 90 to 94)  0.389*** 0.414*** 0.695*** 0.713*** 0.710*** 0.415*** 0.383*** 0.537*** 0.537*** 0.532*** 
 (0.048) (0.054) (0.072) (0.063) (0.062) (0.039) (0.037) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Community Characteristics in 1990           
Population Density (in log) -0.197*** -0.090* -0.114** -0.034 -0.042 -0.272*** -0.182*** -0.199*** -0.029 -0.047 
 (0.033) (0.050) (0.047) (0.066) (0.184) (0.044) (0.027) (0.031) (0.047) (0.099) 
Per capita Income (in log) 0.149 0.103 0.091 0.038 0.035 0.029 -0.027 0.002 -0.019 -0.014 
 (0.119) (0.130) (0.099) (0.117) (0.114) (0.115) (0.079) (0.075) (0.084) (0.081) 
Share of College Degree -3.387*** -2.495*** -1.461 -0.445 2.144 -2.550** -1.672** -1.536** -0.695 1.533 
 (0.979) (0.910) (1.140) (1.112) (4.097) (1.037) (0.744) (0.666) (0.782) (1.633) 
Share of White -0.246 0.040 0.098 -0.088 -0.131 -0.285 -0.083 -0.153 -0.035 0.054 
 (0.266) (0.368) (0.311) (0.369) (0.357) (0.273) (0.288) (0.273) (0.298) (0.320) 
Voter Turnout   1.551 4.354** 3.101 1.201 1.688 1.546 1.893 4.261*** 3.490*** 2.680** 
 (1.255) (1.950) (2.063) (1.938) (1.749) (1.449) (1.388) (0.938) (1.281) (1.219) 
% Democrat -1.307 0.354 -4.590** -3.462* -3.669** -1.792 -1.523 -2.896** -1.644 -1.816 
 (1.569) (2.003) (2.075) (2.045) (1.755) (1.687) (1.340) (1.358) (1.453) (1.391) 
Interaction Terms           
Pop. Density * Emis (in log, mean 90 to 94)     0.001     0.003 
     (0.018)     (0.011) 
Share of College * Emis (in log, mean 90 to 94)     -0.342     -0.382** 
     (0.424)     (0.187) 
Other Location Characteristics in 1990           
Attainment Status to NAAQS 0.283** 0.239 0.264* 0.401** 0.378** 0.222 0.141 -0.163* 0.045 0.077 
 (0.121) (0.182) (0.160) (0.181) (0.178) (0.162) (0.105) (0.096) (0.121) (0.106) 
Industry-specific Wage Rate in log    0.926** 0.830**    0.868*** 0.925*** 
    (0.383) (0.375)    (0.253) (0.212) 
County-avg. Employment Level in log    -0.148** -0.143**    -0.179*** -0.179*** 
    (0.064) (0.063)    (0.044) (0.041) 
Number of TRI-reporting Facilities in census tract    0.017 0.016    0.026* 0.023 
    (0.015) (0.016)    (0.015) (0.014) 
Miles of Highways     -0.004 -0.004    0.005 0.006* 
    (0.007) (0.006)    (0.005) (0.003) 
Miles of Railways    0.021*** 0.020***    0.014*** 0.015*** 
    (0.006) (0.005)    (0.004) (0.004) 
           
State FE NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO YES YES YES NO NO YES YES YES 
Observations 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 




Table 4.9. Cross-sectional Model on Emission Levels– Quantile Regression (1995 Chemicals, 1995 to 2010) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. Var.: log(𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠. , 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 2007 𝑡𝑜 2011)𝑖𝑙 Q = 0.75 Q = 0.75 Q = 0.75 Q = 0.75 Q = 0.9 Q = 0.9 Q = 0.9 Q = 0.9 
         
Emission Levels in log (Mean, 90 to 94) 0.824*** 0.817*** 0.792*** 0.794*** 0.641*** 0.635*** 0.599*** 0.600*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Change in Employment Scale (diff in log) 0.112*** 0.119*** 0.163*** 0.178*** 0.056 0.061 0.163*** 0.158*** 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.055) (0.055) (0.044) (0.055) (0.039) (0.031) 
Employment in log (Mean, 90 to 94)  0.105*** 0.108*** 0.227*** 0.212*** 0.227*** 0.216*** 0.287*** 0.286*** 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.033) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) 
Community Characteristics (1990 value)         
Population Density (in log) -0.130*** -0.117*** -0.090*** -0.061** -0.169*** -0.160*** -0.136*** -0.110*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.031) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.032) 
Per capita Income (in log) -0.023 -0.007 0.008 -0.008 -0.005 -0.064 -0.012 -0.000 
 (0.052) (0.044) (0.050) (0.052) (0.080) (0.069) (0.070) (0.059) 
Share of College Degree -1.849*** -1.594*** -1.856*** -1.385*** -1.678*** -1.624*** -2.253*** -2.178*** 
 (0.316) (0.344) (0.416) (0.403) (0.640) (0.442) (0.437) (0.465) 
Share of White -0.075 0.059 0.207 0.183 -0.196 -0.216 -0.172 -0.108 
 (0.119) (0.141) (0.131) (0.156) (0.197) (0.149) (0.192) (0.169) 
Voter Turnout   0.093 0.339 0.145 -0.472 0.520 -0.087 0.617 0.647 
 (0.568) (0.729) (0.785) (0.825) (1.004) (0.852) (1.005) (1.010) 
% Democrat 0.921 1.094 0.374 0.964 0.664 2.213** 0.514 -0.393 
 (0.775) (0.822) (0.936) (0.970) (1.215) (1.071) (1.161) (1.139) 
Other Location Characteristics in 1990         
Attainment Status to NAAQS 0.056 0.139* 0.131 0.128 0.016 -0.012 -0.049 -0.027 
 (0.057) (0.072) (0.082) (0.085) (0.084) (0.085) (0.076) (0.083) 
Industry-specific Wage Rate in log    0.571***    0.484*** 
    (0.161)    (0.150) 
County-avg. Employment Level in log    -0.052*    0.003 
    (0.029)    (0.034) 
Number of TRI-reporting Facilities in census tract    0.005    -0.021* 
    (0.008)    (0.011) 
Miles of Highways     0.002    0.002 
    (0.003)    (0.003) 
Miles of Railways    0.005*    0.008** 
    (0.003)    (0.003) 
State FE NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO TES YES NO NO YES YES 
Observations 5,088 5,088 5,088 5,088 5,088 5,088 5,088 5,088 
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Table 4.10. OLS Regression on Change in Employment Scale  
 
     
Dep. Var. = ∆ log(𝐸𝑚𝑝)𝑖𝑙   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Employment Scale, Mean 1990 to 1994 (in log) -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.296*** -0.294*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Community Characteristics in 1990     
Population Density (in log) -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.030*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
Per capita Income (in log) -0.017 -0.011 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Share of College Degree 0.297** 0.387*** 0.332** 0.336** 
 (0.133) (0.138) (0.137) (0.142) 
Share of White 0.070* 0.071* 0.054 0.047 
 (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) 
Voter Turnout   0.672*** 0.567** 0.432* 0.448* 
 (0.204) (0.260) (0.256) (0.258) 
% Democrat -1.225*** -1.077*** -0.854*** -0.778*** 
 (0.252) (0.283) (0.280) (0.287) 
Other Location Characteristics in 1990      
Attainment Status to NAAQS -0.036* -0.050** -0.036 -0.031 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) 
Industry-specific Wage Rate in log    -0.073 
    (0.051) 
County-avg. Employment Level in log    -0.002 
    (0.009) 
Number of TRI-reporting Facilities in census tract    0.003 
    (0.003) 
Miles of Highways    0.000 
    (0.001) 
Miles of Railways    -0.001 
    (0.001) 
     
State FE NO YES YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO YES YES 
Observations 9,230 9,230 9,230 9,230 
R-squared 0.162 0.169 0.186 0.187 




CHAPTER 5: Location Choice of Toxic Releasing Facilities and Socio-Economic 
Characteristics - Environmental Injustice at the Micro-Scale 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Communities of color, which are usually also poor, are widely believed to be routinely targeted to 
host facilities that have negative environmental impacts65. To find statistical evidence on this 
phenomenon, environmental justice scholars have studied the location of facilities emitting toxic 
chemicals since the 1980s. A vast body of literature has discussed theories on the location 
distribution of toxic-releasing facilities and have found empirical evidence on a concentration of 
these facilities in areas with low income and large minority groups. Early research attributed this 
collocation to the institutional discrimination and unfair regulating efforts of governments against 
socio-economically disadvantaged groups (Bullard, 1983; Mohai and Bryant, 1992; United Church 
of Christ, 1987). Subsequent research considered potential confounding effects of economic and 
political factors and examined the response of facilities’ location choice to the community socio-
economic characteristics independent of other factors related to them (Anderton et al., 1994; 
Hamilton, 1995b; Wolverton, 2009). These studies, however, do not have a consensus on choosing 
the control factors, and many of them lack a systematic theoretical foundation to derive 
explanations for the effect of community characteristics in different geographic scales66. This may 
account, at least in part, for their mixed evidence on the environmental injustice hypothesis about 
whether race and / or income drive the location of toxic-releasing facilities.  
 In this study, we contribute to the literature by building a micro-level location choice 
framework and examining the impact of community socio-economic characteristics on the entering 
                                                 
65 See examples https://www.nrdc.org/stories/environmental-justice-movement, https://www.latinousa.org/2019/06/19/cityofoil/ 




of toxic facilities into locations defined at a small geographic scale. Specifically, we model a 
particular stage of the location choice, where a facility is selecting a site among several neighboring 
census tracts within a few miles. We assume that the facility chooses the site that maximizes its 
profit, and that the profit depends on the pressure from surrounding communities on its pollution 
as well as tract-variant economic and geographic conditions. This decision could be made after the 
facility has chosen a broader area with the optimal bundle of factors determining its profit in a 
larger market scale, or in a non-sequential way, at some stage when the facility is choosing several 
sites from different local areas for further consideration. Our model only uses information on 
neighborhoods close to the final location of facilities, agnostic of any previous decision-making 
stages. Therefore, it is simpler and more robust to the potential unobserved determinants compared 
to existing frameworks at larger geographic scales. 
 Ringquist (2009) pointed out that such a selection on comparison locations based on the 
presence of polluting facilities can make the sample itself embody part of the relationship between 
community characteristics and locations of facilities, which can bias the coefficients of community 
characteristics towards zero67. This study, however, does not intend to explain the impacts of 
community characteristics on facilities’ location through all possible channels68. Instead, we focus 
on one possible channel - the communities’ opposition and pressure on pollution - which affects 
facilities’ operation at a local scale. Specifically, we focus the facilities with environmental 
performance information being disclosed by the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) since mid-1989. 
The TRI, mandated by the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act (EPCRA), 
                                                 
67 Some studies used similar philosophy to construct comparison groups of locations. Anderton et al. (1994), for example, 
examine the difference in characteristics of locations with facilities for treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes 
(TSDFs) with only locations in the same metropolitan statistical area but without TSDFs.  
68 UCC (1987) listed three potential reasons behind the high likelihood of facilities locating in poor and minorities groups: 1) 
availability of cheaper land, 2) the lack of local opposition to the facility, often resulting from the poor and minorities' lack of 
organization and political resources as well as their need for jobs, 3) the lack of mobility of the poor and minorities resulting from 
budget constraints and housing discrimination that traps them in neighborhoods where toxic facilities are located.  
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requires manufacturing facilities to report their emissions of toxic chemicals and annually 
discloses this information to the public. This transparency forces toxic-releasing facilities to be 
exposed under the supervision of local communities, and high emissions can cause pressure from 
communities in the form of court suits, protests, or collective action for compensation (Hamilton, 
2005; Lynn and Kartez, 1994; MacLean,1996). Pressure from different communities can vary 
depending on local residents’ financial and political resources to voice their demands as well as 
their education on health risks related to pollution (Hamilton, 1993, 1995b). Thus, community 
socio-economic characteristics which signal residents’ ability to claim environmental liabilities 
are expected to influence the operating cost of toxic facilities. We expect such influence primarily 
exists at a local scale based on results from Currie et al. (2015). The authors studied releases of 84 
hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) from manufacturing facilities and found them have a direct impact 
on the air quality of communities mostly within 2 miles from facilities.  
 We adopt McFadden (1974)’s conditional logit model to econometrically analyze the 
location choice of facilities. The micro-scale choice set with small variations in unobserved factors 
underlie the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption required by the model. In 
estimation, we use the community socio-economic characteristics at the time of facilities’ siting to 
address the potential reverse causality issue arising from residents’ migration for environmental 
quality in neighborhoods. Specifically, entries of toxic facilities in communities can lead residents 
to migrate and change community demographics69, and the community demographics prior to 
facilities’ siting are not affected by such impacts. We control for various economic and geographic 
factors that have been shown in the literature to influence facilities’ location choice at a small 
market scale. These factors include industrial agglomeration, land value, network of transportation, 
                                                 
69 Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) have shown that facilities’ entering to a community was associated with a decrease in local population 
density and with the community becoming poorer over time. 
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zoning, and geographic altitude. We also include tax and environmental regulatory stringency at 
the larger state or county scale because these factors may have discontinuous changes at state or 
county borders.  
 We specifically address the potential endogeneity issue on agglomeration. Endogeneity can 
arise when there are unobserved location characteristics that are correlated with both density and 
productivity, which is a key determinant of location choice, of facilities (Moomaw, 1981). This 
issue is often left out of environmental injustice studies but are widely considered in other studies 
on agglomeration. We adopt the control function approach to manage this endogeneity. We 
generate the control function using differences in infrastructure and altitudes between census tracts 
in the choice sets and their neighboring tracts as instruments. Infrastructure and altitudes are 
expected to affect the volume of industrial activities that can be supported in an area but are not 
likely to have direct impacts on the productivity of new facilities once we have controlled for these 
factors in the census tracts in facilities’ choice sets. We also estimate the conditional logit model 
using subset samples to examine potential different responses of facilities owned by subsidiary 
firms (a proxy for absentee managed) to community characteristics. Finally, we use a cross-
sectional model to examine the post-siting performance of facilities in response to the 
characteristics of the communities they chose. We explain facilities’ toxic emission levels in 5 and 
10 years after locating using the community characteristics at the years of facilities’ siting.  
 We obtain data from combining the TRI data from 1990 to 2011 with the National 
Establishment Time Series (NETS) data and the US Census data. All facilities in the sample were 
born after year 1990, which was the first year after the TRI disclosure. The sample contains 12,171 
facilities distributed in 8,300 census tracts over the United States. We find that facilities preferred 
entering communities with low population density and low educational attainment, and that such 
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location choices of facilities were associated with more toxic emissions at 5 or 10 years after siting. 
In contrast, we find that the tendency of facilities to locate into low income and African-American 
communities only existed without the local economic factors, such as existing of other facilities, 
being controlled. Facilities were also found to locate into communities with high rate of Hispanic, 
but such tendency was not correlated with more emissions after siting. The effect of Latinos also 
only appeared in a local geographic scale and could be masked if communities were defined at a 
larger scale. The responses to educational attainment were found to be weaker from facilities 
owned by subsidiary firms. Our findings suggest that facilities’ location behavior can contribute 
to environmental injustice against the socio-economically disadvantaged groups, but potentially 
for different reasons. While some facilities tend to search for “pollution haven” where community 
pressure is lower, some are simply searching for economic benefits, which, however, are correlated 
with low socio-economic status.  
 
5.2 Literature Review 
Since the 1980s, a large number of empirical studies have emerged and focused on describing the 
observed collocation of toxic-releasing facilities and community demographics. Although many 
of their findings strongly supported the hypothesis of a higher concentration of toxic facilities in 
poor and minority communities (Bullard, 1983; Goldman and Fitton, 1994; United Church of 
Christ, 1987), critiques on these studies pointed out that they only considered the market 
equilibrium outcomes and lacked a systematic theoretical framework to explain the source of this 
unequal distribution. Specifically, those studies could not tell whether the equilibrium was evolved 
from facilities’ decision to locate into poor and minority communities, or from the migration of 
poor and minority people into industrial zones after the facilities’ siting (Been and Gupta, 1997). 
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Subsequent studies began to construct theoretical models that separately explained the location 
choice of toxic facilities (e.g. Wolverton, 2009) and the migration of residents in response to the 
changes of toxic exposure in local communities (e.g. Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008; Cameron and 
Crawford, 2003). For those examining facilities’ locations, their models also switch from 
explaining the existence of facilities in specific communities to the entering of facilities into 
communities (Arora and Cason, 1999; Saha and Mohai, 2005; Wolverton, 2009); the latter is not 
likely to affect the pre-existing demographics of destination communities and thus would not 
entangle results of facilities’ locating with results of residents’ migration.   
 In the literature on facilities’ location choice, there is a long debate concerning whether a 
community’s racial composition or income level directly drives the location decision of toxic-
releasing facilities independent of other factors related to them. Hamilton (1995) raised two 
hypotheses related to this question: 1) entrepreneurs and governments were intentionally locating 
toxic-releasing facilities in poor and minority communities because of their racial prejudice (like 
biased employers in the labor market model); 2) the poor and minorities were more targeted by 
toxic polluters because on average they lacked financial resources and political power and were 
less active in collective action to oppose the siting of polluting facilities. Both theories have been 
supported by empirical evidence. De Silva et al. (2016) and Mohai and Saha (2015b) found 
evidence for the discrimination hypothesis, showing a statistically significant effect of 
communities’ racial composition on the location choice of toxic facilities even after controlling 
for income levels and political activeness of communities. Hamilton (1995) and Wolverton (2009) 
found evidence for the other hypothesis, showing no significant effect of race but a significant 
effect of income and political factors. There is also evidence opposing both of the hypotheses and 
suggesting a spurious direct relationship between the location of toxic facilities and race or income. 
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Anderton et al. (1994) and Downey (2005) found that, after controlling for important economic 
factors, such as industrial intensity, neither race nor income showed a significant impact on 
facilities’ location. Anderton et al. (1994) explained that facilities were perhaps only choosing to 
locate in areas that were more urban, which had more industrial activities, while nonetheless also 
offered more job opportunities and affordable housing that attracted minorities and low-income 
residents. Downey (2005) documented evidence that flowing of manufacturing facilities into 
suburban areas with cheaper lands could even mitigate environmental injustice on race, as whites 
were more concentrated there.  
 The mixed evidence in the literature reveals potential coarseness of the existing conceptual 
frameworks that intend to explain the relationship between community demographics and location 
choice of toxic facilities under all scenarios. In the real world, facility managers need to consider 
many factors when siting a facility, but some factors are not observed by researchers. At the same 
time, the relative importance of those factors may vary depending on facilities’ specific 
requirements (Grant et al., 2010). Oversimplified theories can result in fuzziness in the choice of 
empirical techniques, types of facilities, geographic scales of research, and the control variables in 
the empirical tests. We elaborate on these factors below. 
 First, many empirical studies adopted the partial equilibrium model and used the 
community characteristics to predict existence or the number of toxic facilities in a community. 
This theoretical model led to popularity of the binary response model and the Poisson model in 
existing studies (Been and Gupta, 1997; Downey, 2005; List et al., 2003). Becker and Henderson 
(2000), however, pointed out that this framework might only be suitable to explain the births and 
expansions of facilities belonging to local entrepreneurs, who made decisions on whether to open 
a business or not based on local market conditions. In multi-plant firms, the headquarters might 
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scan a larger scale of geography and pick the profit-maximizing location for a new facility. Such 
story suggests a conditional logit model.  
 Second, existing theories on location choice of toxic facilities seldom consider the impact 
of facility internal characteristics. The characteristics of facilities themselves have been found by 
some researchers as important determinants on the emission level or pollution abatement of toxic 
facilities. For example, large firms’ reputations can be less affected by their subsidiary facilities 
which might be located far from the headquarters and be absentee managed (Auyero and Swistun, 
2008). Large firms also tend to have more resources to hire experts to deal with residents’ and 
workers’ claims on health issues caused by hazardous pollutants (Cable et al., 2008). Grant and 
Jones (2003) and Grant, Jones, and Trautner (2005) found that absentee managed and subsidiary 
facilities generated more toxic emissions to their local communities. Grant et al. (2010) also 
documented evidence that emission levels of facilities belonging to subsidiaries of large firms were 
less sensitive to community demographics than that of the single-plant-firm owned facilities. These 
findings demonstrate the role of facilities’ characteristics on determining a facility’s operation cost 
on pollution control. Thus, it is reasonable to hypothesize that facility characteristics also affect 
the profit-maximizing process of facilities in location choice decisions. No studies have examined 
the effect of subsidiary status on the location choice of toxic-releasing facilities.   
 Third, existing studies seldom discuss the geographic scale, or, how to define a community 
and a choice set, of an analysis on facilities’ location choice based on a theory. Studies have shown 
that much evidence on environmental injustice is sensitive to the geographic scale of a community 
that is defined as an alternative in the location choice analyses. Jenkins, Maguire, and Morgan 
(2004), for example, examined the impact factors on the payment from landfill developers to local 
communities and found that racial composition was a significant factor when a community was 
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defined as a county, but not so as a city70. Studies using the discrete choice model have also shown 
some weakness in the theoretical foundations that they were based to construct the choice sets of 
facilities. Some research at the state or city level included all counties or census tracts in the choice 
sets, which sometimes, could result in a large number of alternatives that facilities were assumed 
to consider in their location decisions71. Some of these studies considered the computational 
burden caused by a large choice set and used a randomly selected subset of the alternatives to 
define a choice set. This method relies strongly on the IIA assumption of the choice alternatives 
and thus raises the risk of estimation bias. Although there is no “correct” geographic scale to do 
the above definitions, as it relies on the geographic level of injustice that a researcher is interested 
in, it should be based on a well-established theory. Otherwise, it can lead to problems in the choice 
of explanatory variables for empirical tests. Specifically, location choice at different geographic 
scales can require facilities to consider different factors that may influence their profits. In a broad 
scale, which can encompass multiple counties or states, facilities may need to consider market 
demands, suppliers of inputs, and tax policies (Hamilton, 1995b). But in a local scale, such as 
within a city or a town, the above economic factors could be rather homogenous. Instead, factors 
like zoning, geographic conditions, and impact of local community pressure on pollution could be 
the main considerations of facilities (Boer et al., 1997).  
 Our study fills the above gaps by building a theory-based, micro geographic scale model 
to explain the location choice of facilities in response to local communities’ characteristics. With 
a more careful choice of controls based on this micro scale, our model has fewer missing variables 
and thus can help generating a more accurate interpretation on the potential impacts of community 
characteristics on location choice of facilities. We also examine the potential heterogeneous 
                                                 
70 See additional evidence from a survey of literature from Baden, Noonan, and Turaga (2007).  
71 For example, De Silva et al. (2016) had 4,302 tracts in the choice set when studying the location choice of facilities in Texas. 
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location responses of facilities belonging to subsidiary firms.   
 
5.3 Model 
We consider a profit-maximizing facility i (i = 1, 2, …, I) that is choosing a site within a local 
geographic area (e.g. areas within a city or across several adjacent small towns) after the TRI 
information disclosure in mid-1989. At this micro scale, facility i is expected to make its choice 
by comparing the characteristics of small neighborhoods 𝑱𝒊 = [1, 2, … , 𝑗, … , 𝐽𝑖] in the area, and 
choose the neighborhood 𝑗𝑖
∗ with the bundle of factors that maximize its profit. We suppose that 
facility i has a latent profit function that depends on the location characteristics and the 
characteristics of the facility itself, which includes the amount of toxic chemical emissions that it 
is expected to generate after locating. Specifically, we assume  
𝜋𝑖𝑗 = 𝐹(𝑴𝒋, 𝒁𝒋, 𝑿𝒊, 𝒆𝒊𝒋)             (5.1) 
, where 𝜋𝑖𝑗 denotes the latent profit that facility i would earn in location j; 𝑴𝒋 denotes a vector of 
local communities’ socio-economic characteristics, which are used as proxies for the communities’ 
pressure on toxic pollution after the TRI; 𝒁𝒋 denotes a vector of local geographic and economic 
factors that may affect the profits of facilities; 𝑿𝒊 denotes a vector of facility characteristics; and 
𝑒𝑖𝑗 denotes a vector of unobserved facility- and location-specific factors.  
 𝑴𝒋 includes community socio-economic characteristics at the census tract level. Census 
tracts provide a reasonable approximation to the neighborhoods directly affected by the toxic 
chemicals emitted by facilities and thus of the geographic area within which facilities might 
experience the pressure from local communities72. We follow Chapter 2 and Mohai and Saha 
                                                 
72
 Currie et al. (2015), notes that releases of 84 hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) affect the local ambient air quality mostly within 




(2015b) and include Population Density, Income Level, Educational Attainment, Share of African-
American, and Share of Hispanic in 𝑴𝒋. Population Density measures the number of people that 
could be exposed to toxic pollution and thus have the motivation to oppose polluting facilities in 
a community; Income Level measures the values of properties that could be exposed to pollution, 
and the financial (and also potentially political) resources that residents can use to generate 
collective action and oppose the entry of polluting facilities; Educational Attainment measures 
residents’ knowledge on pollution-induced health risks and ability to process complex information; 
Share of African-American and Share of Hispanic measure the racial composition of communities, 
which are used to test the discrimination hypotheses on environmental injustice. We include both 
African-Americans and Latinos because studies such as Pulido (2000) have suggested that the two 
minority groups may suffer from toxic exposure due to different reasons. African American 
neighborhoods are usually unable to resist polluters’ siting because they tend to be politically weak. 
Latino immigrants are welcomed by facilities because they tend to fill the hazardous, manual jobs 
that other people tend to avoid. It is possible that the communities in the neighbor areas also have 
impacts on profits of facilities because of potential spillover of public concerns and communities’ 
pressure on pollution. We expect that lower population density, lower income, lower educational 
attainment, and higher share of African-American and / or Hispanic in a location j or its 
neighboring locations will increase the likelihood of a facility choosing that location j.  
  𝒁𝒋 includes two groups of control factors. First, we control for various location economic 
and geographic characteristics that can affect the cost of operating or the cost of production inputs 
                                                 
and regions, through the media reports and political activism (Hamilton 2005). A census tract, which is typically larger than a 1-
mile radius circle is likely to provide the appropriate scale to capture public opposition to toxic releasing facilities, but it might be 
too fine in terms of spatial resolution in urban areas where census tracts can be much smaller. 50% of the facilities in our sample 
are located in census tracts smaller than 3.12 sq. mile, about the area of a 1-mile radius circle. 99% of the census tracts in our 
sample are smaller than 200 sq. mile, about the area of an 8-mile radius circle.  
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of facilities in a location. We include the percent of population who are between 25 to 65 years old 
(% Pop 25 to 65) in a census tract as a proxy for potential availability of labor in a market. We 
expect that facilities have a high propensity to choose locations with a larger labor pool, which can 
reduce the risk of insufficient labor supply73. We include the median housing value of a census 
tract (Median Housing Value) as a proxy for the cost of land and include miles of railways (Railway 
Miles) and miles of highways (Highway Miles) as proxies for the cost of transportation. We expect 
facilities to locate where the land rent and/or the transportation costs are low in order to save costs 
of operating. We include the percent of open space for recreation or conservation in a census tract 
(% Open Space) as a proxy for potential environmental liabilities of toxic pollution on protected 
areas and public amenities such as parks. We include the percent of waterbody including rivers or 
lakes (% Waterbody) as a proxy for the altitude of lands and access to water, which could affect 
the production cost of facilities using water for cooling or producing74. % Waterbody may also 
include information on the access of facilities to waterways transportation. We include percent of 
urban population (% Urban) and percent of suburban population (% Suburban) to control for the 
general condition of development, land uses, or existing racial segregation of locations.  
 We also control for the effect of pre-existing facilities in communities. We include a 
dummy for existing toxic-releasing facilities (Dummy for Existing Facilities) as a proxy for zoning 
or other unobservable characteristics that limit industrial activities in some areas. We expect 
facilities to have a higher propensity to locate in neighborhoods with other toxic facilities. We also 
include the number of existing toxic facilities (Number of Existing Facilities) as a proxy for 
                                                 
73 We control for the size of labor pool instead of the labor cost because of data limitation on labor cost at the census tract level. 
However, we expect that at a local scale such as areas within a city, the labor cost tends to be homogeneous across 
neighborhoods. We also tried to include the unemployment rate at the census tract level as another proxy but did not find a 
significant effect of it.  




industrial agglomeration. Industrial agglomeration has been shown as an important factor on 
location choice of facilities that can bias the estimation on coefficients of community 
demographics if omitted from analysis (Anderton et al., 1994; Wagner and Timmins, 2009)75. 
Effects of the stock of facilities, however, can be theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, 
industrial agglomeration can be economically beneficial to the operation of facilities because of 
easier access to suppliers and an industrial skilled labor pool (Puga, 2010). Clusters of toxic-
releasing facilities can also be an indicator of relative acceptability of pollution in an area 
(Wolverton, 2009), which could be more attractive to the polluting facilities than the above 
economic benefits (De Silva et al., 2016). On the other hand, agglomeration benefits can be offset 
by competition arising from facilities that are spatially approximate. Risks of future regulations 
can also be high in areas with a large number of polluting facilities, if, for instance, regulators 
apply more stringent conditions in those areas to prevent pollution hot spots (Gray and Shadbegian, 
2007). It is also possible that the stock of incumbent facilities does not have any direct impact on 
the location choice of new facilities, but they appear to have a correlation because of unobserved 
factors which have attracted or driven out facilities in the past and is also affecting location choice 
of new facilities (Puga, 2010). We consider this endogeneity issue in the econometric estimations 
in the next section.  
 Second, we control for the economic and environmental regulatory factors that may affect 
facilities’ profits and also have discontinuous changes at the state or county borders. We include 
the average corporate income tax rate (Corporate Tax) at the state level76 as a proxy for the average 
business tax burden in a location. Tax has been shown by many studies as an important determinant 
                                                 
75 Anderton et al. (1994) showed that including industrial agglomeration could absorb the significance effects of community 
socio-economic characteristics. Wagner and Timmins (2009), however, found that agglomeration can bias the estimates away 
from finding the pollution haven effect if omitted from analyses.   
76 We also considered using state property tax rate and sales tax rate but did not find significant effects of them.  
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on the location choice of manufacturing facilities (Bartik, 1985; Charney, 1983). However, since 
some studies have also shown that the benefits of industrial agglomeration might reduce the 
sensitivity of firm location to tax differentials (Brülhart, Jametti, and Schmidheiny, 2012), we 
expect a limited effect of this factor on the location choice of facilities in our model. We include 
the county attainment status according to the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (Attainment 
Status) and use it as a proxy for the formal regulatory pressure on pollution. The attainment status 
is part of the requirement of the Clean Air Act (CAA) on the US EPA to measure counties’ air 
quality and based on which to decide regulatory stringency. Many studies have found evidence on 
impacts of this attainment status on facilities’ location choice (Becker and Henderson, 2000; List 
et al., 2003). Based on their results, we expect a lower propensity of facilities locating into counties 
with a “non-attainment” status. We include the percent of residents voting for the Democratic Party 
(% Democrat) as another proxy for local government’s regulation on environmental issues. Studies 
such as Elliott, Seldon, and Regens (1997) have found evidence that the Democrats and liberals 
tended to have a higher support on government’s spending on environmental affairs, as they are 
less likely to view such spending as a threat of free market principles. We expect a lower propensity 
of facilities to locate into counties with higher percent of voting for Democrats.  
 𝑿𝒊 includes the facility characteristics which have been shown in the literature to affect the 
response of facilities’ environmental performance to community socio-economic characteristics. 
Specifically, based on findings from Auyero and Swistun (2008) and Grant et al. (2010), we 
hypothesize that facilities belonging to firms that are subsidiaries of other firms are less sensitive 





5.4 Econometric Estimation 
5.4.1 The Basic Method 
We use McFadden's (1974) conditional logit model to estimate the impact of community socio-
economic characteristics (𝑴𝒋) and other location characteristics (𝒁𝒋) on the location choice of 
toxic-releasing facilities. Since facilities made their location decisions in different years, we add 
temporal information in equation (5.1) and use the characteristics at the years of facilities’ siting 
to explain their location choices. As stated earlier, characteristics at the siting year predate the 
potential impact of toxic emissions or job opportunities from facilities on their located 
communities, which, therefore, avoids the potential reverse causality77. We write equation (5.1) 
on the profit of facility i as a linear reduced-form function on the characteristics of facility i and 
its location j in the siting year t,   
𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑴𝒋𝒕𝜷 + 𝒁𝒋𝒕𝜸 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜹 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡     (5.2) 
, where 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 is assumed to have a type I extreme value distribution with mean zero. The probability 






      (5.3) 
, where 𝐽𝑖 denotes the total number of possible alternative locations in the choice set of facility i. 
We estimate the parameters in equation (5.3) using maximum likelihood. The coefficient of 𝑿𝒊𝒕 
are not able to be estimated because the conditional logit estimation only uses variations within 
each facility’s choice set. To examine the location responses of different facilities to community 
characteristics, we do the estimation on the full sample and also subset samples of facilities.  
                                                 
77 Due to data limitation, we cannot measure the infrastructure and geographic factors (highway, railway, open space, waterbody) 
at the time before facilities’ siting. However, these factors are mainly determined by governments’ concern on local economies or 




5.4.2. Defining the Neighborhood (Location j) 
Our choice of neighborhood reflects the purpose of this study. This study aims to examine the 
location response of facilities to communities’ socio-economic characteristics which are proxies 
for local communities’ pressure on toxic pollution. Since the pressure is assumed to be primarily 
motivated by local residents’ knowledge of facilities’ toxic emissions and their related health risks, 
our unit of analysis corresponds to the area which is likely to be directly affected by the toxic 
emissions of a facility. This area can be approximated by a 2-mile radius circle around a facility 
based on the results from Currie et al. (2015), who studied on the monitored concentration of 
hazardous air pollutions (HAP), and Davis (2011) and Mastromonaco (2015), who studied the 
housing values near toxic facilities78. The real affected area could be a little larger if considering 
potential spillovers of pressure from neighboring communities due to media reports or political 
activities (Hamilton, 1993, 2005). Most census tracts and zip-codes in the urban and suburban 
areas, where most facilities tend to be sited, are at this level or at a finer degree. Therefore, we 
choose census tract as the unit of this analysis. Census tracts also tend to be consistently defined 
over time and is generally comparable over analysis. They are also designed to reflect the views 
of communities themselves of where the neighborhoods begin and end (Been and Gupta, 1997).  
 The areas of census tracts vary widely depending on the population density of regions. 
Tracts in rural areas can be over 100 sq. mile, while tracts in urban areas can be as small as 0.1 sq. 
mile. A few numbers of facilities (< 5%) in our sample are located in census tracts larger than 100 
                                                 
78 The actual distribution of the risks of facilities, of course, would be much more complicated. It would further depend upon the 
type of substances each facility handled, wind patterns, the hydrology and geology of the sites, and transportation routes to 
facilities, to name few (Been and Gupta, 1997). Our approximation is based on the fact that 70% of the toxic chemical releases 
reported to the TRI are air pollution and that Currie et al. (2015)’s study on 84 HAP chemicals showed a minimal effect of the 
HAP emissions on monitors located 2 miles away from the facilities. Meanwhile, Davis (2011) and Mastromonaco (2015) also 
showed that the price of housing within 2 miles of toxic-releasing facilities were the ones responding to the entries of facilities 
and the TRI disclosure of information on the emissions of facilities.   
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sq. miles. Although large in area, census tracts in rural areas usually have homogeneous 
characteristics in terms of community pressure and economic conditions. Thus, using these tracts 
as alternative neighborhoods to model the location choice of facilities would not result in a big 
loss of information. About 50% of facilities in our sample are located in tracts smaller than 3 sq. 
mile (about the area of a 1-mile radius circle). These small tracts can offer fine-degree information 
on community characteristics which can have large geographic variations in urban areas. However, 
characteristics of these small tracts may not be able to fully reflect the pressure from communities 
and their neighbors on facilities’ emissions. We thereby carry out the analysis at the census tract 
level and also at a larger scale, which covers a census tract and its neighboring tracts within 3 miles 
from its centroid. At the larger scale, we use the weighted average of the community characteristics 
of all census tracts within the 3-mile radius circle, where the weight of a neighbor tract is the 
inverse distance between the centroid of the center tract and the centroid of the neighboring tract.  
 
5.4.3 Defining the Choice Set of Alternative Neighborhoods (Set 𝑱𝒊) 
We construct the choice set for each facility using the K nearest census tracts with centroids lying 
within 15 miles from the final street address of the facility. The restriction K guarantees a 
reasonable number of alternative neighborhoods in the choice sets of facilities that are choosing 
locations in urban areas. With K = 50, about 25% of the facilities in our sample have all their 
alternative census tracts with centroids lying within 5 miles from their final addresses, and about 
50% of the facilities have at least 30 alternative census tracts within 5 miles 79 . The small 
geographic choice set can have more homogeneous alternative neighborhoods in terms of 
unobserved factors and make the IIA assumption required by the conditional logit model more 
                                                 
79 We also run the model with K = 100 and K = 150. The wider scale the choice set, the larger variations the choice alternatives 
have, and the higher the risk of omitted variable bias. However, K cannot be too small because we have 19 covariates in the model.  
 
 127 
likely to hold.  The 15-mile restriction is chosen to ensure most facilities in the sample (except for 
the < 0.5% of outliers) have more than 2 census tract alternatives in their choice set.  
 
5.4.4 Endogeneity on Agglomeration 
A fundamental identification problem on agglomeration is that there may be missing local 
variables that are correlated with both density and productivity, which is the key determinant of 
location choice, of facilities (Moomaw, 1981). Since Ciccone and Hall (1996), a standard way to 
manage this problem has been to use instrumental variables (IV). One standard choice of IV is a 
long temporal lag of the stock of facilities in locations (Duranton, 2016; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 
2009). This IV requires rich time variance on the distribution of facilities, because few factors can 
persistently influence the historical stock of facilities and productivity of facilities at present. 
However, this requirement is not satisfied in our case as we only have 5 or fewer years of data on 
the facilities built before 1995.  
 An alternative choice are geological variables. In a study from Glaeser et al. (2010) on 
agglomeration of labor, the authors used soil quality (land fertility) as an IV for the local stock of 
labor. In our case, to the extent that some geology factors influence the stock of facilities and do 
not otherwise cause productivity of facilities conditional on the covariates, the factors can provide 
reasonable instruments to explain the location choice of new facilities. We choose the 
infrastructure and altitude conditions in neighboring communities (essentially spatial lags) to 
generate the IVs. More infrastructure and low altitude in an area can support more industrial 
activities (Kasarda and Rondinelli, 1998). But once we have controlled for these factors in the 
census tracts included in facilities’ choice sets, the conditions in the neighboring tracts on these 
factors tend to have minimal direct impacts on the productivity of facilities. We use information 
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on Highway Miles, Railway Miles, and %Waterbody, and calculate the differences in these three 
factors between each census tract in the choice sets and its (up to) 10 nearest neighboring tracts 
within 15 miles80. To reduce the number of IVs, we take the mean and maximum of the differences 
for the 10 neighboring tracts.  
 We use the control function approach to do the estimation following Petrin and Train (2010) 
on the use of this approach in the conditional logit model. The first step is to estimate the function 
for the Number of Existing Facilities to recover the residual (𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡) entering the control function in 
the location choice model. We assume that the Number of Existing Facilities in each census tract 
is additive in its observed and unobserved determinants and that these two groups of determinants 
are independent. We then regress the Number of Existing Facilities against the covariates in 
equation (5.3) plus the instruments and obtain an OLS estimator of the residual. In the second step, 
we decompose the error (𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡) in the profit function in equation (5.2) into the part that can be 
explained by a function of 𝜇𝑖𝑗 - the control function - and a residual 𝜖?̃?𝑗𝑡, which is assumed to have 
a type I extreme value distribution. The control function is constructed using polynomial 
approximation to have 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 enter the profit function in a flexible manner. We then estimate the 
conditional logit model based on the new profit function using maximum likelihood. Since we use 
an estimator of 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 in this estimation, we adopt bootstrap to estimate the standard errors. 
 
5.5 Variables Construction, Data, and Sample  
5.5.1 Variables and Data Source 
The dependent variable in our model is a binary indicator showing the existence of a facility in a 
                                                 
80 I also checked for the case with 20 and 30 nearest neighboring tracts. Results on the coefficients of the community characteristics 
are robust. Some facilities do not have 10 nearest neighbors within 15 miles.  
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census tract. We obtain information on the street address of toxic-releasing facilities from the TRI 
database (1990 to 2011) and obtain geographic information on census tracts from the National 
Historical Geographic Information System. We merge these data using geographic coordinates. 
The key explanatory variables in our model include five community socioeconomic characteristics 
at the census tract level. We measure Population Density by total population divided by the land 
area of a census tract; Income Level by per capita income adjusted to 2012 dollars; Educational 
Attainment by share of residents with a bachelor or higher degree; Share of African-American and 
Share of Hispanic by the ratio of population in those racial groups over total population. We obtain 
data on these variables from the US Census (1990, 2000, 2010). As the Census is conducted 
decennially, we cannot measure these variables at the year of siting (or birth year) for each facility. 
Instead, we use their values in the year closest but prior to the facilities’ siting year. Data on 
facilities’ siting years and other facility internal characteristics, such as ownership and industry 
SIC code, are obtained from the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) database. The NETS 
provides annual snapshots of the Duns and Bradstreet (DB) database on characteristics of business 
establishments since 1990. We merge the TRI and the NETS data through matching the street 
address, name, and industry SIC code of facilities that appeared in the two datasets81.     
 The control variables include characteristics at different jurisdictional levels, and their data 
are compiled from multiple sources. We measure the housing values of census tracts using the 
median value of owner-occupied housings, with data obtained from the US Census. We measure 
the miles of highways and miles of railways in census tracts by overlaying the map of highway 
networks at the federal, state, and city levels and the map of railway network on the map of census 
tracts. We then calculate the length of highways and railways falling into each census tract. We 
                                                 
81 For details on how we merge the data, refer to Appendix A.  
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obtain data on these infrastructure networks from the National Highway Planning Network (2001) 
and the National Transportation Atlas database (2003). Using a similar method, we also measure 
the percent of open space and waterbodies in each census tract. Open space includes protected 
areas, such as local parks and recreational areas, owned by governments or public and private 
organizations. Waterbodies include streams, rivers, and lakes. Data on these variables are obtained 
from the US Geological Survey (2014). We measure the state-level corporate tax burden using the 
state average corporate income tax revenues divided by the state total business employments. Data 
on these two variables are obtained from the US Census Annual Survey of State Government 
Finances (1990 to 2011). We measure the political ideologies of residents at the county-level using 
information on the voting results of the US presidential elections, with data obtained from the 
Dave Leip’s Atlas (1988 to 2012). Data on the county attainment status to NAAQS are obtained 
from the EPA Greenbook (1990 to 2011). Datasets for the control variables are merged with the 
TRI using census tract IDs from the US Census and county and state FIPS codes corresponding to 
each facility. 
 
5.5.2 Sample  
Our sample consists of manufacturing facilities which reported to the TRI at least once during 
1990 to 2011 and also have their birth year and location data collected by the NETS in the same 
period. The TRI covers industries of mining, utilities, manufacturing, hazardous waste sites, and 
other miscellaneous manufacturing and publishing activities that manage or use toxic chemicals 
in operations. We excluded facilities in the mining industry because the location choice of those 
facilities is highly constrained by mineral sources. We also dropped facilities born before 1990 or 
with missing data in the socio-economic characteristics or other census-tract economic and 
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geographic characteristics used in the estimation model. This yields a final sample with a total 
number of 12,171 facilities distributed in 8,300 census tracts in their birth years. The choice sets 
of these facilities cover a total of 62,762 census tracts.  
 Figure 5.1a presents a map of facilities in the sample. As shown by the map, most facilities 
are clustered in metropolitan areas, such as New York, Chicago, Atlanta, and Los Angeles metro 
areas, where economic activities are highly concentrated. Figure 5.1b presents a map in a smaller 
geographic scale, with the Midwest region as an example. Except for showing a concentration of 
facilities around large cities such as Chicago or mid-size cities such as Indianapolis, IN, it also 
shows a scattering of many other facilities in towns or rural areas. This, as stated earlier, results in 
facilities with different sizes of choice sets.  
 Figure 5.2 presents a histogram showing the distribution of facilities with different sizes of 
choice sets at K = 50. A choice set’s size is measured by the Euclidean distance from centroids of 
tract alternatives in the set to the host facility. Since there are many tract alternatives in a set, we 
use the median (in blue) and the 75th percentile (in red) of the distances of tracts to the facility to 
do the measure. In the histogram, the blue bars show that less than 15% of facilities have half of 
their tract alternatives lying more than 10 miles away. Meanwhile, the red bars show that about 
35% of facilities have 75% of their tract alternatives lying within 5 miles. These numbers 
correspond to Figure 5.1 and indicate that most facilities were located in urban or suburban areas 
with small-size tracts. However, the red bars also show that about 40% of facilities have a quarter 
of their tract alternatives lying 10 miles away. This indicates that a proportion of facilities might 
be located in the peripheral of large cities or in small cities adjacent to large rural census tracts. 
For the urban facilities, our estimation would mainly compare their final chosen tracts with nearby 
tracts within 5 miles. For the facilities near rural areas, our estimation would compare their chosen 
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tracts with urban tracts nearby and also some rural tracts, which could be 10 to 15 miles apart. 
 Figure 5.3 shows the location of facilities and their correlation with local demographics in 
part of the Chicago metro area as an example. We present the facilities built between 1991 to 2011 
in the area, against heat maps of the percentage of residents with college degree, the percentage of 
Hispanic, and the income at the census tract level in 1990. Figure 5.3a demonstrate a clear pattern 
of facilities to locate in low educated areas. A simple calculation finds that the number of facilities 
located in tracts that have more than 15% of residents with college degree is only about 70% of 
the facilities located in tracts with less than 15% of residents with college degree. Figure 5.3b 
demonstrates a similar pattern of local clustering of facilities in communities with a high percent 
of Latinos. Several clusters of facilities appear on the map in the census tracts with more than 5% 
of Latinos; however, the total number of these facilities are similar to the number of facilities 
located in census tracts with less than 5% of Latinos on the map. This signals a potential risk of 
ecological fallacy if we examine facilities’ location response to Latinos in a larger geographic unit.  
Figure 5.3c does not show a positive or negative correlation between income level and facilities’ 
locations. But we find that facilities are more likely to locate in the middle-income areas. This 
pattern corresponds with De Silva et al.’s (2016) finding that income tended to have a quadratic 
relationship with the probability of facilities’ siting.    
 Table 5.1 presents a comparison in characteristics between the census tracts where facilities 
choose to locate with the other alternative tracts in the choice sets. The means and standard 
deviations for the covariates in equation (5.2) are presented. The first panel shows the comparison 
for all facilities in the sample. Population density and educational attainment in the tracts where 
facilities are located are substantially lower than those in the alternative tracts. Per capita income 
is also lower but does not show a large difference, perhaps because of the quadratic relationship 
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as shown in Figure 5.3. The share of African-American and share of Hispanic in the tracts where 
facilities are located are approximately the same, even a little lower, than in the alternative tracts. 
This tends to question the discrimination hypothesis on environmental injustice on race related 
facilities’ location choice. The share of urban population is lower in the tracts with facilities located, 
but the suburban population is higher, which reflects facilities’ preference in suburban areas. We 
also find that facilities tend to choose areas with low housing value, more miles of highways and 
railways, large number of existing facilities, and low propensity to be non-attainment. The second 
panel shows the comparison for facilities with half of their alternative tracts in the choice set lying 
10 miles way (“suburban or rural” facilities). Similar patterns are found in all the covariates, 
indicating that in a micro-scale location choice decision, facilities making choices in the urban or 
rural areas tend to have a homogeneous preference in terms of these factors.  
 
5.6 Results 
Table 5.2 presents results of the estimations on the conditional logit model, with different 
specifications on covariates 82 . In the simplest set-up in Column (1), we only include the 
community socio-economic characteristics. We find that Population Density and Education 
Attainment show negative effects, which indicates facilities’ preference to locate in the less 
populated and low educated areas. Income Level shows a quadratic relationship with the likelihood 
of facilities’ locating; and given that distribution, the coefficients of the linear and square terms 
show that the upward sloping part is dominant. It indicates that conditional on other community 
characteristics, facilities were locating into tracts with higher income but not the highest. Variables 
measuring racial composition of census tracts, Share of African-American and Share of Hispanic, 
                                                 
82 This table presents results for the case with K = 50. Table C6 presents results for K = 100 and K = 150. We find similar results.  
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both show positive effects, indicating a higher propensity of facilities to locate into communities 
with large minority groups.  
 After we add controls in the specifications in columns (2) to (5), we find that Population 
Density and Education Attainment continue showing significant effects but with a decrease in 
magnitude. Income Level does not show a significant effect after industrial agglomeration is 
controlled. Share of African-American shows a less significant effect in Column (2) where labor 
availability, infrastructure, and local housing values are controlled. It then shows a negative effect 
in Column (3) where the general conditions of urban and suburban areas are also controlled. In 
columns (4) and (5), this negative effect becomes more significant and in larger magnitude after 
the effect of pre-existing facilities are additionally controlled. By contrast, Share of Hispanic 
shows a consistent positive and significant effect in all specifications. Based on the coefficients in 
Column (5), we calculate the marginal effects of Population Density, Educational Attainment, and 
Share of Hispanic on the probability of a facility to locate in a census tract. Population Density 
shows a large effect: increasing it by one standard deviation (see Column (1), Table 5.1) in a census 
tract would decrease the probability of facilities locating there by 11%. Educational Attainment 
and Share of Hispanic show smaller effects: one standard deviation increase in residents with 
college degree in a census tract would decrease the probability of facilities locating there by 3.8%, 
and one standard deviation increase in Share of Hispanic would increase the probability by 1.1%.  
 The above results support the hypothesis that toxic-releasing facilities tend to consider 
communities’ pressure on pollution when making location choice decisions. But it provides only 
partial support of the discrimination hypothesis. Specifically, the positive associations between 
toxic facilities and the poor or African-American communities are not likely to be a direct result 
of facilities’ preference on these community characteristics. Instead, it tends to be a result of 
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facilities’ searching for economic benefits in urban or suburban areas and industrial zones. This 
result accords with Anderton et al. (1994) and suggests that historical sorting on income and racial 
segregation correlated with industrial activities and perhaps also housing can be an important 
reason behind environmental injustice. However, the positive association between toxic facilities 
and the less-educated and Latino communities tends to be contributed by the facilities’ preference 
on these characteristics. In Table C5 in Appendix C, we show an additional test on the hypothesis 
from Pastor, Sadd, and Morello-Frosch (2004) that toxic facilities are more likely to be sited in 
communities with both large African-American and large Latino populations. These communities 
with high ethnic churning can make it particularly hard to organize collective action to prevent 
facilities’ siting. We find some evidence from the positive sign of the interaction between Share 
of African-American and Share of Hispanic. It indicates that when the Latino population is large, 
Share of African-American’s effect can also be positive. We also use the index constructed by Cole 
et al. (2013) to measure the ethnic diversity of a community and find a similar positive effect of it.  
 For the other covariates, we find that %Pop25to65 and Median Housing Value show a 
positive and a negative effect in Column (3), respectively, which indicate that facilities are more 
likely to locate into areas with more available labor and low land rent. The effects of these variables, 
however, do not show significance after the effect of pre-existing facilities are controlled, perhaps 
because of high correlations between these factors and industrial zoning. Highway Miles and 
Railway Miles show positive effects, indicating a high propensity of facilities to locate into areas 
with low transportation costs. %Urban Pop. and %Suburban Pop. show positive effects, indicating 
the preference of facilities on the general economic conditions in urban and suburban areas than 
those in rural areas. %Waterbody shows a positive effect, indicating a potential preference of 
facilities on areas with lower altitude and easier access to water. %Democrats and Attainment 
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Status show negative effects, which accords with our expectation that facilities have a lower 
propensity to locate into areas with more stringent regulations. Dummy for Existing Facility shows 
a positive effect, which indicates that facilities are more likely to locate into industrial zones. 
Number of Existing Facilities also show a positive effect. It seems to indicate that facilities tend to 
be attracted by the benefit from agglomeration and potential high acceptance of pollution in an 
area. We consider the possible endogeneity issue on this variable below.  
 Table 5.3 presents results from the first stage OLS regression that generates the residual 
that enters the control function for the Number of Existing Facilities. Most of the instruments show 
significant effects on the stock of facilities. But the different sign of the mean and maximum of 
the differences in the infrastructure and altitude variables between a census tract and their 
neighbors show a complex relationship between these factors and the volume of industrial 
activities in a census tract. In the covariates, County Attainment Status show a positive effect, but 
this effect does not generate any causal inference and only shows that counties with a large number 
of toxic releasing facilities tend to be non-attainment.  
 Table 5.4 presents the results of the conditional logit regressions with the control function 
for the Number of Existing Facilities being included. Column (1) is the same as Column (6) in 
Table 5.1 and is used as a comparison to show the coefficients without correction by the control 
function. Columns (2) to (5) show the regression results with four different specifications on the 
functional form of the control function. We start from including only the linear term of the residual 
from the first stage, and then add one higher order polynomial of the residual at a time in the 
control function, until the coefficients of the community socio-economic characteristics (key 
explanatory variables) and other covariates do not have significant changes, and higher order 
polynomials does not show significant effects.  
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 We find that the control function terms enter significantly and with the expected sign. The 
positive residual in Column (1) suggests that the Number of Existing Facilities contains 
information on desirable location characteristics that are not included in the analysis. The higher 
order polynomials show a potential complicated nonlinear relationship between these unobserved 
factors and facilities’ likelihood of locating, but the general positive relationship still holds. 
Inclusion of the control function adjusts the sign of Number of Existing Facilities. We obtain a 
negative and significant effect of Number of Existing Facilities. This suggests that, conditional on 
effects of the unobserved desirable location characteristics, facilities tended to consider the risks 
of future regulation on pollution “hot spots” and avoided areas with large numbers of existing 
polluters. Coefficients of community socio-economic characteristics and other controls are not 
significantly affected by this adjustment for endogeneity.  
 Table 5.5 presents the results of the regressions where we consider for potential spillovers 
of residents’ pressure from neighboring communities. We measure the census tract socio-
economic characteristics using weighted averages of the characteristics of an alternative tract and 
its neighboring tracts within 3 miles. In the simplest set-up in Column (1), we still find positive 
effects of Population Density and Educational Attainment. Compared with the results in Column 
(1) of Table 5.2, these effects have an increase in magnitude, which indicates a potential impact of 
neighboring communities’ pressure on the location choice of facilities. Income Level still shows a 
quadratic relationship but in an opposite direction. The two racial composition variables also still 
show positive effects as in Table 5.2. After we add controls for the economic and geographic 
factors in columns (2) to (4), we find significance in the effect of Income Level in both the linear 
and the quadratic terms. The magnitudes of these terms show that the downward sloping part is 
dominant. This suggests that high income in neighboring communities can negatively affect 
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facilities’ propensity to locate into an area. Share of African-American shows a similar negative 
effect to those in the previous tables. However, the Share of Hispanic loses its significance. This 
indicates that the Share of Hispanic of neighboring communities may not have additional impact 
on the location choice of facilities. But adding this information in a large geographic scale may 
mask the potential positive relationship between Latino communities and the location of facilities 
because of ecological fallacy83.   
 We additionally consider the potential spillover of labor pools and labor qualities in 
neighboring tracts on the location choice of facilities. Using the same method as for the 
demographic factors, we calculate the weighted average of %Pop25to65 and Educational 
Attainment of alternative tracts and their neighboring tracts within 10 miles. 10-mile is the average 
one-way commuting distance of the US working class (US Census Bureau, 2000). Since a 10-mile 
radius circle is larger than the size of some facilities’ choice sets, these variables can have limited 
variations. The estimation results are shown in Column (5). Both %Pop25to65 and Educational 
Attainment show positive and statistically significant effects. This indicates that large labor pool 
and high labor quality in neighboring communities may also attract facilities to locate.  
 Table 5.6 presents the conditional logit regressions on subsamples of facilities. We find 
that facilities of subsidiary firms have a weak and insignificant response to the income, educational 
attainment, racial composition, and political ideologies of communities in their location choice. 
This result accords with Cable et al. (2008) and Grant et al. (2010) and show the relative weak 
power of community pressure on preventing these polluters to enter local neighborhoods. However, 
facilities of subsidiary firms are smaller in number (N = 1521), so the insignificance of the 
                                                 
83 The insignificance is not likely to be caused by multicollinearity between the share of Hispanic in a census tract with the other 
socio-economic characteristics in the neighboring tracts. To test this, we ran a model with the Share of Hispanics of each tract 
alternatives and other community characteristics averaged over the tract alternatives and their neighboring tracts in 3 miles. We 
see a significant effect of Hispanic rate (the same as in Table 4.2).  
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coefficients should be interpreted accordingly.  
 
5.7 Post-siting Performance of Facilities 
An open question related to our findings is whether location choices are associated with different 
environmental performance of facilities after siting. We explore this issue using a cross-sectional 
regression on the toxic emission levels84 of facilities at the 5th and 10th year after siting. We explain 
the emission levels using community socio-economic characteristics at the census tracts where 
facilities chose to locate. To avoid potential bias from reverse causality, we use the community 
characteristics at the year of facilities’ siting to explain their performance afterwards. We control 
for the economic and geographic characteristics of the census tracts, as well as the facility 
characteristics such as size (measured by employment scales) and the subsidiary status. We also 
control for facilities’ initial emission levels at the first year after siting. So this regression examines 
the 5- or 10-years’ emission of facilities with similar emission levels at siting.  
 One problem with the TRI emission data is censoring. The TRI only requires facilities 
generating more than 500 pounds of toxic chemical emissions to report, which leaves the small 
amount of emissions generated by facilities in some years unobserved to us. We manage this issue 
using the Tobit model; and to satisfy the assumption on normal distributed errors by the Tobit 
model, we use the log of emission levels to construct the dependent variables. Using logs would 
exclude the facilities with zero reported emissions at the first year out of the regression. Thus, this 
regression is more focused on the “large” polluters with high emissions at siting85. We also use log 
                                                 
84 We measure a facility’s emission level using the total toxic releases generated by aggregating releases of each toxic chemical 
reported to TRI. We do not weigh chemicals by toxicity following the results from Arora and Cason (1999) who found that most 
chemicals on the TRI list had similar toxicity, and that the response of facilities’ total releases to the local community demographics 
was not sensitive to the weighting scheme. Since the TRI chemical list had several changes from 1988 to 2011, we only use the 
chemicals on the 1988 list for consistency. 
85 In Table C7, we also present the results for emission levels (without using logs). Results are similar.  
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forms of the explanatory variables, such as population density and per capita income, so reported 
coefficients are elasticities. 
 Table 5.7 presents results from the cross-sectional regressions. Facilities’ emission levels 
at the siting year show a positive and strong correlation with the emissions 5 or 10 years later; the 
employment scales also show a positive correlation. These results indicate large impacts of 
historical emission patterns and the size of production on the emission level of facilities. 
Conditional on the initial emission levels and employment scales, Population Density and 
Educational Attainment of the census tracts where facilities chose to locate show negative effects 
on facilities’ emission 5 or 10 years later. The effects are stronger on the 10-year emissions, which 
indicates a persistent and perhaps cumulative negative influence of community socio-economic 
characteristics on emissions of facilities.  
 We do not find evidence on effects of Income Level or race on the emissions of facilities 5 
years after locating; in 10 years, Share of African-American even shows a negative and significant 
effect, which indicates a lower emission level of facilities that located in African-American 
communities. This accords with our previous findings and suggests that facilities’ locating into 
poor and minority areas is not likely to be a result of facilities’ searching for pollution haven, but 
is likely for other correlated conditions, such as economic benefits in industrial zones. The negative 
sign of Share of African-American, and also Share of Hispanic although not statistically significant, 
could be because facilities have less production expansion in the areas where these minorities are 
concentrated. In Table 4.8 where we examine the employment scale of facilities after siting, Share 
of African-American and Share of Hispanic show negative and significant effect on the emission 
of facilities 10 years after siting. This supports our guess that facilities located in this communities 
tend to have less expansion in scales in the long run. We also only find limited evidence on the 
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effect of Population Density and Educational Attainment of the host communities on facilities’ 
employment. So the negative impact of high community pressure on the emission levels of 
facilities does not necessarily also appear on the production scales of facilities.  
 
5.8 Conclusion  
A large body of literature has documented the disproportionate location of toxic-releasing facilities 
in poor and minority communities. However, the question of whether income and race directly 
drive the location decisions of toxic-releasing facilities still has different answers in the literature. 
One potential reason behind the mixed findings is the relatively coarse theoretical frameworks that 
are used by existing studies to explain the location choice of facilities. They may lead to some 
fuzziness in the choice of facilities for analysis, geographic scales, and statistical controls in the 
empirical tests.  
 This paper developed a micro-scale framework that explained the location choice of 
facilities among neighborhoods within a few miles. Using facilities under the Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI), we analyzed facilities’ location choice among dozens of census tracts (varying 
from 2 to 50) in response to the tract-level socio-economic characteristics, which acted as proxies 
for the potential pressure from local communities on facilities since the TRI disclosure. We 
selected controls based on the factors that influenced the profits of facilities at this micro scale and 
specifically addressed the potential endogeneity issue on industrial agglomeration. This micro-
scale model reduced the risk of omitted variable bias, as unobserved factors that could affect 
facilities’ profits at a large market scale did not enter the location decision of facilities at our 
targeted geographic level. Given this theoretical foundation, estimations from our model could 
help generate a more accurate interpretation on the potential impacts of community characteristics 
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on location choice of facilities. We find that toxic facilities have a higher propensity to enter 
communities with low population density and low educational attainment, and that such location 
choices are associated with higher emission levels after siting. In contrast, we find that the 
tendency of facilities to locate into low income and African-American communities only exists 
without the local economic factors, such as the existence of other facilities, being controlled. We 
find facilities are also locating into communities with high rate of Hispanic, but such tendency is 
not correlated with more emissions after siting.  
 Our findings provide new evidence on environmental injustice at the micro geographic 
scale. But the findings suggest different potential reasons behind the vulnerability of various socio-
economic groups to the toxic-releasing facilities. Although the socio-economic characteristics are 
highly correlated and the injustice can be against a group that is disadvantaged in every dimension, 
our findings give some clues on the sources of such injustice and help to devise policies to address 
this issue. We find that facilities’ searching for pollution havens can be one reason behind 
environmental injustice, as shown by the effect of population density and educational attainment 
on facilities’ location choice. However, facilities’ searching for industrial zones and labor for 
hazardous work, which are correlated with communities’ income and race, can be another 
important reason behind the injustice. The correlation between industrial zones and the poor and 
minorities is possibly a result of historical sorting of low-income and minority people into those 
areas, as shown by previous literature (e.g. Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008). So redesigning permitting 
and zoning rules can help solve the injustice but may not completely do. Policy makers may need 
to face a much harder problem - the income inequity, to fully solve environmental injustice, as 
pointed out by Banzhaf and Timmins (2019).  
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(b) Midwest Region 
Source: Authors using data from the Toxic Release Inventory and the US Census. 
 
















(b) Fraction of Hispanic 
 






Source: Authors using data from the Toxic Release Inventory and the US Census. 
 
(c) Per capita Income 
 




Note: 1. Facilities on the map were built during 1991 to 2011. Community demographics are in year 1990 value.  
2. Scales of the maps and data source are the same and are shown in the bottom of (c). 
3. Cutoffs for the mappings of demographic factors are based on quantiles of the distribution.     
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Table 5.1. Summary Statistics  
 
Variables (at the year of siting) All Facilities  Facilities with 50% Alternative 
Tracts lying 10 miles away  
 Tracts with 
Facilities 




N = 437,601 
(2) 
 Tracts with 
Facilities 




N = 112,185 
(4) 
Community Socio-economic Chars.      
Population density (1000 Persons / Sq. Mi) 1.52 [2.75]  4.16 [6.37]  0.37 [0.71] 1.42 [2.36]  
Per capita Income (10,000$) 1.79 [0.94] 1.89 [1.10]  1.63 [0.51] 1.73 [0.82] 
% College Degree 0.12 [0.09] 0.15 [0.11]   0.09 [0.05] 0.13 [0.09] 
% African-American 0.13 [0.21]  0.14 [0.23]   0.09 [0.15] 0.10 [0.17] 
% Hispanic 0.11 [0.18]  0.12 [0.19]  0.05 [0.10] 0.05 [0.11] 
Census Tract Economic Chars.      
% Pop. 25 to 65 years old 0.52 [0.06] 0.52 [0.07]   0.52 [0.04] 0.52 [0.06] 
Median Housing Value 146.8 [96.6] 169.0 [114.1]  124.1 [48.3] 144.3 [67.1] 
Highway Miles 19.4 [22.7] 8.5 [11.1]  31.2 [27.4] 15.1[15.0] 
Railway Miles 14.2 [14.5]  5.5 [8.7]   20.6 [16.9] 9.4 [11.4] 
% Urban Population 0.57 [0.46]  0.80 [0.37]   0.09 [0.24] 0.46 [0.46] 
% Suburban Population 0.17 [0.33]  0.06 [0.21]   0.32 [0.37] 0.18 [0.34] 
% Open Space 0.11 [0.30] 0.10 [0.30]  0.15 [0.34] 0.15 [0.35] 
% Waterbody 0.04 [0.08]  0.03 [0.08]  0.03 [0.06] 0.03 [0.08] 
Dummy for Existing Facility (1 = YES) 0.69 [0.46]  0.27 [0.44]   0.61 [0.49] 0.32 [0.47] 
Number of Existing Facilities 2.59 [3.74] 0.58 [1.53]  1.61 [2.19] 0.66 [1.43] 
State / County Location Chars.      
State-avg. Corporate Tax per employee 0.31 [0.16]  0.32 [0.17]   0.31 [0.14]  0.32 [0.15] 
County-avg. % Voting for Democrats  0.17 [0.05]  0.18 [0.05]   0.16 [0.05] 0.17 [0.05]  
County Attainment Status 0.43 [0.50] 0.57 [0.49]  0.22 [0.41] 0.33 [0.47]  




Table 5.2. Conditional Logit Model of Location Choice of Facilities 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












Census Tract Demographics       
Population density (1000 Persons / Sq. Mi)  -0.379*** -0.325*** -0.337*** -0.248*** -0.194*** -0.192*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Per capita Income (10,000$) 0.208*** 0.123*** 0.135*** 0.055** 0.011 0.013 
 (0.032) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) 
Per capita Income Sq. -0.018*** -0.010** -0.012*** -0.006* -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% College Degree or Higher -4.059*** -2.358*** -3.457*** -2.279*** -2.041*** -2.044*** 
 (0.166) (0.196) (0.196) (0.189) (0.192) (0.194) 
% African-American 0.184*** 0.116* -0.146** -0.240*** -0.332*** -0.253*** 
 (0.063) (0.064) (0.066) (0.067) (0.068) (0.070) 
% Hispanic 1.497*** 1.322*** 0.976*** 0.454*** 0.295*** 0.306*** 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.108) (0.110) (0.114) (0.115) 
Census Tract Economic Chars.       
% Pop. 25 to 65 years old  -1.015*** 0.414** 0.241 -0.011 0.044 
  (0.187) (0.193) (0.202) (0.200) (0.205) 
Median Housing Value  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Highway Miles  0.005*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Railway Miles  0.029*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Urban Population2   0.868*** 0.343*** 0.071 0.070 
   (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) 
% Suburban Population3   1.754*** 1.138*** 0.938*** 0.913*** 
   (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
% Open Space4    0.077 0.078 0.081 
    (0.075) (0.076) (0.077) 
% Waterbody    0.552*** 0.473*** 0.473*** 
    (0.123) (0.126) (0.128) 
Dummy for Existing Facility (1 = Y)    1.379*** 1.067*** 1.051*** 
    (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) 
Number of Existing Facilities     0.147*** 0.147*** 
     (0.004) (0.004) 
State / County Location Chars.       
State-avg. Corporate Tax per employee      0.122 
      (0.157) 
County-avg. % Voting for Democrats       -2.462*** 
      (0.473) 
County Attainment Status      -0.261*** 
      (0.060) 
       
Number of Facilities 12088 12087 12087 12087 12087 11966 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0803 0.0982 0.115 0.164 0.181 0.181 
Note: 1. Choice set circle has a radius of 15 miles at maximum. Each choice set has 50 census tracts at maximum. 
2. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3. % of urban population is the ratio of urban population lived in urbanized areas over the total population in the tract. % of suburban population 
is the ratio of urban population lived in urban ``clusters’’ outside the urbanized area but not the rural area over total population in the tract.   
4. % of open space is the ratio of the area of protected lands over the total area (including water and land) of the tract. The protected area includes 
the public lands and other conservations areas, such as local parks, agricultural easement, military land, national grassland, private forest, etc.    
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Table 5.3. OLS Regression of the Number of Existing Facilities in Census Tracts 
 (Control Function Approach, First Stage) 
 
 (1) 
Dep. Var.  Number of Existing Facilities 
Instruments  
Mean of Diff1. in Highway Miles with Neighboring Tracts 0.002*** 
 (0.001) 
Max of Diff. in Highway Miles with Neighboring Tracts -0.003*** 
 (0.000) 
Mean of Diff. in Railway Miles with Neighboring Tracts -0.023*** 
 (0.001) 
Max of Diff. in Railway Miles with Neighboring Tracts 0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
Mean of Diff in % Waterbody with Neighboring Tracts -0.528*** 
 (0.098) 
Max of Diff in % Waterbody with Neighboring Tracts 0.016 
 (0.028) 
Covariates  
Population Density  -0.014*** 
 (0.000) 
Per capita Income 0.058*** 
 (0.003) 
Per capita Income Sq. -0.002*** 
 (0.000) 
% College Degree or Higher -0.921*** 
 (0.029) 
% African-American 0.003 
 (0.010) 
% Hispanic 0.340*** 
 (0.013) 
% Pop. 25 to 65 years old 0.791*** 
 (0.034) 
Median Housing Value 0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
Highway Miles 0.006*** 
 (0.000) 
Railway Miles 0.000 
 (0.001) 
% Urban Population 0.515*** 
 (0.010) 
% Suburban Population 0.498*** 
 (0.012) 
% Open Space -0.024*** 
 (0.007) 
% Waterbody -0.175** 
 (0.069) 
Dummy for Existing Facility (1 = YES) 2.171*** 
 (0.005) 
State-avg. Corporate Tax per employee -0.031** 
 (0.013) 
County-avg. % Voting for Democrats  -0.549*** 
 (0.043) 





Year Fixed Effect YES 




Table 5.4. Conditional Logit Model of Location Choice of Facilities – Control Function 
Approach 
 
 Uncorrected  Corrected with Control Function 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Census Tract Demographics        
Population Density  -0.192***  -0.201*** -0.189*** -0.187*** -0.187*** -0.186*** 
 (0.009)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Per capita Income 0.013  0.058* 0.059** 0.052* 0.053 0.051 
 (0.029)  (0.034) (0.028) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036) 
Per capita Income Sq. -0.006  -0.007 -0.006* -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.004)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% College Degree or Higher -2.044***  -2.702*** -2.509*** -2.429*** -2.429*** -2.415*** 
 (0.194)  (0.266) (0.250) (0.230) (0.232) (0.229) 
% African-American -0.253***  -0.234*** -0.206*** -0.208*** -0.207** -0.211** 
 (0.070)  (0.077) (0.076) (0.080) (0.088) (0.088) 
% Hispanic 0.306***  0.590*** 0.501*** 0.476*** 0.465*** 0.465*** 
 (0.115)  (0.123) (0.123) (0.105) (0.125) (0.125) 
Census Tract Economic Chars.        
% Pop. 25 to 65 years old 0.044  0.695*** 0.711*** 0.709*** 0.690*** 0.672*** 
 (0.205)  (0.240) (0.214) (0.239) (0.253) (0.254) 
Median Housing Value 0.000  0.001** 0.001** 0.0005* 0.0005* 0.000* 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.000) 
Highway Miles 0.011***  0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Railway Miles 0.019***  0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (0.001)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
% Urban Population 0.070  0.535*** 0.471*** 0.459*** 0.453*** 0.444*** 
 (0.052)  (0.091) (0.097) (0.113) (0.098) (0.097) 
% Suburban Population 0.913***  1.265*** 1.215*** 1.196*** 1.185*** 1.175*** 
 (0.050)  (0.076) (0.083) (0.099) (0.073) (0.072) 
% Open Space 0.081  0.056 0.067 0.075 0.075 0.070 
 (0.077)  (0.085) (0.092) (0.088) (0.080) (0.080) 
% Waterbody 0.473***  0.681*** 0.574*** 0.583*** 0.568*** 0.557*** 
 (0.128)  (0.154) (0.145) (0.165) (0.142) (0.142) 
Dummy for Existing Facility (1 = YES) 1.051***  2.707*** 2.611*** 2.556*** 2.507*** 2.455*** 
 (0.026)  (0.289) (0.294) (0.320) (0.280) (0.274) 
Number of Existing Facilities 0.147***  -0.615*** -0.559*** -0.520*** -0.488*** -0.453*** 
 (0.004)  (0.131) (0.138) (0.148) (0.128) (0.124) 
Residuals    0.764*** 0.819*** 0.831*** 0.819*** 0.794*** 
   (0.131) (0.138) (0.148) (0.131) (0.127) 
Residuals Square    -0.009*** -0.021*** -0.031*** -0.044*** 
    (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) 
Residuals Cubic     0.0004*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 
     (0.0001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Residuals Quartic      -0.00002** -0.0001** 
      (0.00001) (0.0001) 
Residuals Quintic       0.000002* 
       (0.000001) 
State / County Location Chars.        
State-avg. Corporate Tax per employee 0.122  0.110 0.119 0.121 0.117 0.132 
 (0.157)  (0.194) (0.179) (0.209) (0.193) (0.191) 
County-avg. % Voting for Democrats  -2.462***  -2.842*** -2.617*** -2.552*** -2.580*** -2.508*** 
 (0.473)  (0.507) (0.596) (0.627) (0.646) (0.641) 
County Attainment Status -0.261***  -0.215*** -0.215*** -0.214** -0.216*** -0.230*** 
 (0.060)  (0.064) (0.064) (0.083) (0.065) (0.066) 
        
Number of Facilities 11966  11953 11953 11953 11953 11953 
Pseudo R-squared 0.181  0.181 0.186 0.187 0.187 0.187 
Note: 1. Standard errors are generated using bootstrap with 50 drawings. 




Table 5.5. Conditional Logit Model of Location Choice of Facilities - Pressure at a Larger Scale  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












Census Tract Demographics 
(Avg. over tracts in 3 miles1) 
      
Population Density  -0.488*** -0.400*** -0.280*** -0.274*** -0.283*** -0.265*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
Per capita Income -0.051 -0.185*** -0.127** -0.119** -0.119** -0.109** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.054) 
Per capita Income Sq. 0.032*** 0.050*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
% College Degree or Higher -7.089*** -5.059*** -2.700*** -2.634*** -2.669*** -3.406*** 
 (0.319) (0.376) (0.369) (0.373) (0.465) (0.645) 
% African-American 0.384*** -0.536*** -0.616*** -0.463*** -0.448*** -0.478*** 
 (0.125) (0.136) (0.140) (0.144) (0.143) (0.150) 
% Hispanic 1.541*** 0.391* 0.254 0.202 0.253 0.086 
 (0.203) (0.211) (0.223) (0.224) (0.223) (0.276) 
Census Tract Economic Chars.       
% Pop. 25 to 65 years old  0.270 -0.268 -0.236   
  (0.199) (0.199) (0.204)   
% Pop. 25 to 65 years old - Avg. in 10 miles     0.715** -0.545 
     (0.344) (0.647) 
% College - Avg. over tracts in 10 miles     0.527 1.824 
     (1.643) (1.967) 
Median Housing Value  -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0005* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0003) 
Highway Miles  0.017*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Railway Miles  0.039*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.029*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
% Urban Population  0.717*** -0.046 -0.048 -0.063 0.060 
  (0.056) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.110) 
% Suburban Population  1.745*** 0.862*** 0.837*** 0.837*** 0.922*** 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.102) 
% Open Space  0.025 0.046 0.047 0.051 0.053 
  (0.073) (0.076) (0.078) (0.077) (0.092) 
% Waterbody  1.346*** 0.850*** 0.844*** 0.855*** 0.831*** 
  (0.105) (0.119) (0.120) (0.120) (0.130) 
Dummy for Existing Facility (1 = YES)   1.165*** 1.148*** 1.153*** 1.752*** 
   (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.340) 
Number of Existing Facilities   0.170*** 0.170*** 0.171*** -0.059 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.155) 
Residuals       0.442*** 
      (0.157) 
Residuals Square      -0.045*** 
      (0.005) 
Residuals Cubic      0.003*** 
      (0.001) 
Residuals Quartic      -0.0001*** 
      (0.00003) 
Residuals Quintic      0.000001** 
      (0.000001) 
State / County Location Chars.       
State-avg. Corporate Tax per employee    0.125 0.120 0.123 
    (0.155) (0.155) (0.142) 
County-avg. % Voting for Democrats     -2.393*** -2.381*** -2.227*** 
    (0.488) (0.487) (0.628) 
County Attainment Status    -0.249*** -0.238*** -0.231*** 
    (0.061) (0.061) (0.082) 
       
Number of Facilities 12133 12104 12104 11982 12001 11988 
Pseudo R-squared 0.033 0.082 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.180 
Note: 1. The distance between tracts is measured as the Euclidean distance between the centroid of tracts.  
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Table 5.6. Conditional Logit Model of Location Choice of Facilities - Subsidiary vs Self-owned Firms 
  
 Facilities of Subsidiaries to other Firms  Facilities of Self-owned Firms  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Census Tract Demographics        
Population Density  -0.388*** -0.347*** -0.197***  -0.376*** -0.332*** -0.192*** 
 (0.018) (0.030) (0.018)  (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) 
Per capita Income 0.240*** 0.175*** 0.026  0.199*** 0.127*** 0.012 
 (0.071) (0.064) (0.073)  (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) 
Per capita Income Sq. -0.024*** -0.017** -0.010  -0.017*** -0.011** -0.005* 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
% College Degree or Higher -2.954*** -2.511*** -0.933*  -4.184*** -3.652*** -2.224*** 
 (0.441) (0.497) (0.533)  (0.179) (0.213) (0.212) 
% African-American 0.140 -0.157 -0.267  0.199*** -0.139* -0.248*** 
 (0.181) (0.174) (0.202)  (0.071) (0.071) (0.080) 
% Hispanic 1.497*** 1.009*** 0.344  1.516*** 0.960*** 0.306** 
 (0.318) (0.301) (0.345)  (0.119) (0.115) (0.128) 
Census Tract Economic Chars.        
% Pop. 25 to 65 years old   0.972* 0.630   0.327 -0.017 
  (0.561) (0.607)   (0.204) (0.226) 
Median Housing Value  -0.001 0.000   -0.001** 0.0001 
  (0.001) (0.001)   (0.000) (0.0002) 
Highway Miles  0.012*** 0.009***   0.014*** 0.010*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)   (0.001) (0.001) 
Railway Miles  0.032*** 0.018***   0.032*** 0.019*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)   (0.001) (0.001) 
% Urban Population  0.769*** 0.006   0.865*** 0.073 
  (0.141) (0.144)   (0.057) (0.056) 
% Suburban Population  1.777*** 0.921***   1.740*** 0.909*** 
  (0.136) (0.137)   (0.052) (0.052) 
% Open Space  0.165 0.171   0.029 0.069 
  (0.200) (0.245)   (0.079) (0.098) 
% Waterbody  -0.042 -0.229   0.785*** 0.559*** 
  (0.322) (0.402)   (0.127) (0.145) 
Dummy for Existing Facility (1 = Y)   1.192***    1.035*** 
   (0.071)    (0.027) 
# of Existing TRI Facilities   0.149***    0.148*** 
   (0.011)    (0.004) 
State / County Location Chars.        
State-avg. Corporate Tax per employee   0.332    0.095 
   (0.565)    (0.209) 
County-avg. % Voting for Democrats    -1.841    -2.521*** 
   (1.631)    (0.617) 
County Attainment Status   -0.429*    -0.239*** 
   (0.235)    (0.084) 
        
Number of Facilities 1521 1521 1510  10502 10501 10392 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0772 0.111 0.188  0.0803 0.114 0.179 
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Table 5.7. Cross-Sectional Model of Post-Siting Performance of Facilities – Log of Emission Levels 
 
VARIABLES Emission Level of Facilities at Year 5 after Siting Emission Level of Facilities at Year 10 after Siting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Facility Characteristics           
Emission Level at Year 1 in log 0.584*** 0.576*** 0.573*** 0.565*** 0.567*** 0.473*** 0.468*** 0.463*** 0.455*** 0.458*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.033) (0.034) 
Employment Scale at Year 5 or 10 in log 0.133*** 0.138*** 0.152*** 0.130*** 0.134*** 0.280*** 0.289*** 0.312*** 0.234*** 0.253*** 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.045) (0.045) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.070) (0.071) 
Owned by Subsidiary Firms (1 = Y) 0.199 0.208 0.219 0.158 0.139 0.205 0.152 0.178 0.366 0.360 
 (0.160) (0.158) (0.158) (0.184) (0.185) (0.246) (0.248) (0.248) (0.284) (0.285) 
Location Characteristics at the siting year           
Population Density (in log) -0.152*** -0.127*** -0.126*** -0.139** -0.141** -0.256*** -0.210*** -0.208*** -0.378*** -0.361*** 
 (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) (0.069) (0.069) (0.052) (0.057) (0.057) (0.104) (0.105) 
Per capita Income (in log) -0.014 -0.033 -0.040 0.007 0.007 0.211 0.135 0.118 0.280* 0.271 
 (0.102) (0.105) (0.104) (0.120) (0.120) (0.137) (0.139) (0.138) (0.166) (0.167) 
% College Degree -2.208*** -1.970** -1.967** -1.644 -1.686 -3.866*** -4.070*** -4.040*** -3.894** -3.709** 
 (0.755) (0.794) (0.790) (1.075) (1.087) (1.213) (1.246) (1.243) (1.655) (1.669) 
% African-American 0.080 -0.053 -0.106 -0.220 -0.303 -0.366 -0.971** -1.067** -1.272** -1.184** 
 (0.283) (0.314) (0.314) (0.358) (0.370) (0.427) (0.468) (0.470) (0.555) (0.571) 
% Hispanic -0.154 -0.435 -0.408 -0.557 -0.596 -0.428 -0.851 -0.837 -0.778 -0.776 
 (0.365) (0.494) (0.496) (0.542) (0.543) (0.544) (0.709) (0.711) (0.784) (0.790) 
Median Housing Value (in log)    -0.001 -0.001    -0.002 -0.002 
    (0.001) (0.001)    (0.002) (0.002) 
Highway Miles (in log)    -0.005 -0.004    -0.016* -0.016* 
    (0.005) (0.005)    (0.009) (0.009) 
Railway Miles (in log)    0.006 0.007    0.001 0.002 
    (0.007) (0.007)    (0.010) (0.010) 
Number of Existing Facilities    0.022 0.020    -0.020 -0.021 
    (0.015) (0.015)    (0.026) (0.026) 
Industry-specific Avg. Wage Rate (in log)    0.591** 0.607**    0.918** 1.018** 
    (0.262) (0.265)    (0.454) (0.458) 
Industry-specific Avg. Employment (in log)    -0.014 -0.022    -0.015 -0.011 
    (0.055) (0.057)    (0.085) (0.088) 
% Democrats     0.312     -2.194 
     (1.859)     (2.996) 
Attainment Status     0.251     0.003 
     (0.175)     (0.273) 
           
Observations 3,444 3,444 3,444 2,589 2,560 2,206 2,206 2,206 1,616 1,594 
State FE NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO YES YES YES NO NO YES YES YES 
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Table 5.8. Cross-Sectional Model of Post-Siting Performance of Facilities – Log of Employment Scales 
 
VARIABLES Employment of Facilities at Year 5 after Siting Employment of Facilities at Year 10 after Siting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Facility Characteristics           
Employment Scale at Year 1 in log 0.749*** 0.747*** 0.745*** 0.744*** 0.743*** 0.603*** 0.601*** 0.599*** 0.604*** 0.602*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Owned by Subsidiary Firms (1 = Y) 0.272*** 0.276*** 0.277*** 0.272*** 0.279*** 0.447*** 0.453*** 0.451*** 0.418*** 0.419*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.047) (0.047) 
Location Characteristics at the siting year           
Population Density (in log) -0.005 0.003 0.002 -0.017* -0.016* -0.006 -0.000 -0.001 -0.013 -0.013 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014) 
Per capita Income (in log) -0.005 0.003 0.006 0.019 0.021 -0.002 0.012 0.016 0.044* 0.046* 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) 
% College Degree -0.033 0.095 0.087 -0.049 -0.009 0.076 0.145 0.141 -0.013 0.044 
 (0.110) (0.115) (0.115) (0.151) (0.153) (0.154) (0.163) (0.162) (0.208) (0.210) 
% African-American -0.080* -0.114** -0.102** -0.116** -0.064 -0.188*** -0.254*** -0.238*** -0.257*** -0.202** 
 (0.042) (0.046) (0.046) (0.052) (0.054) (0.060) (0.067) (0.067) (0.076) (0.080) 
% Hispanic -0.208*** -0.103 -0.104 -0.116 -0.106 -0.249*** -0.205** -0.204** -0.175* -0.173* 
 (0.050) (0.068) (0.068) (0.074) (0.074) (0.069) (0.093) (0.093) (0.104) (0.104) 
Median Housing Value (in log)    0.000 0.000    0.000 0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) 
Highway Miles (in log)    -0.000 -0.001    -0.000 -0.000 
    (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001) 
Railway Miles (in log)    -0.001 -0.001    -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of Existing Facilities    -0.007** -0.007**    -0.005 -0.005 
    (0.003) (0.003)    (0.004) (0.004) 
Industry-specific Avg. Wage Rate (in log)    -0.001 0.019    -0.037 -0.007 
    (0.043) (0.043)    (0.060) (0.060) 
Industry-specific Avg. Employment (in log)    0.025*** 0.030***    0.033*** 0.038*** 
    (0.008) (0.008)    (0.011) (0.012) 
% Democrats     -0.543*     -1.102*** 
     (0.278)     (0.416) 
Attainment Status     -0.075***     -0.062 
     (0.026)     (0.038) 
           
Observations 10,439 10,439 10,439 7,957 7,885 7,277 7,277 7,277 5,457 5,406 
R Squared 0.673 0.677 0.678 0.686 0.687 0.486 0.494 0.496 0.518 0.519 
State FE NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO YES YES YES NO NO YES YES YES 
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion 
 
 
Environmental disclosure programs are meant to correct informational asymmetries and increase 
welfare by helping communities take actions based on solid facts. In this dissertation, the relevant 
question is whether such programs benefit all communities regardless of their income, race, and 
education levels. I have analyzed two complementary explanations for the disproportionately low 
emission reduction in communities with low socio-economic statuses after the start of the Toxic 
Release Inventory (TRI) disclosure program.  
 In particular, I studied the effects of community socio-economic characteristics on the 
location choice and the environmental performance of toxic-releasing facilities after the TRI. I 
have addressed four questions: 1) Do the relocation decisions of facilities that existed before the 
TRI respond to the socio-economic characteristics of their host communities? 2) Is the 
environmental performance of the relocated facilities affected by the relocation decisions? 3) Is 
the environmental performance of the facilities not relocated affected by the characteristics of their 
host communities? 4) Do the location choice and the post-siting performance of the facilities born 
after the TRI also respond to the socio-economic characteristics of communities?  
 The four chapters in the main body of this dissertation correspond to the four questions 
listed above. In Chapter 2, I analyzed the effects of community socio-economic characteristics on 
the relocation by toxic-releasing facilities. To overcome the reverse causality problem inherent in 
identifying these effects, I used the TRI disclosure starting in mid-1989 as a natural experiment 
and estimated the effects of the community characteristics in 1990 on the relocation decisions of 
facilities over the following twenty years. I also compared the characteristics of the moving origins 
and destinations of the facilities to obtain further insights about whether community characteristics 
motivate the facilities to relocate. The main results of this chapter show that toxic facilities were 
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more likely to relocate from communities with high population density and high educational 
attainment. The causes of relocation might include community pressure arising from greater 
information availability, but quite likely economic factors were more important. The facilities that 
did relocate tended to move into communities with lower population density, income, and 
educational attainment. This “migration” of toxic facilities down the socioeconomic gradient 
results in adverse distributional effects. 
 In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I analyzed the effect of community socio-economic 
characteristics on the environmental performance of the toxic-releasing facilities that either 
relocated or decided to stay at their existing location after TRI was released. In particular, I first 
analyzed the adjustment in toxic emission levels of the facility movers in response to the difference 
in the characteristics between their moving origins and destinations. I then analyzed the change in 
toxic emission levels of the facility stayers from 1990 to 2011 as a response to the characteristics 
of their host communities. The main results from Chapter 3 show that facilities that relocated into 
communities with lower educational attainment and lower population density were more likely to 
have higher emissions after moving than their counterfactual, especially for the large polluting 
facilities. The main results of Chapter 4 show that facility stayers that located in higher educated 
and more populated communities also had more emission reduction from 1990 to 2011. Combined 
with the findings from Chapter 2, the results from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 suggest that toxic-
releasing facilities are not only moving into communities with a low socio-economic status, which 
signals low community pressure against pollution, but also tend to make use of the low status and 
generate more toxic emissions in those disadvantaged communities.  
 In Chapter 5, I analyzed the effect of community characteristics on the location choice and 
the post-siting performance of the facilities born after 1990. To reduce the potential omitted 
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variable bias, I used a micro-scale location choice model and explained facilities’ siting decisions 
among several neighboring census tracts within a few miles. In this way, the unobserved factors 
that affect facilities’ profit in the large market scale will not enter into the model. I found that the 
facilities born after 1990 also preferred entering communities with low population density and low 
educational attainment, and that such location choices were associated with higher emission levels 
after siting. The facilities were observed to enter low-income and African-American communities 
but only before the economic benefits in industrial zones were being controlled. I also found that 
the facilities were locating into areas with a high rate of Hispanic, and this effect could be masked 
due to ecological fallacy.  
 To summarize, this dissertation describes the distributional effect of the TRI information 
disclosure from the perspective of the location choice and environmental performance of toxic-
releasing facilities after the disclosure. The analyses show that after the TRI was released, 
communities with low socio-economic statuses were targeted to host both facilities that existed 
before the TRI and relocated and the new facilities born after the TRI. While part of the reason of 
this phenomenon could be the searching of facilities for economic benefits, there is also evidence 
of facilities’ targeting disadvantaged communities, especially low educated groups. Low educated 
residents may signal low community pressure because they lack knowledge and capability to 
process complex information. Based on these findings, analyses in the dissertation have two policy 
implications. They suggest distributional impact analysis on the environmental disclosure 
programs to protect socio-economically disadvantaged communities. They also suggest policies to 





Abadie, A., Diamond, A., and Hainmueller, J. (2010). Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case 
Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control Program. Journal of American 
Statistical Association, 105(490), 493–505. 
Abadie, A., Diamond, A., and Hainmueller, J. (2015). Comparative Politics and the Synthetic Control 
Method. American Journal of Political Science, 59(2), 495–510. 
Abadie, A., and Gardeazabal, J. (2003). The Economic Costs of Conflict : A Case Study of the Basque 
Country. American Economic Review, 93(1), 113–132. 
Anderton, D., Anderson, A., Oakes, J. M., and Fraser, M. (1994). Environmental equity: the demographics 
of dumping. Demography, 31(2), 229–248. 
Ard, K. (2015). Trends in Exposure to Industrial Air Toxins for Different Racial and Socioeconomic Groups: 
A Spatial and Temporal Examination of Environmental Inequality in the U.S. from 1995 to 2004. 
Social Science Research, 53, 375–390. 
Arora, S., and Cason, T. (1999). Do Community Characteristics Influence Environmental Outcomes? 
Evidence from the Toxics Release Inventory. Southern Economic Journal, 65(4), 691–716. 
Atkeson, A., Kehoe, P. J., and Pindyck, R. S. (1999). Models of Energy Use: Putty-Putty Versus Putty-
Clay. American Economic Review, 89(4), 1028–1043. 
Auffhammer, M., Bento, A. M., and Lowe, S. E. (2009). Measuring the effects of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments on ambient PM10 concentrations: The critical importance of a spatially disaggregated 
analysis. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 58(1), 15–26. 
Auyero, J., and Swistun, D. (2008). The Social Production of Toxic Uncertainty. American Sociological 
Review, 73, 357–379. 
Baden, B., Noonan, D., and Turaga, R. M. (2007). Scales of justice: Is There a Geographic Bias in 
Environmental Equity Analysis? Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 50(2), 163–
185. 
Banzhaf, S., Ma, L., and Timmins, C. (2019a). Environmental Justice: Establishing Causal Relationships. 
 
 159 
Annual Review of Resource Economics, 11(1). 
Banzhaf, S., Ma, L., and Timmins, C. (2019b). Environmental Justice: The Economics of Race, Place, and 
Pollution. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(1), 185–208. 
Banzhaf, S., and Walsh, R. (2008). Do People Vote with Their Feet? An Empirical Test of Tiebout. 
American Economic Review, 98(3), 843–863. 
Bartik, T. J. (1985). Business Location Decisions in the United States: Estimates of the Effects of 
Unionization, Taxes, and Other Characteristics of States. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 
3(1), 14–22. 
Becker, R. A. (2004). Pollution Abatement Expenditure by U.S. Manufacturing Plants: Do Community 
Characteristics Matter? B.E. Journals in Economic Analysis & Policy, 3(2), 1–21. 
Becker, R., and Henderson, V. (2000). Effects of Air Quality Regulations on Polluting Industries. Journal 
of Political Economy, 108(2), 379–421. 
Been, V., and Gupta, F. (1997). Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios - A Longitudinal Analysis 
of Environmental Justice Claims. Ecology Law Quarterly, 24(1), 1–56. 
Bi, X., and Khanna, M. (2012). Reassessment of the Impact of the EPA’s Voluntary 33/50 Program on 
Toxic Releases. Land Economics, 88(2), 341–361. 
Bilgel, F., and Galle, B. (2015). Financial incentives for kidney donation: A comparative case study using 
synthetic controls. Journal of Health Economics, 43, 103–117. 
Billmeier, A., and Nannicini, T. (2013). Assessing Economic Liberalization Episodes: a Synthetic Control 
Approach. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(3), 983–1001. 
Boer, J. T., Pastor, M., Sadd, J. L., and Snyder, L. D. (1997). Is There Environmental Racism? The 
Demographics of Hazardous Waste in Los Angeles County. Social Science Quarterly, 78(4), 793–
810. 
Brooks, N., and Sethi, R. (1997). The Distribution of Pollution: Community Characteristics and Exposure 
to Air Toxics. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 32(2), 233–250. 
Brouwer, A. E., Mariotti, I., and van Ommeren, J. N. (2004). The Firm Relocation Decision: An Empirical 
 
 160 
Investigation. Annals of Regional Science, 38(2), 335–347. 
Brülhart, M., Jametti, M., and Schmidheiny, K. (2012). Do agglomeration economies reduce the sensitivity 
of firm location to tax differentials? Economic Journal, 122(563), 1069–1093. 
Bullard, R. D. (1983). Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community. Sociological Inquiry, 53(2–
3), 273–288. 
Cable, S., Shriver, T., and Mix, T. (2008). Risk Society and Contested Illness : The Case of Nuclear 
Weapons Workers. American Sociological Review, 73(3), 380–401. 
Cameron, T. A., and Crawford, G. D. (2003). Superfund Taint and Neighborhood Change : Ethnicity , Age 
Distributions , and Household Structure. Working Paper, (January). 
Cavallo, E., Galiani, S., and Noy, I. (2013). Natural disasters and economic growth. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 95(5), 1549–1561. 
Chan, S. H., Gau, G., and Wang, K. (1995). Stock Market Reaction to Capital Investment Decisions : 
Evidence from Business Relocations. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 30(1), 81–
100. 
Charney, A. H. (1983). Intraurban manufacturing location decisions and local tax differentials. Journal of 
Urban Economics, 14(2), 184–205. 
Ciccone, A., and Hall, R. (1996). Productivity and the Density of Economic Activity. American Economic 
Review, 86(1), 54–70. 
Coffman, M., and Noy, I. (2012). Hurricane Iniki: measuring the long-term economic impact of a natural 
disaster using synthetic control. Environment and Development Economics, 17(2), 187–205. 
Cole, M., Elliott, R., and Khemmarat, K. (2013). Local Exposure to Toxic Releases: Examining the Role 
of Ethnic Fractionalization and Polarisation. Ecological Economics, 93, 249–259. 
Currie, J., Davis, L., Greenstone, M., and Walker, R. (2015). Environmental Health Risks and Housing 
Values : Evidence from 1600 Toxic Plant Openings and Closings. American Economic Review, 105(2), 
678–709. 
Davis, L. W. (2011). The Effect of Power Plants on Local Housing Values and Rents. Review of Economics 
 
 161 
and Statistics, 93(4), 1391–1402. 
De Silva, D., Hubbard, T., and Schiller, A. (2016). Entry and Exit Patterns of “Toxic” Firms. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 98(3), 881–909. 
Doudchenko, N., and Imbens, G. W. (2016). Balancing, Regression, Difference-In-Differences and 
Synthetic Control Methods: A Synthesis. 
Downey, L. (2005). The Unintended Significance of Race: Environmental Racial Inequality in Detroit. 
Social Forces, 83(3), 971–1007. 
Duranton, G. (2016). Agglomeration effects in Colombia. Journal of Regional Science, 56(2), 210–238. 
Earnhart, D. (2004). The Effects of Community Characteristics on Polluter Compliance Levels. Land 
Economics, 80(3), 408–432. 
Elliott, E., Seldon, B. J., and Regens, J. L. (1997). Political and economic determinants of individuals’ 
support for environmental spending. Journal of Environmental Management, 51(1), 15–27. 
Fowlie, M., Holland, S. P., and Mansur, E. T. (2012). What Do Emissions Markets Deliver and to Whom ? 
Evidence from Southern California ’ s NOx Trading Program What Do Emissions Markets Deliver 
and to Whom ? Evidence from Southern California ’ s NOx Trading Program. American Economic 
Review, 102(June), 965–993. 
Freudenberg, N., Pastor, M., and Israel, B. (2011). Strengthening community capacity to participate in 
making decisions to reduce disproportionate environmental exposures. American Journal of Public 
Health, 101(SUPPL. 1), 1–8. 
Ghosh, C., Rodriguez, M., and Sirmans, C. F. (1995). Gains from Corporate Headquarters Relocations: 
Evidence from the Stock Market. Journal of Urban Economics, 38(3), 291–311. 
Glaeser, E. L., Combes, P.-P., Duranton, G., Gobillon, L., and Roux, S. (2010). Estimating Agglomeration 
Economies with History, Geology, and Worker Effects. Agglomeration Economics. 
Glaeser, E. L., and Gottlieb, J. D. (2009). The Wealth of Cities: Agglomeration Economies and Spatial 
Equilibrium in the United States. Journal of Economic Literature. 
Goldman, B. A., and Fitton, L. (1994). Toxics wastes and race revisited: An update of the 1987 report on 
 
 162 
the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of communities with hazardous waste sites. Center for 
Policy Alternatives. 
Gould, J. (1986). Quality of Life in American Neighborhoods. Levels of Affluence, Toxic Waste, and Cancer 
Mortality in Residential Zipcode Areas. Bloulder: Westview Press. 
Grant, D., and Jones, A. W. (2003). Are subsidiaries more prone to pollute? New evidence from the EPA’s 
toxics release inventory. Social Science Quarterly, 84(1), 162–173. 
Grant, D., Jones, A. W., and Trautner, N. (2005). Do Facilities with Distant Headquarters Pollute More? 
How Civic Engagement Conditions the Environmental Performance of Absentee Managed Plants. 
Social Forces, 83(1), 189–214. 
Grant, D., Trautner, N., Downey, L., and Thiebaud, L. (2010). Bringing the Polluters Back In: 
Environmental Inequality and the Organization of Chemical Production. American Sociological 
Review, 75(4), 479–504. 
Gray, W. B., Shadbegian, R. J., and Wolverton, A. (2010). Environmental Justice: Do Poor and Minority 
Populations Face More Hazards? NCEE Working Paper, (10). 
Gray, W., and Shadbegian, R. (2007). The Environmental Performance of Polluting Plants: A Spatial 
Analysis. Journal of Regional Science, 47(1), 63–84. 
Greenberg, M., and Anderson, R. (1984). Hazardous Waste Sites: The Credibility Gap. New Brunswick: 
Center for Urban Policy Research. 
Gregory, R., Lombard, J. R., and Seifert, B. (2005). Impact of Headquarters Relocation on the Operating 
Performance of the Firm. Economic Development Quarterly, 19(3), 260–270. 
Hamilton, J. T. (1993). Politics and Social Costs: Estimating the Impact of Collective Action on Hazardous 
Waste Facilities. The RAND Journal of Economics, 24(1), 101–125. 
Hamilton, J. T. (1995a). Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the Toxics Release 
Inventory Data. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 28(1), 98–113. 
Hamilton, J. T. (1995b). Testing for Environmental Racism: Prejudice , Profits , Political Power? Journal 
of Policy Analysis and Management, 14(1), 107–132. 
 
 163 
Hamilton, J. T. (2005). Regulation through Revelation: the origin, politics, and impacts of the Toxics 
Release Inventory Program. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Harrington, D. R., Deltas, G., and Khanna, M. (2014). Does Pollution Prevention Reduce Toxic Releases? 
A Dynamic Panel Data Model. Land Economics, 90(2), 199–221. 
Harrison, K., and Antweiler, W. (2003, June). Incentives for Pollution Abatement: Regulation, Regulatory 
Threats, and Non-Governmental Pressures. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. 
Hausman, J. A. (1993). Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited. 
Holl, A. (2004). Start-ups and Relocations: Manufacturing Plant Location in Portugal. Regional Science, 
83(4), 649–668. 
Hu, W., Cox, L., Wright, J., and Harris, T. (2008). Understanding Firms’ Relocation and Expansion 
Decisions Using Self-Reported Factor Importance Rating. The Review of Regional Studies, 38(1), 67–
88. 
Jenkins, R. R., Maguire, K. B., and Morgan, C. L. (2004). Host Community Compensation and Municipal 
Solid Waste Landfills. Land Economics, 80(4), 513. 
Kalnins, A., and Dowell, G. (2015). Community Characteristics and Changes in Toxic Chemical Releases: 
Does Information Disclosure Affect Environmental Injustice? Journal of Business Ethics, 145(2), 
277–292. 
Karkkainen, B. C. (2001). Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, 
Precursor to a New Paradigm? The Georgetown Law Journal, 89, 257–370. 
Kasarda, J., and Rondinelli, D. (1998). Innovative Infrastructure for Agile Manufacturers. Sloan 
Management Review, 39(2), 73–82. 
Kaul, A., Klößner, S., Pfeifer, G., and Schieler, M. (2017). Synthetic Control Methods: Never Use All Pre-
Intervention Outcomes Together With Covariates. Working Paper, 1–20. 
Khanna, M., and Anton, W. (2002). Corporate Environmental Management: Regulatory and Market-based 
Incentives. Land Economics, 78(4), 539–558. 
 
 164 
Khanna, M., Quimio, W. R., and Bojilova, D. (1998). Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for 
Environmental Protection. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 36(3), 243–266. 
Konar, S., and Cohen, M. A. (1997). Information as regulation: the effect of community right to know laws 
on toxic emissions. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 32(1), 109–124. 
Kreif, N., Grieve, R., Hangartner, D., Turner, A. J., Nikolova, S., and Sutton, M. (2016). Examination of 
the Synthetic Control Method for Evaluating Health Policies with Multiple Treated Units. Health 
Economics (United Kingdom), 25(12), 1514–1528. 
Lee, A. I., and Alm, J. (2004). The Clean Air Act Amendments and Firm Investment in Pollution Abatement 
Equipment. Land Economics, 80(3), 433–447. 
Levinson, A. (1996a). Environmental Regulations and Industry Location: International and Domestic 
Evidence. Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade, 1, 429–457. 
Levinson, A. (1996b). Environmental Regulations and Manufacturers’ Location Choices: Evidence from 
the Census of Manufactures. Journal of Public Economics, 62(1–2), 5–29. 
List, J. A., McHone, W. W., and Millimet, D. L. (2003). Effects of air quality regulation on the destination 
choice of relocating plants. Oxford Economic Papers, 55(4), 657–678. 
Lynn, F. M., and Kartez, J. D. (1994). Environmental Democracy in Action: The Toxics Release Inventory. 
Environmental Management, 18(4), 511–521. 
MacLean, A. (1996). The Right Stuff: Information in the Public Interest. New Solutions: A Journal of 
Environmental and Occupational Health Policy, 6(3), 48–58. 
MacLean, A., and Orum, P. (1992). Progress Report: Community Right-to-know. Washtington DC. 
Mastromonaco, R. (2015). Do Environmental Right-to-know Laws Affect Markets? Capitalization of 
Information in the Toxic Release Inventory. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
71, 54–70. 
McCann, P. (2001). Urban and Regional Economics. Oxford University Press. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 




Mohai, P., and Bryant, B. (1992). Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and Class as Factors in the 
Distribution of Environmental Hazards. Unversity of Colorado Law Review, 63(4), 921–932. 
Mohai, P., Pellow, D. N., and Roberts, J. T. (2009). Environmental Justice. Annual Review of Environment 
and Resources, 34, 405–430. 
Mohai, P., and Saha, R. (2015a). Which Came First, People or Pollution? A Review of Theory and Evidence 
from Longitudinal Environmental Justice Studies. Environmental Research Letters, 10(12), 125011. 
Mohai, P., and Saha, R. (2015b). Which Came First, People or Pollution? Assessing the Disparate Siting 
and Post-siting Demographic Change Hypotheses of Environmental Injustice. Environmental 
Research Letters, 10(11), 1–17. 
Molloy, R., and Shan, H. (2013). The Effect of Gasoline Prices on Household Location. Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 95(4), 1212–1221. 
Moomaw, R. L. (1981). Productivity and city size: a critique of the evidence. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 96(4), 675–688. 
Morgenstern, R. D., Pizer, W. A., and Shih, J. S. (2002). Jobs versus the environment: An industry-level 
perspective. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 43(3), 412–436. 
Nakosteen, R. A., and Zimmer, M. A. (1987). Determinants of Regional Migration by Manufacturing Firms. 
Economic Inquiry, 25(2), 351–362. 
Pargal, S., Hettige, H., Singh, M., and Wheeler, D. (1997). Formal and Informal Regulation of Industrial 
Pollution: Comparative Evidence from Indonesia and the United States. The World Bank Economic 
Review, 11(3), 433–450. 
Pastor, M., Sadd, J. L., and Morello-Frosch, R. (2004). Waiting to inhale: The Demographics of Toxic Air 
Release Facilities in 21st-Century California. Social Science Quarterly, 85(2), 420–440. 
Petrin, A., and Train, K. (2010). A Control Function Approach to Endogeneity in Consumer Choice Models. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 47(1), 3–13. 




Pulido, L. (2000). Rethinking Environmental Racism: White Privilege and Urban Development in Southern 
California. Annals of Association of American Geographers, 90(1944), 12–40. 
Ringquist, E. J. (2009). Assessing Evidence of Environmental Inequities: A Meta-Analysis. Social 
Experimentation, Program Evaluation, and Public Policy, 24(2), 421–443. 
Roe, B., Teisl, M. F., Levy, A., and Russell, M. (2001). US consumers’ willingness to pay for green 
electricity. Energy Policy, 29(11), 917–925. 
Saha, R., and Mohai, P. (2005). Historical Context and Hazardous Waste Facility Siting: Understanding 
Temporal Patterns in Michigan. Social Problems, 52(4), 618–648. 
Schmenner, R. W. . (1980). Choosing New Industrial Capacity: On-Site Expansion, Branching, and 
Relocation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 95(1), 103–119. 
Shadbegian, R. J., and Wolverton, A. (2010). Location Decisions of US Polluting Plants: Theory, Empirical 
Evidence, and Consequences. International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, 4(1), 
1–49. 
Shapiro, M. D. (2005). Equity and information: Information regulation, environmental justice, and risks 
from toxic chemicals. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 24(2), 373–398. 
Tiebout. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy, 64(5), 416–424. 
United Church of Christ, C. R. J. (1987). Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States: A National Report 
on the Racial and Socio-economic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites. 
US EPA. (1979). Siting of Hazardous Waste Management Facilities and Public Opposition. 
US EPA. (2016). 2014 TRI National Analysis. 
van Dijk, J., and Pellenbarg, P. H. (2000). Firm Relocation Decisions in the Netherlands: An Ordered Logit 
Approach. Papers in Regional Science, 79(2), 191–219. 
Wagner, U. J., and Timmins, C. D. (2009). Agglomeration effects in foreign direct investment and the 
pollution haven hypothesis. Environmental and Resource Economics, 43(2), 231–256. 
Walls, D. W. & A. (2011). National Establishment Time-Series ( NETS ) Database : Database Description. 
 
 167 
Wang, X., Deltas, G., Khanna, M., and Bi, X. (2018). Community Pressure and the Spatial Redistribution 
of Pollution: the Relocation of Toxic Releasing Facilities.  
Wolverton, A. (2009). Effects of Socio-economic and Input-Related Factors on Polluting Plants’ Location 
Decisions. B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy, 
9(1). 
World Bank. (1999). Greening Industry: New Roles for Communities, Markets, and Governments. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
U.S. Geological Survey, Gap Analysis Program (GAP). May 2016. Protected Areas Database of   the 
United States (PAD-US), version 1.4 Combined Feature Class.  
U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections (1990 to 2011). 
Steven Manson, Jonathan Schroeder, David Van Riper, and Steven Ruggles. IPUMS National Historical 
Geographic Information System: Version 13.0. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2018.  




APPENDIX A:  Some Details on the Merging of the TRI Data with the NETS Data 
 
A1. The ID for Facilities in TRI and NETS 
The US EPA uses TRIFID to identify the facilities reporting to the TRI. TRIFID is location-specific 
and is not unique to facilities during their lifetime. Once a facility moves, its TRIFID will be 
changed, and the initial TRIFID may be reassigned to others that took the facility’s old physical 
location. Because TRIFID is not facility-specific, we cannot identify the number of facilities 
reporting to TRI based on these IDs but have to rely on the IDs in the NETS data, called DUNS 
number, which is facility-specific and never reassigned. We merge the records of TRI with the 
NETS records year by year. This is because a TRIFID is attached to a unique facility in a specific 
year, so the compound ID, TRIFID + year, can be used to uniquely identify records in the TRI.  
 
A2. Match the IDs in TRI and NETS 
Our main reference to combine the TRI and the NETS database is a cross-walk file from the NETS 
data provider, the Walls company. The file contains two columns, with one for TRIFID and the 
other for DUNS number, and each row tells how to pair one DUNS number with a TRIFID. 
Importantly, the cross-walk file does not contain a year column, even though the TRIFID to facility 
mapping is in principle many-to-many. Therefore, the cross-walk mapping is also many-to-many. 
We describe our approach with dealing with this challenge further below.  
 The NETS data provider generates the cross-walk by matching the common information 
in the TRI and NETS on facilities’ street address, name, 8-digit SIC code, and the parent 
company’s name. Specifically, it first treats a business that has the same street address and can be 
uniquely identified by the address in both NETS and TRI as the same business; then, if the street 
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address is too coarse to uniquely identify a business in either dataset, it turns to the address + name 
of the business and redoes the identification and matching. If still fails, it then turns to address + 
name + 8-digit SIC code, and so on. This matching is incomplete; many facilities in NETS and the 
TRI are not included in the cross-walk. We are able to match some of these facilities using their 
geographic coordinates rounded to 4 (or 3, or 2) decimal points. We add DUNS number to TRIFID 
match to the cross-walk if both the TRI and NETS databases both contain only one unmatched 
facility with the specified co-ordinates. This approach catches facilities that have a small difference 
in the street address in the two datasets but are actually the same facility (e.g. a facility may have 
an address of “12-345 ABC street” in TRI data but “12345 ABC street” in NETS data). It allows 
to matches an additional 0.2% of the TRIFIDs. This geographic matching can also generate many-
to-many matches, because of facility relocation and recycling of TRIFIDs.   
        As noted earlier, this matching process can generate some non-one-to-one matches because 
it does not use any temporal information. Such multiple matches can be generated in 3 ways:  
1) A TRI-reporting facility relocated and continued reporting to TRI after relocating. This facility 
will have two TRIFIDs in TRI but only one DUNS number in NETS, thus resulting in a ``two-to-
one” match. We can determine the temporal order of the two TRIFIDs using the information in 
“TRIFID + year” and obtain a one-to-one mapping of the annual records facilities in the TRI and 






Figure A1. Multiple Matching (TRIFID:DUNSnumber = N:1) 
 
We found that some relocated facilities only have TRIFID before or after moving, and the TRI 
records end or start exactly at the relocation year. One possibility is that the facility only reaches 
the threshold of TRI reporting before or after moving and thus we do not have records in both pre- 
and post- relocation periods. The other possibility is a missing match of the facility’s DUNSnumber 
with its TRI records after or before the relocation. If this is the case, the missing records should be 
attached to another TRIFID. We manually searched the TRI dataset for all these relocated facilities 
by their name, address, and zip-code to fulfill these potential missing records as much as possible.  
2) TRIFID can be recycled and reassigned, therefore one TRIFID can be paired with multiple 
DUNSnumber values in different years. We use the temporal information in TRI to identify which 
years’ records under a TRIFID should be match with a specific DUNSnumber. An example of such 
scenario is shown in Figure A-2.  
 
 




3) A “facility” defined in NETS sometimes is not exactly identical to the “facility” in TRI. Some 
facilities in NETS may contain several facilities in TRI and or the other way around. The number 
of facilities with this kind of problem however is quite small (less than 0.1% of the sample), we 
therefore choose to drop these businesses from the sample given the difficulty of aggregating data 
like the relocation information across facilities.  
 
A3. Correction of Inconsistent Matchings 
After the matching, we end up with a panel dataset of facilities each identified by a unique 
DUNSnumber and having at least one TRI record during our sample period. Nevertheless, we find 
some inconsistencies in this merged dataset between the information from NETS and TRI.  
         First, some facilities whose NETS address has changed (and thus considered relocated) 
continue to report in the TRI under the old TRIFID, which contradicts with the EPA’s rule of 
changing TRIFID with re-location. One possibility is that the relocation did happen, and the old 
TRIFID was re-assigned to a new owner which continued reporting to the TRI (see the example of 
facilities d1 and d2 in Figure A-2), but we did not have the DUNSnumber values for both facilities 
and therefore automatically match the TRI records with the DUNSnumber that we have. For this 
scenario, we can usually see a time gap of several years with no TRI records under this TRIFID, 
which signals a gap between the relocation of the old facility and the start of operations of the new 
facility. In a some of observations (about 3.5% relocated facilities), a sudden large jump in toxic 
releases when the reported address changed also suggests a possible change of ownership and 
production plan. The other possibility is that no relocation took place. We found that the address 
information of a facility in the NETS data can be a contact address instead of the physical address 
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of a facility. However, since NETS identifies facility relocations based on the recorded addresses, 
there is a potential for NETS to mis-identify relocation. We address this situation in a conservative 
way and drop all the facilities with such inconsistency. An alternative way is to treat these facilities 
as non-relocated and assume these relocations did not happen. This assumption however is too 
strict and unrealistic. We investigated deeper into the background behind facilities’ relocation by 
searching the website of thousands of facilities in the TRI and going to Google map and visually 
examining the change of the site of facilities. We found that a change of contact address instead of 
the physical address was highly likely to be a result of a merge or acquisition of one facility by a 
firm operating other existing facility. In this case, it is not reasonable to treat the acquired facility 
as not relocated or as having shutdown, because some of its production was transferred to the 
acquiring firm’s facility and some other parts were kept in the original facility. It is also not 
reasonable to match the NETS data of the acquired or the acquiring facility with the TRI data of 
the two facilities that jointly reported after relocating. Therefore, eliminating these complicated 
cases from the sample is a costly but safe way to generate a clean dataset to analyze relocation. 
The above process is time-consuming and complicated. More details are available from the authors 
upon request.  
 Second, we find that some relocation records in NETS are not real and may actually be 
only a result of clerical errors. For example, some relocation has an origin address of “ABC street” 
and a destination address of “#XXX ABC Street”, with only a street number added. This looks like 
a correction of a clerical error. Although it may also be a real address change from somewhere on 
the ABC street to #XXX in the same street, but such within-street move is not likely to be across 
census tracts. We keep these facilities with such suspicious relocation records in the sample but 
treat them as non-relocated facilities. Note that for these observations, if TRIFID is available for 
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both addresses, it is the same; but if the facility reported only for one of those addresses, TRIFID 
will be missing for one of the addresses.   
 Some other records in the merged data with no change in the NETS address (i.e., non-
relocation records) also show slightly difference in the street address or name between the TRI and 
NETS information (typically with different street number). We eliminate the facilities with this 
type of potential clerical error on the address considering the existing large number of non-
relocated facilities in the sample.  
 
A4. Final Sample 
In the original TRI data from EPA, we have 51,620 TRIFIDs with one or more reports since the 
start of TRI data collection in 1987 to 2011. After the above matching process with the NETS data 
from 1990 to 2011, we have 36,207 TRIFIDs, i.e. a matching rate of 70.1%. Following this process, 
facilities that reported to TRI but shutdown before 1990 are dropped because of missing 
information in NETS which starts at 1990. Within the remaining TRIFIDs, we additionally drop 
the facilities located outside the US continent counties, born after 1990, with inconsistent 
information in NETS and TRI, and having missing values in the covariates. We also do not use 
the TRI records after the relocation of the facilities, as we are explaining the relocation tendency 
of the facilities using the pre-relocation characteristics. We end up with 21,413 TRIFIDs in the 







Table A1. Step-by-Step Sample Generating Process 
Steps of Data Cleaning # of TRIFIDs  
Step 0. Full set of TRI data from EPA (1990 – 2011) 51,620 
Step 1. Merge with NETS data   36,207 
Step 2. Drop facilities not located the Continental US (i.e., those located in 
islands) 
35,940 
Step 3. Drop facilities born after 1990 24,389 
Step 4. Drop records with inconsistency  23,737 
Step 5. Drop the records with missing values in covariates 22,943 
Step 6. Drop the TRI records after relocation (only for relocated facilities) 21,413 
 
 
         The final 21,413 TRIFIDs belong to 23,427 facilities as identified by different values of 
DUNS number. The number of facilities is greater than the number of matched TRIFIDs because 
of two reasons. First, TRIFIDs can be recycled so that some TRIFIDs are shared by several 
different DUNS number values as illustrated in Figure A-2. Second, some facilities only have TRI 
records before 1990 which is out of our sampling period, yielding no reported TRI data of these 
facilities in the sample. However, we include them in the sample because they might still be 
affected by the community pressure in 1990 after their emission information in the pre-1990 years 
was disclosed in mid-1989, especially if they still generated toxic pollution but were below the 
reporting threshold after 1990, or if the firms thought it was likely to exceed the reporting threshold 
in the future.  
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APPENDIX B: More Details on the Synthetic Control Estimation 
 
B1. Single Facility 
Suppose we have 𝐽 + 1 toxic-releasing facilities, and one of them relocated from its original 
location 𝑙0 to a new location 𝑙1 in some year 𝑇𝑟 after 1990. Without loss of generality, suppose 
also that the first facility (𝑗 = 1) is the mover (treated unit), and the other 𝐽 facilities staying in 
their original locations during the sampling period and serving as control units (also called donors 
in Abadie et al. (2003)). We assume the treatment starts at 𝑇0 = 𝑇𝑟 − 2 so that the anticipation 
effect of relocation on facilities’ performance (e.g. the preparation work such as cutting labor and 
reducing production scale in 1 or 2 years before relocation) will not affect the orthogonality 
between the treatment and the pre-treatment outcome. Suppose we can observe data on the 𝐽 + 1 
facilities from period 0 to period 𝑇, and the relocation year 𝑇𝑟 of the treated facility satisfies 3 <
𝑇𝑟 < 𝑇. 
    Let 𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝑁 =  (𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡, 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑗𝑡) be a vector of the interested outcome variables that can be 
observed for facility 𝑗 at time t in the absence of the treatment (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, t = 1, …, 𝑇), and let 
𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐼  be the observed outcome if 𝑗 is exposed to the treatment in periods 𝑇0 + 1 to 𝑇. Assuming 
relocation did not affect the relocated facility in the pre-treatment periods, we could induce that 
𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐼 = 𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝑁  for all j at 𝑡 ∈ {1, 2, … , 𝑇0} . Let 𝛼𝑗𝑡 = 𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐼 − 𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝑁 (𝑡 ∈ {𝑇0 + 1, … , 𝑇}  be the period-
specific effect of relocation on facility 𝑗 in year t, and let 𝐷𝑗𝑡 be the indicator for being treated, 
with 𝐷𝑗𝑡 = 1 iff 𝑗 = 1 and 𝑡 ∈ {𝑇0 + 1, … , 𝑇}. Then we have  
𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐼 = 𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛼𝑗𝑡𝐷𝑗𝑡     (𝐵1) 
, and we aim to estimate 𝛼1𝑡 in the post-treatment periods (𝑡 ∈ {𝑇0 + 1, … , 𝑇}). 𝑌1𝑡
𝐼  and 𝐷1𝑡 can be 
observed in the post-treatment periods, so we only need to estimate 𝑌1𝑡
𝑁 - the performance of the 
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mover after 𝑇0  if it had stayed in its original location 𝑙0 . Following Abadie, Diamond, and 
Hainmueller (2010), we estimate 𝑌1𝑡
𝑁 using a reduced-form model with  
𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝑁 = 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜽𝒕𝑷𝒋 + 𝝀𝒕𝝁𝒋 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡   (𝐵2) 
, where 𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝑁 is the non-relocated outcome, including the counterfactual 𝑌1𝑡
𝑁, of the facilities. 𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝑁 is 
modeled as a function of 𝛿𝑡, unknown time constant effects on 𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝑁 across facilities, 𝑷𝒋, a 𝐾 ∗ 1 
vector of predictors for the outcome variable (not affected by relocation), 𝜇𝑗 , unobserved 
determinants of Y with its effect 𝜆𝑡 allowing to vary over time
86, and 𝜖𝑗𝑡, facility-specific time-
variant unobserved factors assumed to have a zero mean. The predictors in 𝑷𝒋 contain variables 
that describe the productivity of facility 𝑗 as well as the community, economic and regulatory 
conditions of j’s local market.  
 We estimate 𝑌1𝑡>𝑇0
𝑁  using a weighted average of the observed post-treatment outcome 
𝑌𝑗𝑡>𝑇0
𝑁  of the donors.  
𝑌1𝑡
?̂? = ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
= 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
𝑃𝑗 + 𝜆𝑡 ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
𝜇𝑗 + ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
𝜖𝑗𝑡    (𝐵3)  
, where 𝑾 =  (𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝐽+1) is a vector of weights for the donors with 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 for all j = 2,…, J+1 
and 𝑤2 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝐽+1 = 1 . Each particular value of 𝑾  defines an alternative synthetic control. 




= 𝑌1𝑡, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇0, and            ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑃𝑗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
= 𝑃1     (𝐵4) 
                                                 
86 𝜆𝑡 is a function of t. This model generalizes the diff-in-diff / fixed effect model by allowing the effect of the 
unobserved factors to differ over time (Kreif et al, 2016). 
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, then as proved by Abadie et al. (2010), 𝑌1𝑡
?̂? will be an unbiased estimator of 𝑌1𝑡
𝑁, and 𝛼1𝑡 can be 
estimated by  
𝛼1?̂? = 𝑌1𝑡 − ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
, for  𝑡 ≥ 𝑇0 + 1    (𝐵5) 
        We select W by  
min
𝑊
(𝑮𝟏 − 𝑮𝟎𝑾)′𝑽(𝑮𝟏 − 𝑮𝟎𝑾)   (𝐵6) 
s.t. 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 and 𝑤1 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝐽 = 1 
, where 0 denotes the non-relocated facilities in the donor pool. Based on equation (B6), G contains 
the pre-treatment outcomes 𝒀𝒋𝒕≤𝑻𝟎  and the covariates in P. V is a diagonal positive semi-definite 
weighting matrix with the diagonal elements providing the importance weights of the variables in 
G in achieving the minimization. The STATA program developed by Abadie et al. (2010) uses the 
regression-based method as a default to measure V. The method regresses pre-treatment outcomes 
on the predictors in G and assign more weights to stronger predictors (see details in the manuscript 
in Kaul et al. (2017)). This method implicitly does an estimation on the parameters in equation 
(B3). Abadie et al. (2010) also suggest using the cross-validation method that searches all positive 
semi-definite V matrix and the corresponding W matrix to do the minimization. In our case, the 
two approaches yield similar estimation results. Results shown in figures are obtained using V 
from the regression-based method. For the factors in G, Cavallo et al. (2013) and Doudchenko and 
Imbens (2016) suggested no harm including all pre-treatment lags of Y.  In practice, they find that 
the lagged outcomes with strong predictive power have substantial importance than the covariates. 
However, Kaul et al., (2017, Manuscript) argued that this could be harmful when the covariates 
also have strong predictive power on Y. This is because including all outcome lags would result in 
a zero weight of the covariates in P in the minimization procedure. We did the synthetic control 
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estimation with two different choices of outcome lags commonly seen in the literature: the 
outcome lags from 1991 to the last pre-treatment year, and only the lags in 1990, 1992, 1995, 1998, 
2000 and the last pre-treatment year. Our estimation results are robust to the two different settings. 
We include the 1990 value of P in G to guarantee that the treatment (relocation during 2002 to 
2007) is orthogonal to the factors P. 
 After estimating the treatment effect of relocation on each facility mover, we calculate the 
average causal effect 𝑇𝐸𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ by taking the mean of the individual treatment effects 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡, where i = 1, 
2, …, I (I is the total number of relocated facilities). We calculate 𝑇𝐸𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ for every post-treatment 







= (𝑇𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ 1, 𝑇𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ 2, … 𝑇𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑝, … , 𝑇𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑇−𝑇0)   (𝐵7) 
To calculate the average placebo effect, we randomly order the donors from 1 to 50, take the means 
of the estimated placebo effects across the I = 321 relocated facilities by the above order, and 
obtain 50 groups of average placebo effects (APTE). We use this APTE as a proper comparison to 
the average treatment effect (ATE) on the relocated facilities. We calculate the 5th and 95th 
percentiles of the 50 average placebo effects and use them as the upper and lower bound of the 
confidence intervals as 
𝐶𝐼𝑝  =  (5𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒(𝐴𝑃𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑝), 95𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 (𝐴𝑃𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑝))     (𝐵8) 
, where j = 1, 2, …, 50, and CI exists for each period (p) before and after relocation. 
 
B2. Covariates in P 
We choose the covariates in P for the synthetic control estimation from factors that researchers 
have used to explain the relocation decision and emission levels of facilities. They include various 
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measures of a facility’s productivity and operation efficiency, the location-specific factors related 
to the market economic conditions, and the local regulatory and community pressure on the 
pollution of the facility (Arora and Cason, 1999; Fowlie, Holland, and Mansur, 2012; Harrington, 
Deltas, and Khanna, 2014; Wang et al., 2018).  
       We use the number of employees (Emp) and the business Paydex credit score that reflects the 
Financial Health of businesses as measures for a facility’s size and operation efficiency. We use 
the Total Waste Generated from production as a measurement for facilities’ scale of wastes to emit 
or be managed after production. We use the community socio-economic characteristics - 
Population Density, Income Level, Education Level, Non-Hispanic White, Voter turnout, 
Democrats – that is correlated with the scale of liabilities claimed by communities on the polluters 
as the proxies for the local community pressure on the toxic facilities (Hamilton, 1995; De Silva 
et al., 2016; Arora and Cason, 1999; Wolverton, 2009), and use the county Attainment status with 
respect to the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) as the proxy for formal 
environmental regulatory pressure. We also include the status of whether a facility is a Single 
standalone facility or a branch of a large firm as proxies for the community pressure that facilities 
may encounter. Branch facilities have been found to have a higher likelihood emitting toxic 
pollutants because of their reliance on large parent firms to deal with the pressure from 
communities and regulators (Grant et al., 2010). We use the county-level industrial-average Wage 
Rate, Employment Level, and the total number of Toxic Facilities, as proxies for the market 





APPENDIX C: Supplementary Tables and Figures 
Table C1. Analysis of the Effects of Community Pressure on the Annual Relocation Probability: 
 Robustness Test - Adding Proxy for Land Rent 
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Moved in year t 
Community Characteristics  
Population Density in log in 1990 0.170*** 
 (0.019) 
Per capita Income in 1990 (1000 $) 0.002 
 (0.003) 
% College in 1990 2.205*** 
 (0.310) 
% White Residents in 1990 -0.043 
 (0.102) 
County avg. Voter turnout in 1990 0.399 
 (0.361) 
Location Characteristics  
Median Housing Value in 1990  0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
Industry-specific Wage Rate in log 0.209** 
 (0.087) 
Employment Level in log 0.108*** 
 (0.022) 
CAA Attainment Status  0.078 
 (0.060) 
Num. of Facilities in census tract -0.025*** 
 (0.007) 
Facility Characteristics  
Number of Employees in log -0.241*** 
 (0.016) 
PayDex Score (Max - Min)  0.007** 
 (0.003) 
Max PayDex Score -0.009*** 
 (0.002) 
Zero-Emis. Indicator (1 = YES)  0.986*** 
 (0.077) 
Emission < 65th percentile 0.023 
 (0.036) 
Emission > 65th and < 75th percentile -0.017 
 (0.014) 
Emission > 75th and < 90th percentile 0.004 
 (0.003) 
Emission > 90th and < 95th percentile -0.005** 
 (0.002) 




Industry FE YES 
State FE YES 
Year FE YES 
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Table C2. Post Synthetic Control Analysis: Treatment Effect on Emission – OLS Regression  
(Alternative Definition on Dep. Var.) 
 
Dep. Var.: Estimated Treatment Effect on Emission 
(in 1000 pounds) 
     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Facility Chars. 2 yrs before Moving      
Emission -0.614*** -0.603*** -0.666*** -0.235 -0.513*** 
 (0.141) (0.142) (0.130) (0.235) (0.176) 
Size -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Growth -0.747 0.123 0.128 -1.012 -0.686 
 (0.696) (0.773) (0.748) (1.063) (0.943) 
Difference in Community Characteristics 
(Destination - Origin) 
     
Diff. in Population Density 0.167 0.161 0.431** -0.340* -0.037 
 (0.168) (0.157) (0.181) (0.202) (0.148) 
Diff. in Income Level -0.417*** -0.222 -0.476 0.650 -0.009 
 (0.162) (0.375) (0.380) (0.435) (0.367) 
Diff. in Educational Attainment -0.114 11.541** 11.653** 12.427*** 13.714*** 
 (1.852) (4.549) (4.541) (4.636) (4.735) 
Diff. in Non-Hispanic White 0.364 1.162 1.120 -0.183 0.278 
 (1.360) (1.490) (1.453) (1.356) (1.260) 
Diff. in Voter Turnout  0.863 -3.060 -0.497 4.351 -1.012 
 (7.128) (7.566) (7.134) (6.216) (6.988) 
Diff. in Democrats -3.026 0.832 0.225 1.184 1.539 
 (3.616) (3.431) (3.527) (3.276) (3.439) 
Interaction Terms      
Population Density * Emission in 𝑇𝑟 − 2   -0.117**   
   (0.046)   
Income Level * Emission in 𝑇𝑟 − 2    -0.625***  
    (0.222)  
Edu. Attainment * Emission in 𝑇𝑟 − 2     -2.103* 
     (1.113) 
Difference in Covariates      
Diff. in Attainment Status  1.710 1.854 1.764 1.982 1.705 
 (1.513) (1.537) (1.493) (1.375) (1.414) 
Diff. in Wage Rate  -3.449** -3.653** -1.852 -3.050** 
  (1.639) (1.671) (1.164) (1.474) 
Diff. in Urban  -1.593*** -1.560*** -1.264*** -1.464*** 
  (0.363) (0.359) (0.348) (0.353) 
Diff. in Housing  -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Diff. in Toxic Facilities  0.025 0.033 -0.024 -0.007 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.043) (0.045) 
Diff. in Highways  0.031 0.030 0.018 0.031 
  (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) 
Diff. in Railways  -0.068** -0.057** -0.062** -0.071*** 
  (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
      
Observations 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 
R-squared 0.286 0.305 0.312 0.343 0.315 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES 





Table C3. Post Synthetic Control Analysis: Treatment Effect on Emission – OLS Regression  
(Alternative Definition on Dep. Var.) 
 
 
Dep. Var.: Estimated Treatment Effect on Emission 
(in 1000 pounds) 
     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Facility Chars. 2 yrs before Moving      
Size -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.086*** -0.062** -0.069*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) 
Growth 13.369*** 13.081*** 12.513** 12.761*** 12.602** 
 (4.476) (4.893) (5.030) (4.942) (5.024) 
Difference in Community Characteristics 
(Destination - Origin) 
     
Diff. in Population Density -0.174 -0.099 1.308 -1.065 -0.236 
 (1.085) (1.222) (1.654) (1.721) (1.274) 
Diff. in Income Level -2.540 -3.890* -4.516* -2.429 -4.071* 
 (1.945) (2.340) (2.706) (1.794) (2.439) 
Diff. in Educational Attainment -64.413*** -81.726** -82.727** -60.848** -50.927** 
 (24.136) (38.968) (39.600) (26.012) (22.123) 
Diff. in Non-Hispanic White 54.007*** 51.372*** 51.735*** 53.937*** 52.686*** 
 (13.310) (13.083) (13.220) (14.427) (13.646) 
Diff. in Voter Turnout  -31.055 0.389 0.584 6.462 7.921 
 (43.777) (48.359) (48.443) (50.422) (51.138) 
Diff. in Democrats 90.391*** 107.939*** 110.232*** 111.089*** 108.098*** 
 (32.722) (31.281) (31.571) (31.508) (31.481) 
Interaction Terms      
Population Density * Size in 𝑇𝑟 − 2   -0.012   
   (0.014)   
Income Level * Size in 𝑇𝑟 − 2    -0.080  
    (0.090)  
Edu. Attainment * Size in 𝑇𝑟 − 2     -0.241 
     (0.249) 
Difference in Covariates      
Diff. in Attainment Status  17.850*** 16.797*** 17.977*** 16.549*** 17.094*** 
 (5.423) (5.304) (5.375) (5.410) (5.463) 
Diff. in Wage Rate  -20.924* -21.597** -20.261* -21.337** 
  (10.898) (10.815) (10.924) (10.874) 
Diff. in Urban  0.339 -1.002 0.517 -0.593 
  (2.186) (2.866) (2.175) (2.493) 
Diff. in Housing  0.037 0.038 0.034 0.033 
  (0.028) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025) 
Diff. in Toxic Facilities  0.042 0.012 -0.019 0.001 
  (0.554) (0.540) (0.534) (0.544) 
Diff. in Highways  0.120 0.121 0.070 0.094 
  (0.130) (0.130) (0.143) (0.134) 
Diff. in Railways  -0.265 -0.260 -0.254 -0.231 
  (0.191) (0.188) (0.186) (0.175) 
      
Observations 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 
R-squared 0.191 0.194 0.195 0.196 0.196 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table C4. OLS Regression on Change in Waste Generation and End-of-Pipe Waste Management of Facility Stayers 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dep. Var.  ∆ Log (Production-related Waste / Million $ Sales)    ∆ Waste Managed / pound Waste Generated (%) 
           
Waste Generated per Million $ Sales in log, Mean 95 to 99  -0.429*** -0.437*** -0.453*** -0.461***  - - - - 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)      
% Waste Managed, Mean 95 to 99  - - - -  -0.519*** -0.523*** -0.567*** -0.567*** 
       (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Total Waste Generated in log, Mean 95 to 99  - - - -  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
       (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Community Characteristics in 1990            
Population Density (in log)  -0.144*** -0.092** -0.096** -0.013  0.004** 0.004* 0.003 0.004 
  (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.056)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Per capita Income (in log)  0.115 0.052 0.073 0.032  -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
  (0.090) (0.095) (0.095) (0.100)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Share of College Degree  -2.161*** -2.265*** -2.141*** -1.821**  0.112** 0.101** 0.087* 0.094* 
  (0.767) (0.793) (0.796) (0.822)  (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) 
Share of White  0.245 0.586** 0.619** 0.629**  0.034** 0.033** 0.037** 0.036** 
  (0.270) (0.298) (0.297) (0.295)  (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Voter Turnout    -1.207 -0.630 -0.766 -1.904  0.050 0.040 0.017 -0.001 
  (1.233) (1.607) (1.615) (1.637)  (0.073) (0.093) (0.092) (0.094) 
% Democrat  0.081 1.372 0.680 0.363  -0.031 0.015 0.067 0.080 
  (1.523) (1.754) (1.767) (1.837)  (0.089) (0.098) (0.097) (0.103) 
Other Location Characteristics in 1990           
Attainment Status to NAAQS  0.031 0.034 -0.033 0.040  0.001 -0.016** -0.012 -0.011 
  (0.121) (0.147) (0.148) (0.157)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Industry-specific Wage Rate in log     1.822***     0.019 
     (0.295)     (0.016) 
County-avg. Employment Level in log     -0.165***     -0.003 
     (0.059)     (0.003) 
Number of TRI-reporting Facilities in census tract     -0.019     0.001 
     (0.017)     (0.001) 
Miles of Highways     0.001     0.000 
     (0.004)     (0.000) 
Miles of Railways     0.013**     -0.0002 
     (0.005)     (0.0004) 
           
State FE  NO YES YES YES  NO YES YES YES 
Industry FE  NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES 
Observations  3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374  3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 
R-squared  0.187 0.211 0.234 0.243  0.334 0.347 0.387 0.388 




Table C5. Conditional Logit Model of Location Choice of Facilities - Add Ethnic Diversity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Tract j Selected Tract j Selected Tract i Selected Tract i Selected 
Census Tract Demographics     
Population Density  -0.248*** -0.194*** -0.251*** -0.196*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Per capita Income 0.057** 0.012 0.064** 0.017 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) 
Per capita Income Sq. -0.006* -0.006 -0.007** -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% College Degree or Higher -2.272*** -2.036*** -2.325*** -2.079*** 
 (0.190) (0.192) (0.187) (0.189) 
% African-American -0.314*** -0.392*** -0.442*** -0.492*** 
 (0.073) (0.075) (0.074) (0.075) 
% Hispanic 0.356*** 0.214* 0.040 -0.048 
 (0.118) (0.123) (0.120) (0.126) 
% African-American * % Hispanic  1.300** 1.056*   
 (0.548) (0.574)   
Ethnic Diversity Index   0.729*** 0.588*** 
   (0.092) (0.094) 
Census Tract Economic Chars.     
% Pop. 25 to 65 years old  0.228 -0.021 0.085 -0.131 
 (0.202) (0.200) (0.197) (0.196) 
Median Housing Value -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Highway Miles 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Railway Miles 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Urban Population 0.343*** 0.071 0.283*** 0.023 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
% Suburban Population 1.139*** 0.939*** 1.092*** 0.901*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
% Open Space 0.077 0.079 0.090 0.088 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) 
% Waterbody 0.550*** 0.473*** 0.564*** 0.487*** 
 (0.123) (0.126) (0.123) (0.126) 
Dummy for Existing Facility (1 = YES) 1.380*** 1.068*** 1.372*** 1.063*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) 
# of Existing TRI Facilities  0.147***  0.146*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
     
Number of Facilities 12087 12087 12084 12084 
















Table C6. Conditional Logit Model of Location Choice of Facilities – Choice Set at a Larger Scale 
(Include K = 100 or K = 150 Choice Alternatives) 
 
 Choice Set with K = 100 Choice Set with K = 150 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Census Tract Demographics         
Population density (1000 Persons / Sq. Mi)  -0.309*** -0.327*** -0.188*** -0.186*** -0.299*** -0.318*** -0.182*** -0.180*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Per capita Income (10,000$) 0.123*** 0.133*** 0.003 0.005 0.126*** 0.133*** 0.002 0.005 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 
Per capita Income Sq. -0.009** -0.010*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.008** -0.009** -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
% College Degree or Higher -2.222*** -3.458*** -2.030*** -2.003*** -2.140*** -3.408*** -1.962*** -1.942*** 
 (0.194) (0.195) (0.189) (0.192) (0.193) (0.195) (0.186) (0.189) 
% African-American 0.283*** 0.005 -0.182*** -0.092 0.330*** 0.050 -0.138** -0.048 
 (0.062) (0.063) (0.064) (0.067) (0.061) (0.062) (0.063) (0.066) 
% Hispanic 1.392*** 1.016*** 0.293*** 0.311*** 1.425*** 1.050*** 0.287*** 0.306*** 
 (0.097) (0.100) (0.107) (0.108) (0.093) (0.096) (0.104) (0.105) 
Census Tract Economic Chars.         
% Pop. 25 to 65 years old -0.856*** 0.606*** 0.096 0.146 -0.843*** 0.633*** 0.116 0.164 
 (0.183) (0.187) (0.195) (0.199) (0.183) (0.186) (0.193) (0.198) 
Median Housing Value -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Highway Miles 0.004*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Railway Miles 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Urban Population2  1.108*** 0.299*** 0.303***  1.173*** 0.353*** 0.360*** 
  (0.051) (0.049) (0.050)  (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) 
% Suburban Population3  1.730*** 0.903*** 0.876***  1.721*** 0.889*** 0.862*** 
  (0.048) (0.049) (0.050)  (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) 
% Open Space4   0.038 0.039   0.038 0.039 
   (0.069) (0.070)   (0.067) (0.068) 
% Waterbody   0.420*** 0.411***   0.400*** 0.391*** 
   (0.121) (0.123)   (0.119) (0.121) 
Dummy for Existing Facility (1 = Y)   1.117*** 1.100***   1.138*** 1.122*** 
   (0.026) (0.026)   (0.025) (0.025) 
Number of Existing Facilities   0.137*** 0.138***   0.135*** 0.136*** 
   (0.004) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.004) 
State / County Location Chars.         
State-avg. Corporate Tax per employee    0.143    0.201 
    (0.149)    (0.143) 
County-avg. % Voting for Democrats     -2.515***    -2.485*** 
    (0.437)    (0.423) 
County Attainment Status    -0.204***    -0.196*** 
    (0.056)    (0.055) 
         
Number of Facilities 12087 12087 12087 11956 12087 12087 12087 11954 





Table C7. Cross-Sectional Model of Post-Siting Performance of Facilities – Emission Levels (no log transformation) 
 
VARIABLES Emission Level of Facilities at Year 5 after Siting Emission Level of Facilities at Year 10 after Siting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Facility Characteristics           
Emission Level at Year 1 1.14*** 1.15*** 1.13*** 1.19*** 1.19*** 1.41*** 1.39*** 1.36*** 1.60*** 1.60*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) 
Employment Scale at Year 5 or 10 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
Owned by Subsidiary Firms (1 = Y) 174.66*** 170.89*** 170.06*** 157.10*** 151.18*** 200.62*** 188.40*** 192.64*** 260.25*** 265.80*** 
 (41.70) (41.84) (41.91) (55.89) (56.37) (56.58) (56.87) (56.99) (76.59) (77.07) 
Location Characteristics at the siting year           
Population Density (1000 people / sq. mile) -25.29*** -20.53*** -19.89*** -15.56* -9.86 -24.67*** -19.33** -20.43** -20.57* -17.74 
 (7.11) (7.53) (7.46) (9.05) (9.14) (9.08) (9.56) (9.56) (12.08) (12.31) 
Per capita Income (10000$) 70.46** 70.10** 60.52* 65.61 50.73 67.40 87.55* 71.52 82.97 79.54 
 (33.25) (33.77) (33.13) (40.12) (41.21) (44.08) (47.20) (46.10) (56.02) (57.47) 
Per capita Income Sq. -3.73 -3.71 -3.53 -3.24 -2.81 -4.06 -5.76 -5.31 -4.85 -4.82 
 (3.96) (3.89) (3.70) (4.12) (4.23) (5.18) (5.74) (5.47) (5.74) (5.87) 
% College Degree -1,846.3*** -1,584.1*** -1,523.4*** -1,409.5*** -1,342.2*** -1,881.9*** -1,622.5*** -1,554.8*** -1,574.3*** -1,517.1*** 
 (214.5) (222.8) (223.2) (328.6) (333.2) (289.4) (302.6) (303.1) (459.6) (465.5) 
% African-American -51.16 -82.08 -115.88 -162.13 -179.87 -231.03** -334.99*** -379.16*** -568.13*** -546.62*** 
 (74.47) (83.14) (83.38) (108.58) (114.44) (105.98) (119.25) (119.73) (160.85) (168.78) 
% Hispanic -355.88*** -245.33* -222.94* -210.65 -252.69 -290.73** -20.71 -3.40 57.11 50.40 
 (95.98) (131.03) (131.33) (164.26) (166.95) (125.68) (174.21) (174.90) (224.25) (227.39) 
Median Housing Value    -0.44 -0.44    -0.55 -0.52 
    (0.35) (0.35)    (0.48) (0.49) 
Highway Miles    0.39 0.50    -3.12 -3.21 
    (1.32) (1.34)    (1.97) (1.99) 
Railway Miles    1.96 1.43    4.60* 4.67* 
    (1.86) (1.89)    (2.66) (2.70) 
Number of Existing Facilities     12.91**     4.70 
     (5.31)     (7.71) 
Industry-specific Avg. Wage Rate    268.53*** 269.58***    326.65*** 345.72*** 
    (77.68) (78.82)    (113.02) (114.78) 
Industry-specific Avg. Employment    -20.53 -22.33    -21.95 -21.64 
    (15.88) (16.63)    (22.81) (23.98) 
% Democrats     107.90     -449.20 
     (564.86)     (853.67) 
Attainment Status     -77.05     -34.50 
     (53.80)     (76.80) 
           
Observations 10,439 10,439 10,439 7,957 7,885 7,277 7,277 7,277 5,457 5,406 
State FE NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO YES YES YES NO NO YES YES YES 
1. White sandwich robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2. The number of facilities reduced in Column (4) because of missing values in the industry-average wage rate variable. Income loses its significance in Column (5) not because of this decrease in number of 
observations. We did the regression in Column (3) but only on the facilities without missing values in the wage variable and still found a significant positive effect of income.  






Figure C1. Movers with a Significant Difference in Emission Levels with Counterfactuals in Each Period (%) 
 
 
Figure C2. Movers with a Significant Difference in Employment Scales with Counterfactuals in Each Period (%) 
 
Note:  
1. For each mover, we calculate the 5th and the 95th percentile of the placebo effects of its 50 donors. A treatment effect (TE) is treated as positive 
and “significant” if it is greater than the 95th percentile of the placebo effects and is treated as negative and “significant” if it is smaller than the 5 th 
percentile of the placebo effects.  
2. Note that in period 5 and later, we have a smaller number of facilities with the estimated TE. This is because we examine the facilities relocated 
during 2002 to 2007, but our data ends at year 2011, so facilities relocated later than 2002 would have a smaller number of post-relocation periods 
than those relocated in 2002, which would have 9 post-relocation periods. Data in the tail of this figure should be interpreted with caution because 
of this composition effect. 
 
